The research presented in this dissertation was conducted as a pilot study to find the utility of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator as a predictor of success or failure in the use of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy in clinical psychology. Each of the 16 Myers-Briggs Type Indicator categories was investigated to see whether subjects improved, remained the same, or showed deleterious effects from Cognitive Behavioral Therapy concept exposure. For each of the 16 types, a mean-matched pairs hypothesis test was applied to each of three categories (all, female, and male) to determine if there were significant differences between the pre-exposure and post-exposure to CBT related readings utilizing psychological well-being questionnaires. The results indicate that of the 16 MBTI categories, two categories (ISTJ and INTJ) showed statistically significant positive transformation (p < .01) from the CBT concept exposure in each of the subject categories (all, female, and male), and all other groups showed no improvement and no adverse effects. Additionally, an investigation into all 8 dichotomous MBTI dimensions based on strength of personality type (i.e. I >75% or I <25%, N >75% or N <25% etc.) indicated that I > 75%, T > 75%, and J > 75% demonstrated statistically significant improvement (p < .01) after CBT concept exposure, and that all other categories demonstrated no change at a 5% significance level. Future research may attempt to extrapolate the results of this pilot study by broadening the pool of subjects and investigating the numerous permutations of possibilities relating to alternative personality assessments and psychotherapeutic modalities in relation to psychological health.

Chapter 1: Introduction

Background of the Problem

Psychotherapy represents one of the most common modalities in the contemporary world for treating individuals with mental and emotional issues in an attempt to minimize unhealthy cognitions and behaviors, and to facilitate positive and productive living and well-being. Obviously, the range of problems encountered requires a broad spectrum of psychotherapeutic treatment modalities to serve the individual needs of clients. Although professional psychotherapists are generally aware of numerous theoretical orientations, most are forced either by the rigorous demands of specialization in training and/or personal predilections to focus on a narrow part of the spectrum of psychotherapeutic approaches. In fact, even if a psychotherapist were able to become profoundly proficient in a wide variety of treatment options, assisting a particular client may still prove challenging due to generalized psychological complexity.

As there is a plethora of psychotherapeutic methods currently employed to attempt to alleviate emotional and mental suffering in millions of clients, and given the fact that the success rate for each modality is highly variable, it is of paramount importance to be able to match an applicable approach to the individual needs of the client. Of the multitude of current systems—including psychoanalytic ( Haskayne, Hirschfeld, & Larkin, 2014; Poulsen et al., 2014), psychodynamic (Drisko & Simmons, 2012; Haskayne et al., 2014; Robinson & Gordon, 2011), humanistic (Forgeard, Jayawickreme, Kern, & Seligman, 2011; Neff, 2003; Nistor, 2011; Taylor & Brown, 1988), transpersonal (McCullough, Emmons, & Tsang, 2002; Morf & Horvath, 2010), emotional freedom (Fredrickson, 2004; Schwartz et al., 2002), interpersonal therapy (Hilbert et al., 2012; Kashdan et al., 2013; Kiko et al., 2012; Moscovitch & Hofmann, 2007; Sockol, Epperson, & Barber, 2011), group therapy (Hans & Hiller, 2013a; Khoo, Dent, & Oei, 2011; Koerner, Antony, Young, & McCabe, 2013; Mitchell, Newall, Broeren, & Hudson, 2013; Okajima et al., 2013), psychodynamic therapy (Enck, Junne, Klosterhalfen, Zipfel, & Martens, 2010; Querstret & Cropley, 2013), family therapy (Deblinger, Mannarino, Cohen, Runyon, & Steer, 2011; Kashdan et al., 2013; Taylor, Abramowitz, & McKay, 2012; Van der Put et al., 2013; White et al., 2010), and existential (Calhoun, Cann, Tedeschi, & McMillan, 2000; David, Matu, Pintea, Cotet, & Nagy, 2014; Steger, Frazier, Oishi, & Kaler, 2006) to name a few—Rational Emotive Behavioral Therapy (REBT) and Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy (CBT) stand out as some of the most frequently utilized and successful (Beck, & Dozois, 2011; David, Matu, Pintea, Cotet, & Nagy, 2014; DiGiuseppe, DiGiuseppe, Doyle, Dryden, & Backx, 2013; Ellis, 2013; Hans & Hiller, 2013b; Hofmann, Asnaani, Vonk, Sawyer, & Fang, 2012; Kleinstäuber, Witthöft, & Hiller, 2012; Neff, 2003; Olatunji et al., 2013; Poulsen et al., 2014; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997; Rathod, Phiri, & Kingdon, 2010; Szasz, Szentagotai, & Hofmann, 2011; Tovote et al., 2013; Wood, Fujii, Renno, Dyke, & Van Dyke, 2014). Therefore, the ability to predict the applicability and viability of this method is of vital importance in clinical psychology. To this end, this dissertation pursues a prediction method based upon the Myers-Briggs type indicator.

Research Objectives

The research presented in this dissertation is to be conducted as a pilot study to find the utility of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) as a predictor of success in REBT/CBT. As a necessary concomitant, an in depth consideration is given to the philosophic underpinnings of REBT/CBT (General Semantics) and of the MBTI (Jungian psychological types). More particularly, this study quantitatively tests the hypothesis that there exists a relationship between Jungian psychological types, as measured by the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) of personality variables, and constructive changes, after exposure to straightforward practical CBT concepts (See Appendix D), in psychological growth measured by Subjective Happiness Scale, Personal Growth Initiative Scale, Meaning in Life Questionnaire, Satisfaction with Life Scale, and Gratitude Questionnaire (See Appendix A).

Proposed Value of the Study

The purpose of this study is to test the hypothesis that there exists a relationship between Jungian psychological types and successful use of CBT concept exposure. More particularly, this research postulates that the MBTI personality assessment may be used to provide a practical, accurate guide to decide on the utility and applicability of CBT/REBT in psychotherapeutic settings. Consequently, the main focus of this investigation will be data analysis and interpretation. If strong correlations exist, clients can be guided into treatment programs more appropriate to their psychological profile type. It is obvious that any guidance as to whether clients react differently according to psychological type to treatment modality is useful. Obviously, if strong positive or negative correlations are found, this study would be of significant value to clinicians.

In order to fully grasp the historical forces behind the development of REBT/CBT and the MBTI it is necessary to give some consideration to their philosophic underpinnings: Korzybski’s General Semantics (Ellis, 2007; Korzybski, 1921, 1994; Levinson, 2010) and Jungian psychological types (Jung, 1971) respectively. After a somewhat lengthy historical exposure to General Semantics and Jungian psychological types, an overview of two highly refined particularizations of these areas is given: REBT/CBT and MBTI respectively. Chapter 2 is an in-depth consideration of previous research concerning the main areas related to the current dissertation: Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) and Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT), automatic processing, attentional bias, the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, happiness and well-being.

Historical Background

Introduction to General Semantics

In 1921, Korzybski, an expert in mathematics and engineering, attempted to apply the rigorous methods of science to the sphere of human psychology. In his work entitled Manhood of Humanity: The Science and art of Human Engineering (1921), he attempted to show that through mathematical philosophy and a rigorous application of the scientific method, an explicit definition of the nature of human beings, the construction of scientific ethics, and a clear understanding of the fundamental laws of human nature would be made manifest as unambiguously as the laws of physics. In fact, it could be argued that Korzybski’s fundamental thesis in this work was to explicate the possibility of the achievement of the summum bonum. He clearly argues that this potentiality is based on the fundamental capacity of humans to generalize intellectual and spiritual experience and to benefit from the culturally accumulated inherited wisdom of previous generations.

In 1933, Korzybski produced another work titled Science and Sanity that hints at educational transformation through scientifically applied linguistic epistemological principles. However, he cautioned that all of his observations were only transiently true due to the ‘time-binding’ nature of language itself: the semantic limitations imposed by the inevitable fact that language manifests in, and is constrained to, a particular moment in time (Korzybski, 1994). This characteristic linguistic caution is founded on Korzybski’s apprehension regarding the position of humanity moving forward, and reflects his concerns about the need for methods of thinking that bring about a necessary revolution in consciousness. Therefore, Korzybski’s proposed epistemological transformation subsumes such seemingly disparate realms as quantum physics, economics, sociology, organizational development, anthropology, education, politics, psychology, communication, and philosophy. Korzybski focused on advancing cognitive transformation through a basic reconsideration of logic and language, fundamental to such a broad-based transformation. This requires epistemological introspection in which all elements related to knowing, doubting, problem solving, thinking, and communication are reevaluated scientifically and objectively through introspection, observation, and the development of new theories. It also necessitates an ongoing effort to organize and systematize the vast amount of ever-increasing scientific knowledge pouring in from diverse fields to create new technologies adapted to the ever-increasingly complex environment of modern life.

It appears that humans begin to absorb language early on, possibly while still in the womb, and are constructed as voracious language machines (Adams, 1974; Fintel & Iatridou, 2003; Textor, 2009). Attitudes and values appear to be programmed at deep levels of unconsciousness, and the influence becomes so profound that it is virtually impossible to see the world as it is, but rather as it is seen through multitudinous levels of linguistic abstraction. Phenomenologically, symbolization manifests as thinking, self-talk, talking to others, writing, mathematics, problem-solving, decision-making, and a plethora of other linguistic activities. Yet these activities impose a linguistic prison, and different languages contain different epistemological traps. For example, the E-prime derivative of General Semantics (Bittencourt, 2007; DiGiuseppe, DiGiuseppe, Doyle, Dryden, & Backx, 2013; Duží, Jespersen, & Materna, 2010)asserts that clarity of thought may be somewhat realized through minimization or even complete avoidance of the misuse of the verb ‘to be.’ Korzybski analyzed fundamental language structures and concluded that identification was tantamount to semantic disturbance. However, in analyzing elementary language structures, levels of abstraction must be accounted for. This necessitates semantic evolution; otherwise, structurally unsatisfactory conclusions arise. Korzybski demonstrated that the use of the word ‘is’ leads to inaccurate overgeneralizations, such as ‘I am bad’ or ‘I am good,’ whereas in reality, so-called ‘good’ and ‘bad’ actions are engaged in intermittently by all individuals. Hence, the desirability of a linguistic methodology of transformation, such as REBT and CBT, is clear. Erroneous identifications can be restated with phrases such as ‘I see myself as good’ or ‘I see myself as bad’. This more accurately states that it is an interpretation of goodness or badness. Rather than stating something such as ‘the play was excellent,’ the E-prime version may be something such as ‘I greatly enjoyed the play.’ In this way, a more clear and realistic expression of phenomenological experience is communicated rather than an absolutist judgment.

As another example, the Spanish language improves on the philosophic implications of the verb ‘to be’ by utilizing two different forms: ‘ser’ (to indicate a permanent state of being) and ‘estar’ (to indicate a transient state of being). In English, the tendency to express hunger by the phrase ‘I am hungry’ seems radically different than the equivalent in Spanish, ‘tengo hambre,’ or ‘I have hunger.’ Certainly having something seems a lot less drastic than being or becoming something. However, it is quite difficult to transform a statement as simple as ‘the car is blue’ into a possibly more accurate assessment such as ‘the car appears to be blue to me,’ and yet the latter statement much more accurately reflects the subjective process of perception and cognitive processing. To carry out this process in its extreme version would require intense effort, nevertheless the payoff in terms of personal transformation and joy may be worth it. CBT, and particularly REBT, directly reflect the E-prime derivative of General Semantics.

It is possible that language needs to evolve in order to incorporate what at first may seem trivial, but in the long run may communicate a more rich and complex description of the gestalt of human experience. Korzybski referred to this process as ‘psycho-logics,’ in which a complete description of human reactions is more accurately described (Duží et al., 2010; Hauck, 2011). Korzybski often said, ‘a map is not the territory,’ but it certainly attempts to represent the entire territory of human experience. Humans do not simply passively process the external world, but rather actively influence experiences through semantic filters. Therefore, transformation may necessitate training in which semantic difficulties are solved by aspiring to levels transcending language itself (Kaplan & Hamati-Ataya, 2013; Korzybski, 1994). The process of perception appears to be a macro-level statistical experience in which fine details are usually overlooked. Humans seemingly perforce perceive a universe consisting of distinctly differentiated objects in space and time in a constant state of flux. This dynamic process involves a complex gestalt of feedback mechanisms and consciousness; therefore, it is vitally important that all domains of human interaction involving business, family, and personal relationships be brought to full awareness in terms of the inevitable exchanges of semantic reactions. Otherwise, individuals may be at great risk; Korzybski (1921) warns that to gain a proper comprehension of the true definition of being human requires intense scrutiny without which fundamental misperceptions necessarily produce chaos at the individual and collective level. For Korzybski, even most philosophic and psychological perspectives inevitably lead to erroneous conclusions when the scientific method is not strictly and empirically adhered to.

Obviously, General Semantics is concerned with much more than semantic linguistic manipulation and the acquisition of verbal skills to facilitate communication. It addresses itself to the entire range of human experience and existential meaning (Narasimhan, Bhaskar, & Prakhya, 2010). Korzybski (1994) clearly affirms that General Semantics is a complex direct derivative of philology, and that his work necessarily develops a generalized theory of values through an empirical, holistic, non-reductionistic consideration of the gestalt of human experience. Therefore, for the individual, General Semantics addresses itself to the complete gestalt of physical, mental, emotional, and psychospiritual through a scientific approach that is post-metaphysical. The methods derived from General Semantics and implemented by REBT and CBT can be consistently employed and are congruent with a wide variety of psychological and spiritual paths. This is indicative not only of an objective scientific analysis—although General Semantics subsumes mathematics and science—but also the subjective, phenomenological experience of the individual. In other words, General Semantics represents an ongoing effort to continuously organize knowledge to realize systems and methodologies to effect self-actualization and mutual understanding. It aims to facilitate increased awareness of the entire spectrum of phenomenological experience in order to facilitate personal growth and more optimal communication with all individuals. This requires that an amalgamation of the multitudinous branches of science be integrated into a psychospiritual theory which, among other things, includes a deeper understanding of individual reactions to words, labels, and symbols. Such a psychospiritual approach needs to be integrative, to produce creative integration and collaboration. This approach transcends mere linguistic manipulation; better communication must include the art of listening. In fact, to experience deeper levels of understanding, it may be necessary to transcend thought completely. In any case, thinking represents merely one aspect of human activity; the entire semantic reaction includes both nonverbal and verbal levels of experience in the here-and-now reality of ‘time bound’ beings.

Empiricist philosophy based science and mathematics are insufficient to address the intensity of meaning in the psychospiritual semantic reaction to the world of objects and events that includes complex conscious and subconscious processes (Hartwig, 2011; Korzybski, 1921, 1994; Narasimhan, Bhaskar, & Prakhya, 2010). Meaning, creativity, and a productive orientation seem to be profoundly influenced by affective states. Meaning itself may be meta-analyzed recursively, e.g. ‘What is the meaning of meaning?’ It is certainly possible that no linguistic structure is sufficient to address such a question. In fact, for a more complete understanding, it is possibly necessary to analyze the entire neurological process of perceiving, thinking, and learning—evaluating through neurological theory and a consideration of the dynamic biochemical features and patterns involved in self-development and the realization of a productive existence. Korzybski points out an important extension of this fact by noting that though new abstractions may replace older ones, they tend to become static. It is essential to realize that seemingly static features of the macro object oriented environment derived from ordinary perception are in reality an infinitely dynamic process involving quantum features which are necessarily beyond the scope of neural apprehension, and yet are accessible through higher order abstraction (Korzybski, 1994; Krämer, 2013). Therefore, although high order abstractions facilitate such cognitive activities as recollection, they also act as dangerous semantic reaction pitfalls. Yet without abstract critical analysis memory itself would seem to be impossible; everyday neural experience is stored via higher order abstractions and revivified through memory (Korzybski, 1994).

In the West, this extension in the rational domain is culturally taken to be superior to approaches based on feeling and subjectivity. Cultural programming dictates a ‘rational animal’ self-concept, and this is promoted as a unique distinguishing characteristic. The supremacy of rationality currently finds its culmination in the cold, passionless realm of science (Allison, 2011; Bhaskar, 2000; Hartwig, 2011; Marquis & Wilber, 2008; Wilber, 2003, 2004). Korzybski, too, severely condemns neurologically induced emotionality, while simultaneously leaving the door open to transformation (Korzybski, 1994). The external universe is ever-changing, hence everyday experience—even scientific knowledge derived from outside sources—profoundly influences emotion, evaluation, and semantic responses. This takes place through neural associative mechanisms, and yet through psycho neural training, critical judgment and psychic balance may be cultivated.

This certainly presents a ‘chicken and egg’ dilemma: Is it the case that high order abstractions and logical capabilities are derived from a primal cauldron of unconscious feelings and drives, or can higher order abstractions influence and integrate fundamental neurological processes? It certainly seems that semantic reactions are subjectively influenced by feelings related to interactions with the environment, i.e. feelings seem to precede abstractions and are highly impactful with respect to behavior in both constructive and destructive senses. Thus, it would seem that Korzybski views that feelings and neurology supersede rationality; this speaks to the existentialist view that basic humanness and meaning are predicated upon supra-rational factors such as feeling and intuition. If so, then, to progress psychologically and spiritually requires an acute awareness of the innate propensity for abstraction, and this requires a multidimensional approach to understanding the gestalt of organismic functioning. Obviously, the innate tendency is to narrowly focus on the perceptual elements in our environment through the focus of attention, or lack thereof. This perceptual abstraction severely limits the possibility of actually realizing ‘what is going on’ in the universe at large. This is a critical point of inflection: the realization that an awareness of the process of abstraction and its inherent concomitant—the abstraction—cannot represent objective reality necessarily implies that all individuals are possessed by a subjective abstract state of consciousness. Each individual seems constrained to a subjective solipsistic weltanschauung.

According to Korzybski, only scientific structural analysis can begin to arbitrate non-semantic levels of consciousness (Bachmann, 2012; Horgan, 1994; Jacob, 1995; Korzybski, 1994). Merely the fact that perception is constrained to only a fraction of the information available in the electromagnetic spectrum alone drastically influences the process of attention. Even though we accept the reality that is presented to us, we are really only seeing a little window of what is happening. Additionally, even minimally perceptible objects are in a state of constant flux, and therefore it is only possible to abstract a miniscule subset of the virtual infinity of experiences presented to us from moment to moment. Even perceptual machinery, i.e. the senses and brain, are also in a continuous state of flux. Hence, from a neurological perspective it is quite advisable to mistrust sense data and beliefs founded upon it (Horgan, 1994; Jacob, 1995). This is emphasized in General Semantics by the concept of the extensional device known as ‘ETC’ (Varasdi, 2010). The universe, which is beyond perceptual and cognitive grasp and obviously impactful on thought patterns, feelings and behaviors, is acknowledged by the open-ended admission that there must always be more of the unknown in any given circumstance. Ambiguity and uncertainty exist at the immediate perceptual level and therefore must necessarily be propagated to cognitions via abstraction.

Since most real-life experiences are multidimensional, any system that perpetuates rigidity necessarily increases the probability of erroneous perception. Not only are perceptual field elements selectively and subjectively picked, but also at every level of abstraction afterwards more elements are eliminated by means of generalization. The reduction is due to many factors including the limitations of language, vocabulary, and personal values. Hence, since all experience is filtered through subjective semantic abstractions, it seems impossible to ever achieve anything remotely resembling absolute objectivity. However, Korzybski postulates that linguistic formulations, though necessarily ambiguous with respect to reality, are nevertheless reflexive in that worldviews may be linguistically analyzed and adaptive skills formulated (Ferreira, Slevc, & Rogers, 2005; Korzybski, 1994).

With ‘territory’ representing what is actually going on in reality in the external world and ‘map’ representing abstraction from experience, it is obvious that perception generally reveals only a minute fraction of reality, and thus the subjective world is essentially an abstract construct. Reality is constructed through abstract semantic reactions that inevitably produce drastically different characteristics than the original experience. This opens the door through generalization to contradictions and distorted, even delusional perceptions. Therefore, ongoing reminders of the complexity of perception via a highly variable neurological system in which future perceptions are drastically influenced by preconceptions are necessary.

Among the major perceptual problems may be the fact that most individuals believe that Aristotelian syllogistic logic accurately assesses reality, when in fact it is symptomatic of engagement in a complex of abstracting through a hierarchy of generalizations that are ever more increasingly removed from the objective universe at large. It seems, then, that humans are inevitably possessed by semantic transformations influenced by feeling, sensing, values, personal preferences, habits of language, evaluative statements, moral judgments, classifications, self-reflexive epistemological observations, relational mathematical abstracting, past habits of perception, assumptions, and preconceived notions, all filtering and directing (or misdirecting) the abstraction process. If so, reality is partially created through symbolic manipulation.

Social construction theory posits that the meanings inferred from linguistic messages are profoundly influenced by everyday life to create and maintain self-definition by way of social interactions and communication intersubjectively (Burroughs, 2014; Löwstedt & Räisänen, 2014). Language is a crucial element facilitating cultural change and, in the process propagating values and beliefs, implicitly carries with it cognitive and emotional connotations. Hence, values and meanings are essentially communicated by way of social conditioning rather than individually decided upon. Additionally, social programming influences all aspects of our habitual roles and communication styles thereby impacting all social interactions. This effectively creates, through reification, a schism between institutionalized social roles and the underlying true self. Obviously such a process constrains individuals to restrictive patterns of cognition and conduct. An awareness of the subjective nature of such social constructs and patterns of communication is essential to psychological health and growth.

Awareness of these complex subjective elements is crucial to the realization of wisdom, self-actualization and human progress. Hinting at the difficulty for achieving a purely semantic solution, Korzybski (1994) holds that perceptual propositions necessarily involve shifting variables to multiordinal levels of abstraction, creating ambiguity. Without cognizance of this process, personal and social strife and confusion follow (Korzybski, 1994). Without in-depth linguistic structural research and an awareness of the historical process of additive language directed toward seemingly relatively unimportant matters, the fundamental verities of life might remain unaddressed. Nevertheless, Korzybski optimistically posits that through linguistic evolution, new methods and structures may be invented to approach a coherent, verifiable universal experience of life.

As words have many meanings in various contexts, certainly multiordinality applies to language. Language is assimilated through cultural osmosis: unconscious patterns of thinking and acting which ultimately manifest as distinctive individual patterns of attitudes, values, habits, and cognitions that are then used to relate to the world through observation and judgments. The roots of the influence of the psychological unconscious run deep into the neurological sphere. Therefore, it would seem that any attempt at psychological transformation must concomitantly address underlying neurological factors that influence ideas, theories, assumptions, and modes of thinking that have become second nature. Though there is a substantial overlap both psychologically and physically between and among all individuals, individuality manifests in distinct past experiences, environments, cognitions, values, feelings, and habits.

In summary, in order to effect a semantic gestalt through a conscious psychotherapeutic/psychospiritual process, it is necessary to profoundly analyze experiences, outlooks, and individual reactions with the environment. By accepting that linguistic elements cannot precisely represent external objects, it is possible to discriminate between low order abstractions and high order abstractions. This requires a drastic reassessment and transformation of modes of thinking and language usage in order to disengage from individual and cultural habits and to produce a radically transformed epistemological worldview by the use of new linguistic structures and thinking modalities. A General Semantic method that enables individuals to transcend personal difficulties through a rigorous training procedure is vital to spiritual progress. Such a method is precisely implemented in CBT/REBT.

Introduction to Jungian Psychological Types

Generally, ad hoc systems are developed based on past experience in order to navigate interactions with others with the expectation of consistent response patterns in various social transactions. This essentially amounts to an attempt to construct systems and guidelines based on previous experiences with others. Personality theories represent a formalization of this process. The foundation for Carl Jung’s nomothetic theory of psychological types derives from his work of the same title published in 1921 that endeavored to create a methodological framework for researchers attempting to categorize disparate psychological perspectives (Jung, 1971). Jung’s psychological type theory may act as a critical psychological guideline for comprehending these external portions of the human psyche. More importantly, on a deeper level Jung maintains that the human psyche requires balance. This theory asserts that since the unconsciousness, which naturally strives to complement the conscious mind, has a primitive, primeval nature and since this force cannot be dislodged from the human psyche, it requires an ongoing effort at radical transformation. Repressed tendencies retain instinctual potency and remain unconscious until an accretion of repressed energy perforce manifests symptomatically through catastrophic physical or psychological collapse; objectivity is nullified by subjective energy. Thus, the force of the unconscious can paralyze an individual in a destructive compensatory fashion, opposed to the conscious mind and nullifying any effort toward healthy equilibrium. The result can be subordination of the conscious controlling personality and its natural orientation to a productive existence. In essence, an unconscious inferior function may actually act as a conscious entity. This opens the door to psychological exploration of the unconscious due to its very intrusion into the conscious domain through analysis of the pathological primitive expressions that are characteristic of the unconscious.

To fully appreciate and effect this process, it is necessary to consider the entire system of Analytical Psychology, but to summarize, the Jungian type system accounts for the manner in which individuals perceive information, the manner in which decisions and judgments are made, and the source of energy and inspiration responsible for attitudinal orientation (Jung, 2012, 2014). The opposite poles of perception are sensation and intuition (irrational functions), the opposite poles of judgment are thinking and feeling (rational), and the opposite energy orientations are introversion and extraversion. According to Jung, various combinations of these factors constitute the dominant psychological type that is under direct control by conscious will. However, from a psychotherapeutic perspective, the activities of the polar opposite inferior functions may act as doorways to the contents of the unconscious mind, and if such unconscious compensatory attitudes are not brought to awareness, then psychological imbalance ensues. Whenever an individual allocates excessive energy in any attitude or function, inaccurate perceptions and judgments inevitably manifest (Jung, 1983). Jung advocated compensation for the development and nurturing of unconscious inferior functions and observed that since the unconscious mind is temporally past-oriented and is energized by a one-dimensional conscious orientation, the primary role is to autonomously compensate for the moment-to-moment vicissitudes of the cauldron of conscious experience (Jung, 1971b). Ideally, compensation is complementary rather than oppositional and facilitates psychic equilibrium; it is essential that highly charged unconscious forces be discharged to enable the instinctive drive toward individuation and self-actualization. Thus, from a Jungian perspective, the developed awareness of psychological types is quite useful in becoming aware of inferior, or least developed functions active in the unconscious, but this does not simply mean intellectual awareness or knowledge: it requires full integration in order to avoid the deleterious effects of one-dimensional personality development. According to Jung, a profound apprehension of the maladaptive potentials of inferior functions facilitates natural and necessary growth and adaptation.

From a more simplistic viewpoint, Jung’s theory of Psychological Types contains a personality categorization based on two attitude types – extroversion and introversion, and four functions of consciousness – sensation, intuition, thinking, and feeling. The abstract introverted attitude reflects a safe withdrawal from externality and associated power interactions. Conversely, extraverts may be negatively impacted by their positive relationship with the external objects through subjugation (Jung, 1971). Sensing (S), Intuition (N), Thinking (T), and Feeling (F) symbolize the four functions. According to Jung, sensation relates to sensual perception, and intuition to unconscious perception where active fantasies are produced by focusing on emergent unconscious elements that are being brought into the domain of conscious awareness (Jung, 1971). Hence, sensation is associated with conscious awareness whereas intuition expresses unconscious perception; therefore, these are representative of polar, compensating functional opposites. Thinking and feeling develop independently from sensation (Jung, 1971). Active thinking corresponds to logic and reason, i.e. directed linear thinking, whereas feeling and passive-fantasy thinking are related to subjective evaluation and intuition (Jung, 1971). Categorically, thinking subsumes intellectual cognition and logic; feeling is related to subjective evaluation and intuition by way of the awareness of the unconscious constructs (Jung, 1971). Essentially, intuition functions to communicate images and perceptions more directly than can be achieved through rank ratiocination. If proper attention is given to intuitive insights with sensation, feeling, and thinking evenly curbed, a constructive psychic adaptation may be achieved due to diminishing the obstructing influence of intrusive external stimuli upon fundamental perception (Jung, 1971).

Combinations of the two attitude types and the four functions of consciousness yield eight psychological type categories: Extraverted sensation, introverted sensation, extraverted intuition, introverted intuition, extraverted thinking, introverted thinking, extraverted feeling, and introverted feeling. According to the theory, extraverted types are energetic, action-oriented people with a tendency to act first and contemplate later. They would tend to know a little about a lot of different subjects, and frequently interact socially. Introverts are attracted to reflection, cogitation and solitude rather than energetic activity. Intuition and sensing are conducive to gathering information. Intuition-oriented individuals revel in abstraction and pattern recognition and engage insight garnered from the unconscious. Thinking is realized through detached, rational, rule-oriented decision making. Those with a feeling orientation make decisions through a sense of harmony and consideration of others (Jung, 1971).

Although all four functions are used in various situations, usually one is preferred and dominant, while the others act as secondary, tertiary, or least-utilized (shadow) functions. According to Jung, individuals are essentially driven by both nature and nurture toward habitual manners of cognition and action according to the dichotomous psychological attributesADDIN CSL_CITATION { “citationItems” : [ { “id” : “ITEM-1”, “itemData” : { “author” : [ { “dropping-particle” : “”, “family” : “Jung”, “given” : “C”, “non-dropping-particle” : “”, “parse-names” : false, “suffix” : “” } ], “id” : “ITEM-1”, “issued” : { “date-parts” : [ [ “2013” ] ] }, “title” : “The basic postulates of analytical psychology”, “type” : “article-journal” }, “uris” : [ “http://www.mendeley.com/documents/?uuid=fe13d3a1-9457-4b52-81a2-d59f07b40a2d” ] }, { “id” : “ITEM-2”, “itemData” : { “author” : [ { “dropping-particle” : “”, “family” : “Jung”, “given” : “CG”, “non-dropping-particle” : “”, “parse-names” : false, “suffix” : “” } ], “id” : “ITEM-2”, “issued” : { “date-parts” : [ [ “2014” ] ] }, “title” : “Collected Works of CG Jung, Volume 11: Psychology and Religion: West and East”, “type” : “book” }, “uris” : [ “http://www.mendeley.com/documents/?uuid=b7d0b1fa-be7a-4a42-96c0-f8b5a89398cc” ] }, { “id” : “ITEM-3”, “itemData” : { “author” : [ { “dropping-particle” : “”, “family” : “Jung”, “given” : “CG”, “non-dropping-particle” : “”, “parse-names” : false, “suffix” : “” } ], “id” : “ITEM-3”, “issued” : { “date-parts” : [ [ “2012” ] ] }, “title” : “Psychology of the Unconscious”, “type” : “book” }, “uris” : [ “http://www.mendeley.com/documents/?uuid=43b890eb-3922-4304-8bcb-b7dbbad1f4ad” ] } ], “mendeley” : { “formattedCitation” : “(C Jung, 2013; CG Jung, 2012, 2014)”, “plainTextFormattedCitation” : “(C Jung, 2013; CG Jung, 2012, 2014)”, “previouslyFormattedCitation” : “(C Jung, 2013; CG Jung, 2012, 2014)” }, “properties” : { “noteIndex” : 0 }, “schema” : “https://github.com/citation-style-language/schema/raw/master/csl-citation.json” }. As alluded to previously, Analytical Psychology proposes that the dominant characteristic resonates with the conscious mind and the opposite paired inferior function characteristic is a repressed manifestation of the unconscious (Jung, 2012). Thus, the development of secondary functions acts in concert with the opening of the unconscious, and when this does not occur, psychic imbalance develops due to the inherent stress between dominant and inferior psychic complexes.

In summary, within Jung’s typological system individuals are classified by two mental functions and attitudes into four dichotomies: Extraversion (E) vs. Introversion (I), Sensing (S) vs. Intuition (N), and Thinking (T) vs. Feeling (F). Sensing and intuition relate to the method by which an individual takes in information, i.e. sensing types receive information sensually whereas intuition oriented types primarily utilize conceptual schemata. The thinking function is related to impersonal analysis and linear thinking whereas the feeling function utilizes sensitivity to others in nonlinear decision-making. Additionally, thinking types attempt to use objective reasoning devoid of emotion in decision-making whereas feeling types utilize subjective emotion as a basis for decision-making. One’s conscious attitudinal orientation is specified by the introvert/extravert dichotomy. Extroversion and introversion relate to the source of energy that nourishes mental functioning, with extraverts being informed by external sources, while introverts derive sustenance from their own cognitive world. Introversion is reflective of the subjective orientation and is conducive to solitary cogitation. Conversely, extraversion is reflective of object-oriented, connected social activity permitting influence from the environment at large. With regard to perception and the four functions, sensing is related to present moment oriented realism, while intuition is open to multitudinous possibilities and attitudinal changes.

To generalize, Jung’s psychological type theory attempts to categorize the virtual infinity of individual psychological orientations and behaviors. It represents an insightful conceptualization and categorization for dealing with the multitudinous patterns of psychic activity. Additionally, relative to this dissertation, it provides the basis for theoretical extension by Katharine Cook Briggs and Isabel Briggs Myers who in 1962 developed the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator psychometric assessment (Myers, 1962). This was published and written specifically based on the concept that psychological problems may be more successfully addressed by utilizing Jung’s psychological typologies by focusing on the creation of an instrument reflecting both introversion and extraversion along with classifications of perception and judgment through a practical system (Myers & Myers, 2010).

Summary of the MBTI

The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) assessment measures personality types based on Jungian psychological type categories with an extension to include perception and judgment. Although it is based on Jungian psychological types, it seems to clarify and simplify individual tendencies and innate psychic proclivities. These basic differences concern the way people “prefer” to use their minds, specifically the way they perceive and the way they make judgments (Myers & Myers, 2010). Individuals derive energy in distinct ways (E vs. I), gather information differently (S vs. N), make decisions in unique ways (T vs. F), and organize the world in dichotomous ways (J vs. P).

To elaborate on each of the eight dimensions:

E vs. I. Extraverts are absorbed in their immediate surroundings, open and communicative, easily form new social connections, are genuinely interested in others, openly express their opinions, and readily accept responsibility and initiative. From this perspective, values are based on the external collective, which, even if accepted in an unquestioning manner, oftentimes leads to constructive emotional relationships (Myers & Myers, 2010).

Introverts focus on their own feelings and cognitions, enjoy solitude and reflection, form minimal friendships, enjoy maintaining personal psychic space, and enjoy working alone. Hence, even if an introvert possesses enthusiasm and constructive feelings, they will oftentimes remain unexpressed and discoverable only by those in close association(C Jung, 2013; CG Jung, 2012, 2014).

S vs. N. Sensing types are current-moment oriented, realistic, readily adapt to new circumstances, and actively pursue physical pleasures. Such types are necessarily dependent on the five senses and find such perceptual experience to be uniquely trustworthy. Conversely, for such individuals indirect ideas from secondary abstract symbolic sources, such as the written word, are less trustworthy and necessarily entail a translation to reality for meaning to be apprehended (Myers & Myers, 2010).

Intuitive types are future-directed, averse to regimented routine, enjoy abstract theory, are prone to self-reflective doubt, and are intrigued by unusual experiences. Such individuals generally relish solving unique problems, learning new skills and dislike repetition. Oftentimes energetic enthusiasm catapults them to rapid conclusions, enabling them to encounter life expectantly through conscious inspiration. Since sense impressions are repressed, imagination dominates actual observation (Myers & Myers, 2010).

T vs. F. Thinking types are logically analytical, fascinated by algorithmic structures and systems, emotionally distant, uninvolved and uninterested in facilitating social relationships. For such individuals, logic is valued over emotion and impersonal interests supersede everyday human relationships. Sterile truth is far more attractive than everyday human tactfulness (Myers & Myers, 2010).

Feeling types readily communicate emotions, tend to be ‘people pleasers’ showing deference and sensitivity to others, and are deeply involved in emotional relationships. They tend to be skilled in interpersonal persuasion dynamics that lead to harmony and agreement oftentimes through concession. Such individuals are usually skillful in personal relationships and value harmony, even to the point of making concessions to facilitate and preserve relationships (Myers & Myers, 2010).

P vs. J. Perceiving types are able to multitask without feeling compelled to completion, are not burdened by an undue sense of responsibility, are impulsive, and act based on moods without regard to necessary preparations. Perceptive types oftentimes engage in rigid, discipline-oriented parental practices creating faithful followers that mindlessly obey (Myers & Myers, 2010).

Judging types are meticulous planners, finish tasks that they have started, are rule and discipline oriented, like to “dot all I’s” and “cross all T’s,” relish stability, and are averse to retracting decisions. The perception orientation relates to the awareness of people, ideas, and external events. ‘Judgment’ is characterized by the process of arriving at conclusions from perception. They are inextricably entwined as perception dictates experience and judgment is utilized to take appropriate action. Hence, differences in style of perception and judgment produce behavioral differences (Briggs & Myers, 1995).

Overview of Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy and Cognitive Behavioral Therapy

Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT) and Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) may seem at first to have little in common with Jungian Psychological Types and the MBTI. However, there are distinct and fundamental points of tangency between the two. Both possess clearly intrinsic connections with General Semantics. Numerous times, Albert Ellis credited General Semantics as fundamental to his development of Rational Emotive Behavioral Therapy (David, Matu, Pintea, Cotet, & Nagy, 2014; DiGiuseppe, DiGiuseppe, Doyle, Dryden, & Backx, 2013; Ellis, 2001, 2013). Additionally, he credited Korzybski for his pioneering efforts in dramatizing the importance of personal linguistic constructions by noting that imprecise thinking manifests in generalized language constructs, which lead to recursively more insidious, habitual imprecision in language habits. Ellis (2001) struck an optimistic note by pointing out that negative linguistic habits are self-constructed and therefore open to change and transformation. Also, as will be shown in the data analysis relating to this dissertation, there is a direct linkage between Jungian psychological types measured by the MBTI and the efficacy of REBT/CBT.

Summary of the REBT/CBT process

The fundamental philosophic basis of REBT/CBT is the assertion that thoughts are necessarily juxtaposed between external events and internal emotional reactions. The process may be summarized as an actual activating event producing a seemingly immediate interpretation filtering through both rational and irrational beliefs and evaluations producing behavioral, emotional, and cognitive consequences (DiGiuseppe, DiGiuseppe, Doyle, Dryden, & Backx, 2013; Ellis, 2001). Ellis (2001) believed that Korzybski held a similar notion of the process where individuals perceive an event and unconsciously construct evaluations producing internal verbalizations and emotional reactions.

Essentially, an external stimulus acts as a catalyst to an internal evaluative thought that then produces an emotional reaction. Contrary to commonly held viewpoints, the emotional response is not caused by the stimulus itself, but rather by the thoughts related to the stimulus. The REBT/CBT approach further maintains that many thoughts are distortions of reality and that individuals possess the capacity for self-awareness and modification of distorted views. Unrealistic cognitive distortions are seen as the essential cause of psychological distress and dysfunction. Thoughts such as ‘nobody ever listens to me,’ ‘I never do anything right,’ ‘I’m no good,’ and ‘nobody likes me’ are examples of the types of statements that may cause ‘hopeless’ emotions and negative self-image. Rational Emotive Behavioral Therapy attempts to deconstruct this process(Bayne, 1995; McCaulley, 1981; Pittenger, 1993).

REBT/CBT practice requires a comprehension of the interrelationship between and among thoughts, emotions, and behaviors. In REBT oriented therapy, psychological healing is realized as a client gains an awareness of cognitive distortions and reinforcing behaviors by upgrading viewpoints to more realistic perspectives. The client and therapist join together to analyze distorted thoughts and assumptions by reality testing them and engaging in behaviors that contradict the cognitive distortions (Ellis, 2001, 2013). Ultimately, it is hoped that the client is able to gain skill in the area of awareness of cognitive distortions and the modification of such distortions. Ideally, as humans are innately teachable, the acquisition of skills for the transformation of emotions via experiences with others throughout life follows as a necessary potentiality. However, this approach seems best suited to individuals who are able to introspect and apply a rationalistic, scientific methodology in the laboratory of their own psyche. As mentioned previously, an analysis of this fact by way of personality assessment is the foundation of this dissertation.

REBT/CBT, then, fundamentally asserts that individuals are able to transform their lives without the necessity of understanding unconscious motivations or why such transformations occur. Clients may simply engage in behavioral techniques acquired from a therapist and consciously alter thought patterns. Hence the focus is on becoming aware of irrational beliefs and emotions and modifying them. Thus, REBT/CBT can be viewed simply as a training program: using techniques to become aware of thoughts and behaviors and modifying them. In summary, the REBT process proceeds as follows: an activating event may feed into either a rational or irrational belief. If it is fed into a rational belief, a healthy consequences ensue and effective action necessarily follows. If, however, the activating event triggers irrational beliefs, unhealthy consequences follow, which may be utilized as fodder for rational disputation, which may act as a feedback loop to challenge the original irrational beliefs.

Some of the basic methods of REBT include transformation of many cognitive distortions such as ‘demandingness,’ ‘awfulization’, personalization, dichotomous thinking, low frustration tolerance, global rating, absolutism, selective abstraction, magnification, minimization, mind reading, overgeneralization, disqualifying the positive, catastrophizing, emotional reasoning, using ‘should statements,’ labeling and mislabeling, and all-or-nothing thinking (DiGiuseppe, DiGiuseppe, Doyle, Dryden, & Backx, 2013; Ellis, 2013). For example, mind reading is a poor practice to engage in, as for the most part none are able to truly know what is going on in the mind of another person. Yet, it can cause a great deal of distress when it is engaged in. Better to say ‘it seems as though this person thinks in a particular way,’ than the absolutist statement ‘he thinks such and such’. Using words such as always, only, or never is usually a practice that leads to misperception, confusion, and strife. Labeling represents a method of overgeneralization through lazy, simplistic thinking. If an individual says that a person is a ‘complete moron,’ it is probably incorrect, but it may severely influence any interaction with the supposed ‘moron.’

Ultimately, REBT/CBT requires an in-depth comprehension of the interrelationship between and among thoughts, emotions, and behaviors. It demonstrates methods for language modification through an intense observation of patterns of overgeneralization, labeling, demandingness, and other types of language patterns. Its emphasis on semantic precision and linguistic accuracy characterize it as a pioneering and prime practical example of a therapeutic method that implements the philosophic abstractions promulgated by Korzybski (Ellis, 2001, 2007) ADDIN CSL_CITATION { “citationItems” : [ { “id” : “ITEM-1”, “itemData” : { “DOI” : “10.1007/s10942-014-0189-0”, “ISSN” : “0894-9085”, “author” : [ { “dropping-particle” : “”, “family” : “David”, “given” : “Oana A.”, “non-dropping-particle” : “”, “parse-names” : false, “suffix” : “” }, { “dropping-particle” : “”, “family” : “Matu”, “given” : “Silviu A. 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Chapter 2 – Review of the Literature

This dissertation attempts to establish a connection between the MBTI and the effectiveness of CBT/REBT utilizing the following measures of happiness and well-being: Subjective Happiness Scale, Personal Growth Initiative Scale, Meaning in Life Questionnaire, Satisfaction with Life Scale, and Gratitude Questionnaire. Since no previous studies have directly explored this relationship, a literature review of the various components of the current study is explored in this chapter: CBT/REBT, automatic processing, social anxiety, MBTI, and happiness and well-being. The consideration of automatic processing and social anxiety are included to indicate a counterbalancing viewpoint to CBT/REBT and well-being respectively.

Comparison of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) and Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT)

For this dissertation, REBT and CBT are essentially used interchangeably, although strictly speaking, there are both differences and similarities between the two. Although REBT was derived from philosophic principles applied to psychotherapy and CBT is rooted in empiricism, both have been extensively studied scientifically through rigorous research. REBT was philosophically derived from Greek (Epictetus) and modern philosophers (especially Korzybski) as an attempt to create an empirically effective psychological therapy (Ellis, 2001, 1991; Levinson, 2010) in which emotions, thoughts, and behaviors are mixed with philosophically rooted thinking to produce an empirically founded modality; in other words, a hybrid of philosophizing and scientifically empirical approaches. In either case, both CBT and REBT utilize empirical investigation of dysfunctional attitudes based on the principle that dysfunctional beliefs are essentially self-constructed and can therefore be deconstructed. Philosophically, REBT claims that certain imperative categories of cognition, such as dysfunctional assertions of ‘should’ and ‘must,’ necessarily produce psychological problems and even that dysfunctional beliefs are synonymous with irrationality (DiGiuseppe, DiGiuseppe, Doyle, Dryden, & Backx, 2013; Ellis, 2001, 2013; Padesky & Beck, 2003). However, it does not deny the fact that environmental and biological factors may also be causative.

In both REBT and CBT, one of the primary goals is to promote introspective skills that facilitate the investigation of individual beliefs through disputation of irrational beliefs and utilization of methods for changing them (McMahon, 2011; Padesky & Beck, 2003). One of the main keys is recognition of seemingly-automatic negative cognitions, and the promotion of an awareness of underlying cognitive distortions such as over-generalizations and self-blaming. Reformulation and restructuring beliefs may be done through client self-talk, or by promoting an awareness of unconsciously held dysfunctional automatic thinking. In this way, an individual may gain a more profound understanding of the mechanics of psychological dysfunction, such as depressive cognitions or social anxiety, and develop alternatives to reduce both symptoms and the probability of relapse (Padesky & Beck, 2003). Both CBT and REBT focus on fundamentally understanding thinking processes, utilizing techniques of guided discovery, and the application of the scientific method to personal beliefs through observation, experimentation, and direct disputation of irrational beliefs (Bond & Dryden, 2000; Bond, Dryden, & Briscoe, 1999; Bridges & Harnish, 2010; Ellis, 2001; Fives, Kong, Fuller, & DiGiuseppe, 2011; Owings et al., 2013; Padesky & Beck, 2003; Vernon, 2011). In studies, both systems use behavioral experiments to test beliefs and gather evidence via real-life experiments. Additionally, both models posit that thoughts, behaviors, emotions, and physiological responses mutually interact in an environmental context, and advocate that therapists focus on the interaction gestalt in the application of treatment procedures (DiGiuseppe, DiGiuseppe, Doyle, Dryden, & Backx, 2013; Ellis, 2001). REBT tends to focus on underlying statements related to ‘should’ and ‘must’ as the basis of core irrational schemas rather than focusing on ‘automatic thinking’ (Beck & Dozois, 2011; Hofmann, Asnaani, Vonk, Sawyer, & Fang, 2012). In both systems, therapists may act collaboratively with clients via role-playing in which the therapist is simultaneously an expert guide and co-discover of meaning. However, the ultimate arbiter of dysfunctionality is the therapist acting to differentiate functional and dysfunctional cognitions (Ellis, 2001; Lyddon, Weill, & Robin, 2002; Padesky & Beck, 2003; Williams, 1994).

Cognitive conceptualizations and irrational beliefs have received empirical support as causative of many disorders such as posttraumatic stress disorder, depression, and social anxiety (Hofmann et al., 2012; Padesky & Beck, 2003; Varga, 2014). Irrational beliefs (REBT) and dysfunctional beliefs (CBT) are prevalent in many emotional and behavioral disorders (Ellis, 2001, 2013). Both REBT and CBT systems boast diminished relapse rates when compared to other therapeutic modalities (Beck & Haigh, 2014; Padesky & Beck, 2003; Waugh & Koster, 2014). However, REBT emphasizes that feeling good about psychotherapy does not necessarily equate to getting better clinically, and emphasizes fundamental philosophic transformation as key to true transformation and as a buffer against future emotional, cognitive adversity (Ellis, 2001, 2013).

The Efficacy of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy and Rational Emotive Therapy

The efficacy of CBT has been studied in relation to schizophrenia, substance abuse disorder, depression, bipolar disorder, personality disorder, insomnia, anxiety disorders, aggression, anger, chronic pain and fatigue, social anxiety, and general stress (Hans & Hiller, 2013b; Olatunji, Cisler, & Deacon, 2010). Compared to other psychosocial interventions, CBT has been found to be effective for (a) cannabis dependence in decreasing the dropout rate from therapy and minimizing relapse (Carroll et al., 2012); (b) treating smoking cessation, and decreasing relapse among nicotine quitters (Song et al., 2012); (c) problematic gamblers (el-Guebaly et al., 2012; Holst & Brink, 2010; Myrseth et al., 2011); (d) the treatment of schizophrenia when used as an adjunct to pharmacotherapy, improving mood, general functioning, and reducing social anxiety (Ciraulo et al., 2013; Jauhar, McKenna, & Radua, 2014; Naragon-Gainey, Gallagher, & Brown, 2014; Rathod, Phiri, & Kingdon, 2010); (e) treatment for depression (Beltman, Voshaar, & Speckens, 2010; Tovote et al., 2013); (f) minimizing depressive symptoms in combination therapy with pharmacotherapy (Beltman et al., 2010; Berking, Ebert, Cuijpers, & Hofmann, 2013; Cuijpers et al., 2012; Li, Fitzgerald, & Rodin, 2012; Tovote et al., 2013); (g) bipolar disorder when used as an adjunct to pharmacotherapy by attenuating bipolar disorder symptoms and preventing relapse (Batmaz, Kaymak, Soygur, Ozalp, & Turkcapar, 2013; Kurdal, Tanriverdi, Savas, Tanrıverdi, & Savaş, 2013; Schöttle, Huber, Bock, & Meyer, 2011); (h) treating anxiety disorders producing substantial positive effects when utilized as a first-line treatment approach, and in treating secondary symptoms such as sleep dysfunction, and when combined with social skills training, CBT has demonstrated superior results over psychopharmacology (Gearing, Schwalbe, Lee, & Hoagwood, 2013; Hans & Hiller, 2013a; MacLeod & Mathews, 2012; Olatunji et al., 2010; Roy-Byrne et al., 2010; Schmidt, 2012; Taylor, Abramowitz, & McKay, 2012); panic disorder (Baldwin, Waldman, & Allgulander, 2011; Szuhany, Kredlow, & Otto, 2014). CBT methods such as cognitive restructuring, exposure, and systematic desensitization for generalized anxiety disorder have been shown to be superior to psychopharmacology, and have been found to be effective in treating posttraumatic stress disorder (Ehlers et al., 2010; Farach et al., 2012; Khoo, Dent, & Oei, 2011; Powers, Halpern, Ferenschak, Gillihan, & Foa, 2010; Steiner, Petkus, Nguyen, & Loebach Wetherell, 2013; Wyrwich, Harnam, Locklear, Svedsäter, & Revicki, 2011). Also, CBT, combined with exposure response prevention for obsessive-compulsive disorders, has been shown to be similarly efficacious compared to clomipramine and selective reuptake inhibitors (Olatunji et al., 2013). Some studies show that CBT outperforms psycho-education, exposure and response prevention, pharmacotherapy treatments and behavioral stress management in treating hypochondriasis (Bailey & Wells, 2014; Muse, McManus, Hackmann, & Williams, 2010; Olatunji et al., 2014). CBT has been found to be effective in dramatically reducing body dysmorphic disorder symptoms and body image disturbances (Greenberg & Wilhelm, 2011; Prazeres, Nascimento, & Fontenelle, 2013; Wilhelm et al., 2014; Wilhelm, Phillips, Fama, Greenberg, & Steketee, 2011; Witthöft & Hiller, 2010). Regarding remission response rates for bulimia nervosa, CBT has proven substantially better than interpersonal therapy, hypno-behavioral therapy, and self-monitoring (Hay & Claudino, 2012; Hay, 2013; Poulsen et al., 2014). CBT has additionally been involved efficaciously in treatment for (a) binge eating disorder (Brauhardt et al., 2014; Hilbert et al., 2012; Iacovino, Gredysa, Altman, & Wilfley, 2012; Vanderlinden et al., 2012); (b) insomnia treatment producing favorable outcomes with respect to sleep onset latency, total sleep time, and sleep efficiency (Okajima et al., 2013; Okajima, Komada, & Inoue, 2011; Okajima, Nakajima, Ochi, & Inoue, 2014); (c) the treatment of personality disorders and antisocial personality disorder (Haskayne, Hirschfeld, & Larkin, 2014; Yakeley & Williams, 2014); (d) outpatient cocaine users with antisocial personality has met with moderate success (Drisko & Simmons, 2012); (e) anger and aggression control problems to address such problems as anger suppression and expression (Carthy, Dudley, & Ayres, 2013; Deffenbacher, 2011; Mackintosh, Morland, Frueh, Greene, & Rosen, 2014); (f) treating occupational stress (Flaxman & Bond, 2010; van der Put et al., 2013); (g) stress in parents with children with developmental disabilities when combined with behavioral parent training (Deblinger, Mannarino, Cohen, Runyon, & Steer, 2011; Moree, Davis, Thompson, & Davis, 2010; White et al., 2010; Wood, Fujii, Renno, Dyke, & Van Dyke, 2014). CBT has been found to be a superior psychological treatment for decreasing the pain intensity for fibromyalgia and chronic fatigue syndrome (Kohl, Rief, & Glombiewski, 2014; Martínez et al., 2013; Schreurs, Veehof, Passade, & Vollenbroek-Hutten, 2011; Sil & Kashikar-Zuck, 2013; Wiborg, Knoop, Stulemeijer, Prins, & Bleijenberg, 2010; Wiborg, Knoop, Wensing, & Bleijenberg, 2012). Finally, CBT has been found to be useful in controlling conditions related to perinatal depression and has been found to significantly reduce anxiety symptoms related to premenstrual syndrome (Freeman, 2010; Kleinstäuber, Witthöft, & Hiller, 2012; Sockol, Epperson, & Barber, 2011). Moderate improvement effects have been observed in treating (a) anxiety and stress for HIV positive individuals and in diminishing anger symptoms (Kemppainen, MacKain, & Reyes, 2013; McIntosh, Seay, Antoni, & Schneiderman, 2013; Spies, Asmal, & Seedat, 2013); (b) secondary symptoms related to spinal cord injury in improving coping skills and quality of life (Mehta et al., 2011; Perkes, Bowman, & Penkala, 2013); (c) irritable bowel syndrome (Enck, Junne, Klosterhalfen, Zipfel, & Martens, 2010; Garland et al., 2012; Grundmann & Yoon, 2014; Tanaka, Kanazawa, Fukudo, & Drossman, 2011; Yoon, Grundmann, Koepp, & Farrell, 2011).

In summary, although the efficacy of CBT is minimal for some psychological problems and varies by target group, it has a proven track record demonstrating that it is quite useful for a broad spectrum of psychological problems. As the research base of CBT is extensive, and given that its application is quite cost effective, the advisability of the use of CBT as a primary intervention for numerous psychological issues seems obvious. Therefore, any correlation discovered by this dissertation with respect to personality type and CBT outcome would be quite useful for therapists and patients.

Frustration Intolerance Beliefs: Their Relationship with Depression, Anxiety, and Anger

As an example of a particular application of the REBT/CBT methodology, the treatment of depression, anxiety, and anger is illuminating (David et al., 2014). In CBT/REBT in general, causality is viewed as related to frustration intolerance beliefs. Beliefs related to a low tolerance for frustration and discomfort are seen as one of the fundamental underlying causes of psychological disturbance related to depression, anxiety, and anger. In fact, frustration intolerance and self-worth are seen as fundamental underlying processes that produce, through absolute evaluation, a broad spectrum of psychological problems (DiGiuseppe, DiGiuseppe, Doyle, Dryden, & Backx, 2013). In particular, frustration intolerance is related to the reluctance to accept the differential between individual desire and reality as it is, and if self-worth is made contingent on absolute conditions, it too acts as a source of psychological disturbance. Either of these distorted belief categories can produce depression, anxiety problems, and anger (Bridges & Harnish, 2010; Fives, Kong, Fuller, & DiGiuseppe, 2011; Schloss & Haaga, 2011; Shanahan, Jones, & Thomas-Peter, 2011; Szasz, Szentagotai, & Hofmann, 2011). Hence, through both low self-esteem and low frustration tolerance, distorted beliefs can produce anger. In fact, distorted frustration intolerance and self-worth beliefs have been shown to be significant predictors of anxiety and depression, and generally, belief typology may be useful in predicting classes of emotional disturbance (Bond & Dryden, 2000; Owings et al., 2013). Frustration intolerance may manifest in many situations related to external conditions such as perceived injustice, or internal conditions such as discomfort with emotions (Bond & Dryden, 2000; Harrington, 2005). These various specific content types may be related to distinct categories of disorder. Examples of this would be represented by the intolerance of uncertainty being related to generalized anxiety and specific frustration intolerance viewpoints being related to depression.

A Frustration Discomfort Scale has been used as a multidimensional evaluation mechanism for frustration intolerance, and has been found to be psychometrically accurate in support for construct validity (McHugh, Reynolds, Leyro, & Otto, 2013; Schloss & Haaga, 2011). Statistical analysis demonstrates that frustration intolerance factors may be broken down into emotional intolerance, entitlement, achievement, and discomfort intolerance. These categories are exemplified by cognitions such as, ‘I can’t handle doing things that entail a lot of hassle,’ ‘I can’t stand having uncomfortable feelings,’ ‘I can’t stand other people getting in the way the of me getting what I want,’ ‘I need to have the approval of others,’ ‘if I do not succeed then I am a complete failure,’ and ‘I can’t handle not getting what I want.’

Many such statements indicate that demands, rather than needs, reflect a sense of entitlement related to unfairness and delayed gratification and are a feature of irrational demands underlying frustration. Also, beliefs related to perfectionistic achievement and unrealistically high standards may be particularly dysfunctional when their achievement is based on or related to self-worth (Dunkley, Berg, & Zuroff, 2012; Frost, Glossner, & Maxner, 2010).

Usually in CBT/REBT therapy, numerous psychological problems are analyzed along with a constellation of dysfunctional beliefs, and core beliefs are targeted based on theoretical assumptions as to an association between particular beliefs and specific problems. The possibility exists that efforts toward disputation of irrelevant beliefs may diminish the efficacy of this therapeutic process. It may be that entitlement beliefs are more inextricably connected to anger problems as opposed to self-worth issues. It may also be the case that entitlement beliefs focusing on life’s unfairness are little connected to depression. Therefore, the safest therapeutic route to address complex problems may be to employ a multidimensional modality aimed at frustration intolerance and self-worth issues to ensure that subtle, fundamental irrational beliefs may be addressed.

A Consideration of Automatic Processing

A seemingly drastic opposing view of cognition is considered here to give a more complete picture of the complexity involved in the extent to which individual thoughts and responses are directly related to unconscious processes. This is a fundamentally philosophical and psychological question. Some researchers have categorized styles of information processing as ‘automatic’ verses ‘controlled’ (Bargh, Schwader, Hailey, Dyer, & Boothby, 2012; Bargh, 2011; Sheeran, Gollwitzer, & Bargh, 2013). Automatic processes are unintentional, effortless, and unconscious, whereas controlled processes require effort and conscious thought (Kihlstrom, 2014). The effects of priming, or the initial activation of knowledge structures, and stereotypes arising from situational context and the extent of unconscious influence on behavior have been extensively studied (Doyen, Klein, Simons, & Cleeremans, 2014; Molden, 2014). These studies indicate that attitudes and emotional reactions may be automatically triggered situationally, i.e. evaluation, emotion and perception may be direct, unmediated psychological reactions. Attitudes may be automatically activated preconsciously, and subsequently influence thought and behavior. Some studies show that even self-concept appears to be activated automatically in the presence of relevant stimuli, and directly impacts categorizing behavior and dispositional (as opposed to situational) attribution (Howell & Shepperd, 2011; Moran, Jolly, & Mitchell, 2014; Uleman, Rim, Adil Saribay, & Kressel, 2012).

The ‘automatic’ verses ‘controlled’ dimensions have been researched in terms of attitude formation, impression formation, attribution, and stereotyping (Bargh, 2013; Dickter & Gyurovski, 2012). Perception may influence behavioral tendencies automatically, unintentionally, and unconsciously; therefore, if an individual is not aware of perceptual processing, then conscious control may be impossible. In other words, hypothetically, cognition and behavior may be automatically activated via perceptual features related to the immediate environment, and the activation of behavioral tendencies takes place unconsciously and independently of conscious volition (Bargh, 2013; Dickter & Gyurovski, 2012).

Though other studies contend that behavioral response to environmental influences is under conscious control, it is possible that conscious responses are selected based on automatic perceptions, feelings and cognitions. A hybrid two-stage model has been suggested in which an automatic perceptual reaction is followed by conscious choice influenced by individual values in which an individual may transcend automatic stereotypical influences given sufficient motivation (Massaro & Cowan, 1993; Rouder, Lu, & Speckman, 2005; Timmermans, 2012). Others investigating automaticity of attitudes, however, have hypothesized that preconsciously held attitudes are more influential in behavioral outcomes than conscious intentional ones, to the point that individuals may not be even aware of an interpretive bias, or be able to control prejudicial behavior (Devine, Forscher, Austin, & Cox, 2012; Fujita, 2011; Nosek, Hawkins, & Frazier, 2011). In other words, behavioral responses are activated immediately in a given context, and this psychological situation subsumes all possible immediate individual reactions to external stimuli as well as individual expectations for the near future, subjective evaluation of the situation, associated emotional reactions with similar past situations, and the entire spectrum of behavioral responses in an individual repertoire. This theory is born out in research that demonstrates consistent individual behavior responses over time (Mischel & Shoda, 1995, 1999; Sherman, Nave, & Funder, 2010).

Other studies indicate that conscious control over a behavior requires active monitoring of unwanted states of consciousness (Hayes, Villatte, Levin, & Hildebrandt, 2011; Winkielman & Schooler, 2011). Ironically, the probability of an unwanted behavior occurring may be increased by attempts to avoid the particular behavior (Baird, Smallwood, Fishman, Mrazek, & Schooler, 2013; Wegner, Erber, & Zanakos, 1993; Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). The simple act of thinking about a particular behavior may increase the probability of overt manifestation even when unintended. This has been referred to as the ‘ironic processing model,’ and may occur because the effort to ward off an unwanted behavior causes it to be more accessible by virtue of the fact that it is kept in the conscious field of awareness (Beevers, Wenzlaff, Hayes, & Scott, 2006; Wegner et al., 1993). Obviously, this is problematic if cognitions can truly be influenced by external events with a concomitant increase in the probability of a particular unwanted behavior. Therefore, active vigilance may act as a behavioral inhibitor, but such control over unwanted cognitions may necessitate concentration on something else. Some research has demonstrated that when an individual is aware of the possible influences of environmental cues and the consequent cognitive distortions, negative effects may be mitigated (Bargh, 1988; Higgins & Eitam, 2014; Kuppens & Tong, 2010). As a cognitive representation of behavior seems informationally applicable in a given situation, behaviors derive from a cognitive repertoire that may severely limit the range of behavioral options. Due to the complexity of environmental influences and potential for hidden variables, from an experimental viewpoint, it is difficult to measure the relative strengths of environmental influence on behavior as opposed to the influence of rational judgment. However, it seems reasonable that altering perception or the cognitive schema will be reflected in behavioral transformation (Cienki, 2013); hence the possibility of the efficacy of CBT/REBT.

Automaticity of Higher Mental Processes

A great deal of debate has taken place within psychology over issues such as the existence of free will and its influence in relation to mental activity, choices, and behavior (Bargh, 2013; Baumeister, Crescioni, & Alquist, 2010; Ebert & Wegner, 2011; Ent & Baumeister, 2014; Simonton, 2013). Some theorists in this area have been able to develop cognitive science without reference to conscious intention and free will while others disagree (Morsella & Bargh, 2010; Neuringer & Jensen, 2012). As with behaviorists, some cognitive theorists see behavior as deterministic and automatic. In other words, even psychological activities such as perceptions, memories, judgments, and emotions are strictly determined by preexisting causes that inevitably lead to precise outcomes. From this viewpoint, even though structural distinctions do exist in the behaviorists’ rejection of all internal processes as explanatory with respect to human behavior contrasted with such internal constructs forming the basis of cognitive science, cognitive science and behaviorism may share a fundamental deterministic unity(David et al., 2014; DiGiuseppe & Doyle, 2013; Ellis, 2013; Oakley & Freeman, 2011). Therefore, even though strict behaviorism inadequately accounts for linguistic behavior and is unable to account for the human propensity for linguistic creativity, it still coincides philosophically in terms of determinism with some exponents of cognitive theory, even though they differ by permitting consideration and investigation of internal constructs (Allen, Wilkins, Gazzaley, & Morsella, 2013; Leonardi, 2012; Vosgerau, 2010).

Even though this fundamental disparity is philosophically substantial, some cognitive theorists espouse a strict deterministic position (Schoenemann & Wang, 1996; Toates, 2006). Both behaviorists and some cognitive scientists claim deterministic evidence of behavioral and mental activities taking place without conscious intervention or choice (Bargh & Ferguson, 2000; Toates, 2006). From this viewpoint, cognitions such as pursuit of goals, interpersonal behaviors, and judgments operate without conscious will, and all constructs such as feelings, motivations, thoughts, and both conscious and unconscious impulses are deterministically caused. This represents a hard deterministic cognitive, psychological, and philosophic position. Even activities that seem to derive from conscious choice may be ultimately explainable—if analysis is complex enough,—to particular causes. It may in fact be the case that all higher mental activity occurs automatically, stimulated by external events completely devoid of any intervention from conscious will. If so, CBT/REBT perspectives may be a mere chimera.

Other theories of construct accessibility demonstrate that goals and external events may be involved in the activation of mental representations, and accessibility to mental constructs is both an additive and interchangeable (Bargh, Bond, Lombardi, & Tota, 1986; Bargh, Lombardi, & Higgins, 1988; McConnell, Shoda, & Skulborstad, 2012). Accounting for higher order processing involves motivations and goals in relation to environment. Whether these can be directly influenced by environmental situations without conscious reasoning or choice and consequently impact behavior and other aspects of advanced mentation is difficult to ascertain. Although cybernetic-like feedback from the environment involved in response activation may have influence, the development of automatic control systems in which either a self-regulating machine or an individual may be altered due to external conditions without direct conscious participation in a self-regulating mechanistic process may eventually reflect complete determinism, it is difficult to see whether a complete explanation of complex goal-directed activity can be achieved (McConnell et al., 2012). Certainly, in order for goal orientation over extended periods of time to act to guide behavioral choices, it seems necessary that environmental information feedback would be required to permit the operation of a sophisticated level of access to environmental information. Simplistic examples in the domain of engineering and machine intelligence do exist (Huang, Wang, & Lan, 2011; Larrañaga & Moral, 2011). However, the distance between human mental processing and adaptation to experience seems to be only remotely similar at this point in time. Purposive human behavior seems to require feedback and conscious intelligent goal direction to explain higher order cogitation via goal-directed motivation.

That environmental events may be able to activate internal goal structures and social information processing has been explored (Huang & Bargh, 2014; Sripada, Swain, & Ho, 2014). Yet the manner in which information is processed, stored, and remembered relative to an environmental social situation or event is not well understood. The interpretation of external events is dramatically different depending on individual state of consciousness and goal orientation. It seems likely that goal creation takes place through conscious choice thereby limiting the extent of environmentally induced automatic processes and associated judgments, evaluations, memories, and behaviors. However, it is likely that the environment, via cybernetic feedback, activates goals unconsciously. That such developments recede from conscious awareness is a likelihood in that intentional processes (such as driving a car) ultimately become effortless, operating in time in immensely complex environments. Many have argued that even automatic plans of action need to be associated with higher order goals and strategies, and concluded that habitual behaviors are connected to goal-oriented mental representations rather than environmental effects (Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2010; Orbell & Verplanken, 2010). If an environmentally-triggered goal may seem to be set into operation effortlessly to influence behavior based on relevant environmental events due to explicit conscious choices to define the original goal, these environmental features are possibly ultimately, automatically associated with underlying goal structures. Hypothetically, then, if high-level goal representations follow lower level mental constructs and become automatically associated, then an individual may be engaged in the same behavior and goal-making due to situational features. In other words, a goal structure may become automatically activated upon the perception in an environmental situation—i.e. an unintentional skill has been acquired, analogous to being able to drive a car. This auto-motive model implies that the external events can directly trigger goal formation devoid of conscious choice and function unconsciously. This phenomenon may also occur even when impression formation is subliminally induced (Loersch & Payne, 2014; Posten, Ockenfels, & Mussweiler, 2014). This automatic activation of motivational orientation may transcend the mere formation of concrete goals and include high-level abstract motivational orientations. However, for this dissertation, such hard determinism is rejected in favor of the ‘common sense’ position that conscious will exists and may be utilized via CBT/REBT for the purpose of conscious transformation of beliefs and attitudes.

Attentional Bias, Self-consciousness and Perfectionism in Social Phobia

Social phobia provides a particular example of a prevalent anxiety disorder characterized by intense fear of humiliation and embarrassment in social situations with unknown people (Hambrick, Turk, Heimberg, Schneier, & Liebowitz, 2003; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997; Turk, Heimberg, Luterek, Mennin, & Fresco, 2005). As such, social phobia has been the focus of intense research. CBT models in particular have been explored to both understand and treat social phobia. Empirical research has indicated that social phobia derives from attentional bias towards negative social information, intense public self-consciousness, unrealistic degrees of perfectionism and expectations for social performance (Morrison & Heimberg, 2013). Cognitive bias refers to a systematic proclivity to focus on certain types of information via attentional bias, to recall particular types of information through memory bias, or to engage in interpretive bias toward ambiguous situations. Although attentional bias in threatening situations may have evolutionary survival value, the same mechanism may be maladaptive when harmless situations are perceived as extremely threatening due to a distorted belief system or cognitive schemata that produces fear. Much research demonstrates that individuals with social phobia utilize irrational attentional bias to interpret nonthreatening social information as threatening (Hambrick et al., 2003; Lundh & Öst, 2001; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997; Teachman, Joormann, Steinman, & Gotlib, 2012; Turk et al., 2005). The fear of being negatively evaluated by others may be predominantly related to the utilization of socially threatening words (Lundh & Öst, 2001).

Some social psychologists claim that healthy social interactions require both self-awareness and awareness of others (Cheng, Govorun, & Chartrand, 2012; Silvia & Phillips, 2011). Socially anxious individuals may interject negative self-referential cognitions and preoccupations producing extreme self-focus, low expectations for success, negative feedback, over-perception of the self as a central figure, negative internal attributions in ambiguous situations, and distorted perception of the averseness of the situation, all of which produces social phobia. Private self-consciousness — the attitudinal proclivity to focus on one’s own feelings, moods, thoughts, and attitudes — and public self-consciousness — the proclivity to focus primarily on outwardly public observable aspects of oneself and others — are involved in social anxiety and social phobia, with a clear direct correlation between social anxiety, social phobia, and high degrees of public self-consciousness (Ashbaugh & Radomsky, 2009; Frost et al., 2010; Hampel, Weis, Hiller, & Witthöft, 2011; Jain & Sudhir, 2010; Kiko et al., 2012; Penttinen, Wahlström, & Kuusinen, 2013).

As perfectionistic beliefs are involved in the development and continuation of social phobia, CBT has been found useful in the transformation of public self-consciousness (Brown & Kocovski, 2013; Egan, Wade, & Shafran, 2011; Frost et al., 2010; Koerner, Antony, Young, & McCabe, 2013; Mitchell, Newall, Broeren, & Hudson, 2013; Nobel, Manassis, & Wilansky-Traynor, 2011). As many socially phobic individuals hold unrealistically high standards for social performance both toward their own performance and others, modification of perfectionism seems key to alleviating social phobia and the distorted need to be perfect in order to meet public expectations. In other words, as perfectionism represents a core of social phobia, successful treatment aimed at a reduction of perfectionism and a concomitant reduction of attentional bias for socially threatening situations by means of CBT may be impactful in the diminution of social phobia. However, caution may be in order with respect to a simplistic ‘perfectionism causes social phobia’ conjecture in that individual variation may demand a more nuanced analysis of causation.

Clinical Implications of Cognitive Bias Modification for Interpretative Biases in Social Anxiety

As social anxiety disorder is one of the most prevalent anxiety disorders, has a low recovery rate, and correlates with a diminished quality of life, it warrants closer attention (Beard, Moitra, Weisberg, & Keller, 2010; Clark, 2011; Fehm, Beesdo, Jacobi, & Fiedler, 2008; Mobini, Reynolds, & Mackintosh, 2013). It is of profound importance to gain a better understanding of the underlying cognitive processes and psychological mechanisms behind the development and maintenance of the disorder. The CBT model posits that negative self-appraisals are fundamental to the development and maintenance of social anxiety by way of distorted appraisals in the form of attentional bias, judgment, interpretation, and memory (Fehm et al., 2008; Mobini et al., 2013; Moscovitch & Hofmann, 2007). It has been asserted that bias information processing is directed toward self-judgment in social situations, and that unrealistic expectations regarding social performance and an unrealistic view of an ideal self are core cognitive distortions (Neff, 2003; Spurr & Stopa, 2002). These studies have shown that the main characteristic feeding social anxiety is the fear that perceived deficiencies will lead to social exposure and shame. Those with social anxiety tend to interpret social interactions through dysfunctional assumptions resulting in the perception of social danger. In this process, anxious individuals tend to focus on negative information about themselves and create negative self-evaluations and predictions about poor future social performance through elevated attention to internal cues that trigger anxiety.

Other theoretical models of social anxiety propose that negatively biased cognitions of self and perceived negative evaluation are not the primary causes of social anxiety, rather that socially anxious individuals are primarily focused on internal cues (Mansell, Clark, & Ehlers, 2003; Mobini et al., 2013; Pineles & Mineka, 2005; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). From this viewpoint, socially anxious individuals simultaneously process both internal and external cues to imagine negative evaluations made by others from external stimuli such as facial expressions. This model presumes that vigilance toward negative social cues is a primary element that feeds into negative self-focus, creating an erroneous belief in negative views of self by others. If this is true, this implies that changes in the environment powerfully impact social anxiousness, as individual attention oscillates between self-image and perceived external threats, creating a negative interdependence spiral of external and internal cues. Therefore, the fundamental view of the CBT/REBT model of social anxiety that socially anxious individuals are vulnerable due to a distorted information-processing bias can be profoundly useful in transformation. Otherwise, with exposure to ambiguous social situations, socially anxious individuals will exhibit negative cognitive biases. As most real life social situations provide ambiguous cues with multitudinous possibilities for interpretation, socially anxious individuals are constantly ‘at risk’ for misinterpreting innocuous cues as criticism or rejection and perceiving their own actions as inferior to those of others. The constructive resolution of ambiguity is therefore a main focus of CBT therapy, with the goal of modification of negative cognitive biases and a corresponding reduction of social anxiety.

The CBT models postulate a diverse range of cognitive processes leading to negative information processing biases and anxiety disorders. The resolution of ambiguity in social situations is fundamental to research as socially anxious individuals interpret social events negatively (Amin, Foa, & Coles, 1998; Bachmann, 2012; Beatty, 1988; Hoppitt, Mathews, Yiend, & Mackintosh, 2010; Moscovitch & Hofmann, 2007; Taylor & Brown, 1988). Research indicates that socially anxious individuals interpret ambiguous situations as more threatening than non-anxious individuals, and engage in catastrophization of even minutely negative social events (Heimberg, 2002; Mobini et al., 2013; Riskind et al., 2013). This tendency to catastrophizing leads to both negative bias and diminished positive bias in the creation and selection of responses when confronted with ambiguity (Mobini et al., 2013; Stopa & Clark, 2000; White, Suway, Pine, Bar-Haim, & Fox, 2011). This in turn leads socially anxious individuals to increased threat interpretation bias and diminished constructive interpretation bias (Amir, Taylor, & Donohue, 2011; Beard & Amir, 2010; Hallion & Ruscio, 2011; Mobini et al., 2013).

In relation to the perception of threats from social cues, individuals estimate the cost-benefit and probability of negative events occurring, with socially anxious individuals overestimating social danger and miscalculating probabilities related to negative social events by overestimating the likelihood and cost of these events (Chen, Rapee, & Abbott, 2013; Heimberg, 2002). This judgmental bias by socially anxious individuals has been extensively researched. In both clinical and non-clinical settings socially anxious individuals manifest distorted interpretations of ambiguous social situations and such interpretation biases are predominately unrecognized by socially anxious individuals (Mobini et al., 2013; Vassilopoulos, Moberly, & Douratsou, 2012). In summary, socially anxious individuals tend to catastrophize minimally negative social events, overestimate the likelihood and cost in potentially negative social situations, and produce social anxiety by way of negative self-processing.

Utility of CBT/REBT for Social Anxiety

CBT has developed numerous interventions for the modification of cognitive biases associated with anxiety disorders wherein individuals can be trained to generate positive interpretations of ambiguous stimuli; such training has produced constructive transformations in state anxiety (Amir, Taylor, & Donohue, 2011; Beard, 2011; Hertel & Mathews, 2011; MacLeod & Mathews, 2012; Viana & Gratz, 2012). Modifications in interpretation bias endure in spite of changes in the context of experimental training, and studies show that when individuals are exposed to training in benign constructive interpretation bias, diminished anxiety is experienced (Hertel & Brozovich, 2010; Holmes & Mathews, 2010; Tran, Hertel, & Joormann, 2011). When subjects are trained to interpret ambiguous situations in either positive or negative self-relevant ways, corresponding changes in self-reported affect and self-esteem occur under emotionally vulnerable conditions, especially when subjects are encouraged to consciously generate positive interpretations of ambiguous situations (Mobini et al., 2013; Tran, Siemer, & Joormann, 2011). When subjects are actively trained to select and generate threatening or nonthreatening meanings of ambiguous events, subsequent self-ratings of emotionality are congruent with the direction of training (Hoppitt et al., 2010). Socially anxious individuals who receive positive interpretation induction generate more benign interpretations in ambiguous social situations, and are therefore substantially less anxious in similar future social situations, significantly endorse fewer threat interpretations, and demonstrate more benign interpretations (Mobini et al., 2013). Therefore, active methods of interpretation training produce new attitudes in a training-congruent direction. Interpretation and attentional bias are both the targets for treatment of anxiety disorders, and treatments combining these two approaches are efficacious in significantly reducing social anxiety symptoms in relation to interpretative and attentional bias (Brosan, Hoppitt, Shelfer, Sillence, & Mackintosh, 2011; Mobini et al., 2013). A substantial body of literature demonstrates that cognitive bias modification is a highly efficacious intervention for transforming negative interpretation bias, thereby reducing anxiety disorders in general, emotional vulnerability, and social anxiety in particular (Amir, Taylor, & Donohue, 2011; Beard, 2011; Brosan, Hoppitt, Shelfer, Sillence, & Mackintosh, 2011; Hallion & Ruscio, 2011; Hoppitt, Mathews, Yiend, & Mackintosh, 2010; Lothmann, Holmes, Chan, & Lau, 2011; MacLeod & Mathews, 2012; Mobini, Reynolds, & Mackintosh, 2013).

The discovery that CBT training is efficacious in modifying negative interpretative biases in individuals with social anxiety has both clinical and theoretical implications. The research results reviewed above lend support to CBT-oriented theories regarding the causes of social anxiety and the emphasis on biased information processing producing negative evaluation with associated perceived negative self-processing inclining individuals to vulnerability in the development of social anxiety (Brosan et al., 2011; Hallion & Ruscio, 2011; Heimberg, 2002). As positive interpretation training enhances positive mood, any investigation targeting the efficacy for particular groups of individuals is highly desirable. For example, some studies (Blackwell & Holmes, 2010; Lothmann, Holmes, Chan, & Lau, 2011) have found that positive interpretation training was more impactful among some groups using mental imagery as opposed to verbal processing. In other words, images rather than verbal representations may influence positive or negative affectivity among some groups, and that may necessitate the employment of visual prompts and images during training for those who find mental imagery more accessible than verbal processing and manipulation. Therefore, generalized CBT methods for addressing a broad spectrum of psychological maladies may be more applicable to some groups than others. Hence, the focus of this dissertation to ascertain whether certain groups identified by the Myers-Briggs type indicator instrument are more prone to positive transformation through CBT methods than others appears quite useful. Ultimately, content-specific training materials tailored for specific Myers-Briggs typology groups may utilize theoretically specific clinical presentations and programs tailored to individual psychological types.

Myers-Briggs Type Indicator

Life satisfaction and psychological well-being are not just related to individual life circumstances. In fact, they may be predominantly related to personality type and attendant inherent proclivities toward the experience of positive and negative emotions. Generally speaking, cognitive styles have been the subject of numerous studies and have been defined as the intersection between independent, overlapping constructs: cognition and personality (Evans, Richardson, & Waring, 2013; Van Hiel, Onraet, & De Pauw, 2010). Additionally, numerous studies have examined the relationship between the Myers-Briggs type indicator and cognitive style, mental ability, and learning style (Carlson, 1980; Carlson & Levy, 1973; Cools & Van den Broeck, 2007; Edwards, Lanning, & Hooker, 2002; Edwards, 2003). Studies indicate that extraversion is correlated with positive affect, higher levels of psychological well-being and high life satisfaction, whereas neuroticism is correlated with lower levels of life satisfaction (Costa & McCrae, 1980; Wilt, Noftle, Fleeson, & Spain, 2012). Extroversion has also been shown to be substantially correlated with constructive relationships, personal growth, and self-acceptance (Crocker, 2011; Morf & Horvath, 2010; Schlenker & Weigold, 1990). Intuitive type personalities positively correlate with openness, feeling types correlate with agreeableness, and judging types positively correlate with conscientiousness (Furnham, Moutafi, & Crump, 2003; Furnham & Moutafi, 2012; McCrae, & Costa, 1992; McCrae & Costa, 1997; McCrae, 2013). The Myers-Briggs type combination category JP has been as associated with analytic strategies, the SN configuration with openness to inferential judgments and the TF typology has been related to analytical processing (Beyler & Schmeck, 1992; Cools et al., 2007).

The Myers-Briggs type indicator provides substantial self-understanding without moral stigmatization (Bayne, 1995; Lloyd, 2007, 2012a). However, psychological type in itself may in fact become an implicit religion and lead individuals to complacency with being what they are (Lloyd, 2007, 2012a, 2012b). This has been addressed extensively (Lloyd, 2012b; Myers, McCaulley, & Most, 1998), and the position has been advocated that completion of one’s personality through the development of least-preferred processes may be challenging, yet rewarding in later life, as alternatively individuals may retreat inappropriately into a stagnant comfort zone leading to a rigid commitment to dominant psychological type processes. Hence, a clear awareness of psychological type proclivities may be advantageous to personal growth. Polar opposites and imbalances may need to be addressed, not just in later life, but whenever they are discovered.

As the Myers-Briggs type indicator is the predominant measure of Jungian psychological types, and is one of the most prevalent psychological assessments to measure personality types in both practical applications and research, it has been the focus of copious research scrutiny (Kelly & Jugovic, 2001; Lloyd, 2012b; Myers et al., 1998; Pulver & Kelly, 2008; Salter, Evans, & Forney, 2006), and has demonstrated internal consistency with respect to homogeneity in responses and temporal stability (Capraro & Capraro, 2002; King et al., 1999; Lloyd, 2012b; Pulver & Kelly, 2008). Historically, the MBTI derived from Jung’s dichotomous psychological type theory by profiling individuals on four scales: Extraversion-Introversion (E-I), Sensing-Intuition (S-N), Thinking-Feeling (T-F), and Judging-Perceiving (J-P), resulting in 16 possible profiles such as INTJ. Additionally, a quantitative measure called the Preferences Clarity Index, or PCI, provides a numeric indication of measurement precision yielding profiles such as I-20, N-15, T-3, J-20 (Myers et al., 1998). This provides a more accurate basis for assertion of MBTI categories and strengths of categorizations. Jung theorized that the innate tendencies demonstrated by psychological types fluctuate somewhat over an individual’s life time (Jung & Campbell, 1971; Jung, 1971), and therefore the MBTI, along with the PCI tend to evaluate personality type at a particular instant in time. Hence, particular categorizations are somewhat transient and therefore testing and retesting may be necessary to provide a reflection of this fundamental continuous fluctuation of personality preferences. However, sophisticated analytical methods such as configural frequency analysis and log-linear analysis indicate that Jungian dichotomies and categorical scores of the MBTI demonstrate innate personality dispositions and stable patterns of scores (Kelly & Jugovic, 2001; Myers et al., 1998; Pulver & Kelly, 2008; Salter et al., 2006). Multiple administrations of the MBTI through longitudinal studies indicate highly statistically significant stability for both categorical and numerical scores. Therefore, even though some researchers (Arnau, Green, & Rosen, 2003; Deng, Liu, Li, & Hu, 2013; Vacha Haase & Thompson, 2002) have advocated the use of alternative measures for Jungian personality types, most researchers and practitioners have found that the fundamental personality constructs measured by the MBTI are truly dichotomous and stable. Of course, care must be taken that the MBTI is ethically administered by qualified professionals to facilitate the acquisition of increased self-awareness through an understanding of personality type disposition. In this way, awareness of personality traits and their expression based on experience and personal development, though categorically reflecting subconscious preferences toward particular behaviors, can constructively inform psychotherapeutic counseling, research, and personal development. Hence, though personality research is not a precise science and numerous theories have been employed to explain the infinite complexity of human behavior in a variety of complex situations, the theory of Jungian psychological types and the MBTI indicate that it is a valid tool to facilitate self-transformation and self-understanding.

Happiness and Well-Being

Since this dissertation attempts to measure changes in well-being after exposure to CBT/REBT concepts, and because aside from the negative aspects of personality traits and social anxiety, one of the major goals of CBT/REBT is the realization of positive states of being, an in-depth consideration of happiness and well-being is in order.

Generally, subjective well-being reflects the level of constructive feelings and thoughts that an individual has about his or her life. Cognitively, this subsumes a generalized sense of satisfaction with aspects of life, and emotionally, individuals with high subjective well-being primarily experience pleasant affect mostly due to constructive appraisals of external events (Caunt, Franklin, Brodaty, & Brodaty, 2013; Lyubomirsky, Dickerhoof, Boehm, & Sheldon, 2011; Lyubomirsky, 2001; Quevedo, Abella, Marrero Quevedo, & Carballeira Abella, 2011). Subjective well-being is highly correlated with absence of negative affect, the presence of positive affect, and general satisfaction with life. Conversely, individuals with low subjective well-being evaluate their lives and events as undesirable, which leads to negative emotional states including depression, anxiety, and anger (Lamers, Westerhof, Kovács, & Bohlmeijer, 2012; Robinson & Gordon, 2011; Wasylkiw, Fabrigar, Rainboth, Reid, & Steen, 2010).

Predictors of life satisfaction and happiness have oftentimes been found to differ from normally expected values. For example, no particular time in an individual’s life is exceptionally happier or unhappier than any other (Mogilner, Kamvar, & Aaker, 2010). Additionally, confrontation with crisis times is also not predictable by age (McCrae et al., 1999). With respect to gender, global well-being appears to be approximately equal in men and women cross culturally (Witter, Stock, Okun, & Haring, 1985). Additionally, race and ethnic group also have been found to be unrelated to psychological well-being and self-esteem (LaVeist, Thorpe, Pierre, Mance, & Williams, 2014; Schueller & Seligman, 2010; Witter et al., 1985). However, nationality has been found to be quite important in relation to subjective well-being levels, with individualistic cultures that are conducive to the expression of positive emotion and encouraging of the experience of happiness manifesting higher levels of subjective well-being and self-reported life satisfaction (Costa & Zonderman, 1987; Dolan, Peasgood, & White, 2008; Helliwell, 2003; Wrosch & Scheier, 2003). Finally, even though vast numbers of individuals see being well-off financially and materially as being intimately connected with happiness levels, studies have shown that once the basic necessities of life are provided for, the correlation between happiness and income is minimal (Angeles, 2011; Fujita & Diener, 2005; Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, & Stone, 2006; Lyubomirsky, 2011; Verme, 2011; Wolbring, Keuschnigg, & Negele, 2013) with only a slight increase in happiness among high income earners (Zuzanek, 2013). It seems that though an absence of wealth may cause unhappiness and misery, its presence does not necessarily guarantee happiness (Diener, Horwitz, & Emmons, 1985; Judge, Piccolo, Podsakoff, Shaw, & Rich, 2010). Even drastic short-term increases or decreases in individual fortune seem to only temporarily modify levels of well-being due to hedonic adaptation (Diener & Scollon, 2014; Lyubomirsky, 2011; Mancini, Bonanno, & Clark, 2011; Sheldon & Lyubomirsky, 2006). Therefore, the idea that subjective well-being is inextricably tied to income levels and economic growth appears to be an illusion. Happiness seems to be available to all individuals irrespective of race, gender, age, and most income levels.

Some of the traits associated with happy individuals are optimism, self-esteem, personal control, and extraversion (Diener, 2013; Janoff-Bulman, 1989; Lyubomirsky, King, & Diener, 2005; Lyubomirsky, Sheldon, & Schkade, 2005; Meevissen, Peters, & Alberts, 2011; Peterson, Park, & Seligman, 2005; Rashid, 2014; Taylor & Brown, 1988). Additionally, happy individuals seem to manifest a personal bias, viewing themselves as more intelligent, ethical, healthier, and less prejudiced than others. Individuals who feel empowered tend to better manage stress, achieve more academically, and experience more happiness than those who are deprived of control (Judge & Larsen, 2001; Larsen & Ketelaar, 1991; Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Rashid, 2014; Sheldon & Lyubomirsky, 2006). An optimistic attitude wherein individuals sense an expectation for success is correlated with healthier and happier lives than is pessimism (Dember & Brooks, 1989; Judge & Larsen, 2001; Littman-Ovadia & Nir, 2014). Extraverts seem happier than introverts whether they are alone or with others, whether their occupations are solitary or social, whether their living circumstances are metropolitan or rural, or whether they live with others or alone (Diener, Inglehart, & Tay, 2012; Diener, Diener, Oishi, & Lucas, 2003; Emmons, 1991; Judge & Larsen, 2001; Layous & Lyubomirsky, 2012; Lucas & Baird, 2004; Norris, Larsen, Crawford, & Cacioppo, 2011; Specht, Egloff, & Schmukle, 2011; Tkach & Lyubomirsky, 2006). It is probably the case that extroversion causes increased subjective well-being, and increased subjective well-being causes increased outgoing behavior. Therefore, although close social relationships may certainly increase stress, it seems that the benefits outweigh the costs. Individuals with numerous intimate friendships tend to be healthier, enjoy higher positive affect, and live longer than those lacking such relationships (Friedrich, Cohen, & Wilturner, 1988; House, Umberson, & Landis, 1988; Lyubomirsky, 2011). It may be that the rampant levels of depression in modern culture are directly connected to impoverished social relationships and social bonds. For example, unsuccessful marital relationships are correlated with unhappiness, while close supportive marital relationships are viewed as joyous (Birditt, Hope, Brown, & Orbuch, 2012; DeMaris, Sanchez, & Krivickas, 2012; Dush & Amato, 2005; Lee & Bulanda, 2005; Lee, Seccombe, & Shehan, 1991). Of course, it may be that happy individuals are more prone to enter constructive marital relationships to begin with.

Work satisfaction is directly connected to subjective well-being and life satisfaction (Cozijnsen, Stevens, & Tilburg, 2010; Elton & Smart, 1988; Erdogan, Bauer, Truxillo, & Mansfield, 2012; Lyubomirsky, King, et al., 2005). This may be due to the fact that individuals tend to define their personal identity in terms of what they do, and through this realize a broader sense of community and network of constructive relationships, and thereby, a sense of belonging may be created through work, providing focus and meaning. Conversely, work may be unsatisfying if the related stresses are overwhelming, or when individuals are disengaged and bored. The ideal may be when the demands of the job match the skill set of an individual producing an optimal state of engagement or flow in which one is unselfconsciously absorbed in an activity with a focused mind, thereby producing transcendence through concentration or flow (Carpentier, Mageau, & Vallerand, 2011; Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, 1996, 1997, 2014a, 2014b; Salanova, Rodríguez-Sánchez, Schaufeli, & Cifre, 2013). From this perspective, happiness results from intense engagement in consciously challenging meaningful activities.

Finally, research has shown that an intimate connection exists between mental health and religion, possibly due to the fact that religious individuals are far less inclined to drug and alcohol abuse, divorce, unhappy marriages, and suicide (Calhoun, Cann, Tedeschi, & McMillan, 2000; Terrizzi, Shook, & Ventis, 2012; Messay, Dixon, & Rye, 2012; Myers, Eid, & Larsen, 2008; Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007). Consequently, religious individuals tend to be physically healthier and enjoy life due to healthier lifestyles (Daaleman, Cobb, & Frey, 2001; McIntosh, Poulin, Silver, & Holman, 2011; Newton & McIntosh, 2010). The relationship between religion and happiness transcends culture as those who are spiritually committed are far more likely to report high levels of life satisfaction directly related to the level of spiritual commitment (McCullough, Hoyt, Larson, Koenig, & Thoresen, 2000; Witter et al., 1985). Additionally, faith appears to assist individuals in coping with life crises (Ellison, Fang, Flannelly, & Steckler, 2013; George, Ellison, & Larson, 2002; Harvey, Barnes, & Greenwood, 1987; McGloshen & O’Bryant, 1988; Milevsky & Levitt, 2004; Momtaz, Ibrahim, Hamid, & Yahaya, 2010). In summary, there are clearly positive correlations between faith and well-being which may be related to numerous factors such as supportive relationships, the sense of meaning and purpose derived from spiritual practice, religious optimism, and finally a deep sense of hope in the face of the inevitability of death.

More on Subjective Well-Being

The term happiness, though popularly used, is somewhat abstract and difficult to define as it may refer to the positive affect at a given moment or a broad-based evaluation of life satisfaction and subjective well-being. Additionally, subjective well-being is a broad-based term used to evaluate the level of well-being of an individual. Such evaluations can be both negative and positive and subsume feelings and judgments about life satisfaction, levels of engagement and interest, and multitudinous variations of sadness and joy in relation to recreation, relationships, work, health, meaning, and purpose. Even though an evaluation of well-being may be subjective, it can be objectively measured by studying verbal and nonverbal behavior, attention, memory, facial measures, physiological responses, and general activity. A plethora of assessments of well-being exist, including: (a) Self-Anchoring Striving Scale (Angner, 2011; Tay & Diener, 2011), (b) Sixty-Second Happiness Measure (Fordyce, 1988; Verme, 2011), (c) PANAS ((Bargh & Ferguson, 2000; Bargh, 2011; McKenna, 2012; Morf & Horvath, 2010; Reid, 2011)Merz & Roesch, 2011; Shafir, Taylor, Atkinson, Langenecker, & Zubieta, 2013; Sheldon & Lyubomirsky, 2006), and the assessments used in this dissertation: (a) Subjective Happiness Scale (Lyubomirsky, Boehm, Kasri, & Zehm, 2011; Lyubomirsky, Dickerhoof, et al., 2011; Lyubomirsky & Tucker, 1998; Sheldon & Lyubomirsky, 2006; Tkach & Lyubomirsky, 2006), (b) Personal Growth Initiative Scale (Robitschek & Ashton, 2012; Robitschek et al., 2012), (c) Meaning in Life Questionnaire (Diener, Inglehart, et al., 2012; Pavot, 2013; Steger & Kashdan, 2008; Steger, Frazier, Oishi, & Kaler, 2006), (d) Satisfaction with Life Scale ADDIN CSL_CITATION { “citationItems” : [ { “id” : “ITEM-1”, “itemData” : { “DOI” : “10.1146/annurev-clinpsy-032511-143052”, “ISSN” : “1548-5951”, “PMID” : “22035241”, “abstract” : “Clinical anxiety disorders and elevated levels of anxiety vulnerability are characterized by cognitive biases, and this processing selectivity has been implicated in theoretical accounts of these conditions. We review research that has sought to evaluate the causal contributions such biases make to anxiety dysfunction and to therapeutically alleviate anxiety using cognitive-bias modification (CBM) procedures. After considering the purpose and nature of CBM methodologies, we show that variants designed to modify selective attention (CBM-A) or interpretation (CBM-I) have proven capable of reducing anxiety vulnerability and ameliorating dysfunctional anxiety. In addition to supporting the causal role of cognitive bias in anxiety vulnerability and dysfunction and illuminating the mechanisms that underpin such bias, the findings suggest that CBM procedures may have therapeutic promise within clinical settings. We discuss key issues within this burgeoning field of research and suggest future directions CBM research should take to maximize its theoretical and applied value.”, “author” : [ { “dropping-particle” : “”, “family” : “MacLeod”, “given” : “Colin”, “non-dropping-particle” : “”, “parse-names” : false, “suffix” : “” }, { “dropping-particle” : “”, “family” : “Mathews”, “given” : “Andrew”, “non-dropping-particle” : “”, “parse-names” : false, “suffix” : “” } ], “container-title” : “Annual Review of Clinical Psychology”, “id” : “ITEM-1”, “issue” : “1”, “issued” : { “date-parts” : [ [ “2012”, “1” ] ] }, “note” : “\n From Duplicate 2 ( \n \n Cognitive bias modification approaches to anxiety\n \n – MacLeod, C; Mathews, A )\n\n \n \n\n \n\n \n\n “, “page” : “189-217”, “title” : “Cognitive bias modification approaches to anxiety.”, “type” : “article-journal”, “volume” : “8” }, “uris” : [ “http://www.mendeley.com/documents/?uuid=f7e267bf-7189-4a0f-9943-254aff1bee9f” ] }, { “id” : “ITEM-2”, “itemData” : { “DOI” : “10.1016/j.jbtep.2010.12.006”, “ISSN” : “1873-7943”, “PMID” : “21349242”, “abstract” : “It is well established that anxious individuals show biases in information processing, such that they attend preferentially to threatening stimuli and interpret emotional ambiguity in a threatening way. It has also been established that these biases in attention and interpretation can causally influence anxiety. Recent advances in experimental work have involved the development of a paradigm known as Cognitive Bias Modification (CBM), a constellation of procedures which directly modify bias using computerised tasks. Excitingly, these procedures have been shown to reduce bias in attention to threat (CBM-A), and to promote a positive interpretive bias (CBM-I) in anxious populations; furthermore, these modifications are associated with reductions in anxiety. We believe that these techniques have the potential to create a real clinical impact for people with anxiety. Initial studies involved volunteer participants who reached criteria for clinical diagnoses to be made, but emerging evidence suggests that patients referred for therapy also benefit. For the purposes of experimentation researchers have normally looked at one procedure at a time. In order to try to maximise the potential clinical impact we wished to investigate whether the combination of the procedures would be more effective than either alone. We also wished to investigate whether the procedures could be carried out in routine clinical settings with patients referred to an out-patient psychological treatment service. We therefore carried out a pilot study using a combined approach of CBM-A and CBM-I with a sample of 13 anxious patients referred to an out-patient psychology service for cognitive therapy. The results showed successful reductions in threat related attentional and interpretive bias, as well as reductions in trait and state anxiety. Participant reports describe the procedures as acceptable, with the attentional task experienced as boring, but the interpretive one experienced as helpful. While recognising the methodological problems of the pilot study we believe that these results give indications that the techniques could provide an effective intervention for anxiety, and that further study is well justified.”, “author” : [ { “dropping-particle” : “”, “family” : “Brosan”, “given” : “Lee”, “non-dropping-particle” : “”, “parse-names” : false, “suffix” : “” }, { “dropping-particle” : “”, “family” : “Hoppitt”, “given” : “Laura”, “non-dropping-particle” : “”, “parse-names” : false, “suffix” : “” }, { “dropping-particle” : “”, “family” : “Shelfer”, “given” : “Lorna”, “non-dropping-particle” : “”, “parse-names” : false, “suffix” : “” }, { “dropping-particle” : “”, “family” : “Sillence”, “given” : “Alison”, “non-dropping-particle” : “”, “parse-names” : false, “suffix” : “” }, { “dropping-particle” : “”, “family” : “Mackintosh”, “given” : “Bundy”, “non-dropping-particle” : “”, “parse-names” : false, “suffix” : “” } ], “container-title” : “Journal of behavior therapy and experimental psychiatry”, “id” : “ITEM-2”, “issue” : “3”, “issued” : { “date-parts” : [ [ “2011”, “9” ] ] }, “page” : “258-64”, “title” : “Cognitive bias modification for attention and interpretation reduces trait and state anxiety in anxious patients referred to an out-patient service: Results from a pilot”, “type” : “article-journal”, “volume” : “42” }, “uris” : [ “http://www.mendeley.com/documents/?uuid=ac922437-f4f9-4bbd-be11-bb0eeec22cde” ] }, { “id” : “ITEM-3”, “itemData” : { “DOI” : “10.1586/ern.10.194”, “ISSN” : “1744-8360”, “PMID” : “21306216”, “abstract” : “Cognitive bias modification (CBM) is an innovative approach to modifying cognitive biases that confer vulnerability to anxiety. CBM interventions are designed to directly modify attention and interpretation biases via repeated practice on cognitive tasks. Analogue studies have demonstrated that CBM affects cognitive biases and anxiety in a number of anxiety conditions. Multisession CBM treatments have shown preliminary efficacy for generalized social phobia and generalized anxiety disorder, with effect sizes comparable to existing treatments. However, with any newly developing field, there are a number of important limitations of the existing data that need to be addressed before making firm conclusions regarding CBM’s efficacy for anxiety disorders. This article focuses on the theoretical rationale for CBM and the current evidence from analogue and clinical samples.”, “author” : [ { “dropping-particle” : “”, “family” : “Beard”, “given” : “Courtney”, “non-dropping-particle” : “”, “parse-names” : false, “suffix” : “” } ], “container-title” : “Expert Review of Neurotherapeutics”, “id” : “ITEM-3”, “issue” : “2”, “issued” : { “date-parts” : [ [ “2011”, “2” ] ] }, “page” : “299-311”, “title” : “Cognitive bias modification for anxiety: current evidence and future directions”, “type” : “article-journal”, “volume” : “11” }, “uris” : [ “http://www.mendeley.com/documents/?uuid=039a5f50-8576-4472-85b2-562250c145ba” ] }, { “id” : “ITEM-4”, “itemData” : { “DOI” : “10.1111/j.1469-7610.2010.02286.x”, “ISSN” : “1469-7610”, “PMID” : “20629805”, “abstract” : “BACKGROUND: Negative biases in the interpretation of ambiguous material have been linked to anxiety and mood problems. Accumulating data from adults show that positive and negative interpretation styles can be induced through cognitive bias modification (CBM) paradigms with accompanying changes in mood. Despite the therapeutic potential of positive training effects, training paradigms have not yet been explored in adolescents.\n\nMETHODS: Eighty-two healthy adolescents (aged 13-17 years) were randomly allocated to either positive or negative CBM training. To assess training effects on interpretation bias, participants read ambiguous situations followed by test sentences with positive or negative interpretations of the situation. Participants rated the similarity of these sentences to the previously viewed ambiguous situations. Training effects on negative and positive affect were assessed using visual analogue scales before and after training.\n\nRESULTS: After training, adolescents in the negative condition drew more negative and fewer positive interpretations of new ambiguous situations than adolescents in the positive condition. Within the positive condition, adolescents endorsed more positive than negative interpretations. In terms of mood changes, positive training resulted in a significant decrease in negative affect across participants, while the negative condition led to a significant decrease in positive affect among male participants only.\n\nCONCLUSION: This is the first study to demonstrate the plasticity of interpretation bias in adolescents. The immediate training effects on mood suggest that it may be possible to train a more positive interpretation style in youth, potentially helping to protect against anxiety and depressive symptoms.”, “author” : [ { “dropping-particle” : “”, “family” : “Lothmann”, “given” : “Claudia”, “non-dropping-particle” : “”, “parse-names” : false, “suffix” : “” }, { “dropping-particle” : “”, “family” : “Holmes”, “given” : “Emily A EA”, “non-dropping-particle” : “”, “parse-names” : false, “suffix” : “” }, { “dropping-particle” : “”, “family” : “Chan”, “given” : “Stella W Y”, “non-dropping-particle” : “”, “parse-names” : false, “suffix” : “” }, { “dropping-particle” : “”, “family” : “Lau”, “given” : “Jennifer Y F”, “non-dropping-particle” : “”, “parse-names” : false, “suffix” : “” } ], “container-title” : “Journal of child psychology and psychiatry, and allied disciplines”, “id” : “ITEM-4”, “issue” : “1”, “issued” : { “date-parts” : [ [ “2011”, “1” ] ] }, “note” : “\n From Duplicate 2 ( \n \n Cognitive bias modification training in adolescents: effects on interpretation biases and mood.\n \n – Lothmann, Claudia; Holmes, Emily A; Chan, Stella W Y; Lau, Jennifer Y F )\n\n \n \n\n \n\n \n\n “, “page” : “24-32”, “title” : “Cognitive bias modification training in adolescents: effects on interpretation biases and mood”, “type” : “article-journal”, “volume” : “52” }, “uris” : [ “http://www.mendeley.com/documents/?uuid=2e5aeec3-5649-4ad6-b6c8-6633330693b6” ] }, { “id” : “ITEM-5”, “itemData” : { “DOI” : “10.1037/a0023808”, “ISSN” : “1939-2117”, “PMID” : “21707134”, “abstract” : “OBJECTIVE: At least 3 randomized, placebo-controlled, double-blind studies have supported the efficacy of computerized attention modification programs (AMPs) in reducing symptoms of anxiety in patients diagnosed with an anxiety disorder. In this study we examined patient characteristics that predicted response to AMP in a large sample of individuals diagnosed with generalized social phobia.\n\nMETHOD: The sample comprised 112 individuals seeking treatment for generalized social phobia who completed a randomized clinical trial comparing AMP (n = 55) with a placebo condition (i.e., attention control condition; n = 57). We examined the following domains of baseline predictors of treatment response: (a) demographic characteristics (gender, age, ethnicity, years of education); (b) clinical characteristics (Axis I comorbidity, trait anxiety, depression); and (c) cognitive disturbance factors (attentional bias for social threat, social interpretation bias).\n\nRESULTS: Results revealed that ethnicity predicted treatment response across both conditions: Participants who self-identified as non-Caucasian displayed better overall response than did Caucasians. The only prescriptive variable to emerge was attentional bias for social threat at preassessment. Participants in the AMP group who exhibited larger attentional bias scores displayed significantly greater reductions in clinician-rated social anxiety symptoms than did their counterparts in the attention control condition.\n\nCONCLUSIONS: These results suggest that AMP may be targeted to individuals most likely to benefit from these programs.”, “author” : [ { “dropping-particle” : “”, “family” : “Amir”, “given” : “Nader”, “non-dropping-particle” : “”, “parse-names” : false, “suffix” : “” }, { “dropping-particle” : “”, “family” : “Taylor”, “given” : “Charles T CT”, “non-dropping-particle” : “”, “parse-names” : false, “suffix” : “” }, { “dropping-particle” : “”, “family” : “Donohue”, “given” : “Michael C MC”, “non-dropping-particle” : “”, “parse-names” : false, “suffix” : “” } ], “container-title” : “Journal of consulting and clinical psychology”, “id” : “ITEM-5”, “issue” : “4”, “issued” : { “date-parts” : [ [ “2011”, “8” ] ] }, “page” : “533-41”, “title” : “Predictors of response to an attention modification program in generalized social phobia.”, “type” : “article-journal”, “volume” : “79” }, “uris” : [ “http://www.mendeley.com/documents/?uuid=2e060169-7c41-4eb8-a32e-29964a86720f” ] }, { “id” : “ITEM-6”, “itemData” : { “DOI” : “10.1007/s10608-012-9445-8”, “ISSN” : “0147-5916”, “author” : [ { “dropping-particle” : “”, “family” : “Mobini”, “given” : “Sirous”, “non-dropping-particle” : “”, “parse-names” : false, “suffix” : “” }, { “dropping-particle” : “”, “family” : “Reynolds”, “given” : “Shirley”, “non-dropping-particle” : “”, “parse-names” : false, “suffix” : “” }, { “dropping-particle” : “”, “family” : “Mackintosh”, “given” : “Bundy”, “non-dropping-particle” : “”, “parse-names” : false, “suffix” : “” } ], “container-title” : “Cognitive Therapy and Research”, “id” : “ITEM-6”, “issue” : “1”, “issued” : { “date-parts” : [ [ “2013”, “3”, “14” ] ] }, “note” : “\n From Duplicate 2 ( \n \n Clinical Implications of Cognitive Bias Modification for Interpretative Biases in Social Anxiety: An Integrative Literature Review\n \n – Mobini, Sirous; Reynolds, Shirley; Mackintosh, Bundy )\n\n \n \n\n \n\n \n\n “, “page” : “173-182”, “title” : “Clinical implications of cognitive bias modification for interpretative biases in social anxiety: An integrative literature review”, “type” : “article-journal”, “volume” : “37” }, “uris” : [ “http://www.mendeley.com/documents/?uuid=e69e3969-df53-4664-a8f1-08a40058413b” ] }, { “id” : “ITEM-7”, “itemData” : { “DOI” : “10.1016/j.beth.2009.01.002”, “ISSN” : “1878-1888”, “PMID” : “20171329”, “abstract” : “Training participants to select threat or nonthreat interpretations of emotionally ambiguous stimuli or passively exposing them to valenced scenarios can modify later interpretation of ambiguity. However, only when encouraged to actively select meanings do congruent changes in emotional response occur during training itself (Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000). The present study assessed the more critical question of whether active training is also necessary for modifying subsequent emotional responses to images of new ambiguous scenarios presented after training. As predicted, active training did lead participants to rate their images of emotionally ambiguous scenarios as being more unpleasant after training as compared to a matched passive condition. This finding supports the view that active generation of meaning during interpretive training is critical for the modification of later emotional responses.”, “author” : [ { “dropping-particle” : “”, “family” : “Hoppitt”, “given” : “Laura”, “non-dropping-particle” : “”, “parse-names” : false, “suffix” : “” }, { “dropping-particle” : “”, “family” : “Mathews”, “given” : “Andrew”, “non-dropping-particle” : “”, “parse-names” : false, “suffix” : “” }, { “dropping-particle” : “”, “family” : “Yiend”, “given” : “Jenny”, “non-dropping-particle” : “”, “parse-names” : false, “suffix” : “” }, { “dropping-particle” : “”, “family” : “Mackintosh”, “given” : “Bundy”, “non-dropping-particle” : “”, “parse-names” : false, “suffix” : “” } ], “container-title” : “Behavior Therapy”, “id” : “ITEM-7”, “issue” : “1”, “issued” : { “date-parts” : [ [ “2010”, “3” ] ] }, “note” : “\n From Duplicate 1 ( \n \n Cognitive bias modification: The critical role of active training in modifying emotional responses\n \n – Hoppitt, Laura; Mathews, Andrew; Yiend, Jenny; Mackintosh, Bundy )\n\n \n \n\n \n\n \n\n From Duplicate 2 ( \n \n Cognitive bias modification: The critical role of active training in modifying emotional responses\n \n – Hoppitt, Laura; Mathews, Andrew; Yiend, Jenny; Mackintosh, Bundy )\n\n \n \n\n From Duplicate 2 ( \n \n \n Cognitive bias modification: The critical role of active training in modifying emotional responses\n \n \n – Hoppitt, L; Mathews, A; Yiend, J; Mackintosh, B )\n\n \n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n “, “page” : “73-81”, “title” : “Cognitive bias modification: The critical role of active training in modifying emotional responses”, “type” : “article-journal”, “volume” : “41” }, “uris” : [ “http://www.mendeley.com/documents/?uuid=a8d6a4a9-0dd9-4a80-8720-b06fc99f36ea” ] }, { “id” : “ITEM-8”, “itemData” : { “DOI” : “10.1037/a0024355”, “ISSN” : “1939-1455”, “PMID” : “21728399”, “abstract” : “Cognitive biases have been theorized to play a critical role in the onset and maintenance of anxiety and depression. Cognitive bias modification (CBM), an experimental paradigm that uses training to induce maladaptive or adaptive cognitive biases, was developed to test these causal models. Although CBM has generated considerable interest in the past decade, both as an experimental paradigm and as a form of treatment, there have been no quantitative reviews of the effect of CBM on anxiety and depression. This meta-analysis of 45 studies (2,591 participants) assessed the effect of CBM on cognitive biases and on anxiety and depression. CBM had a medium effect on biases (g = 0.49) that was stronger for interpretation (g = 0.81) than for attention (g = 0.29) biases. CBM further had a small effect on anxiety and depression (g = 0.13), although this effect was reliable only when symptoms were assessed after participants experienced a stressor (g = 0.23). When anxiety and depression were examined separately, CBM significantly modified anxiety but not depression. There was a nonsignificant trend toward a larger effect for studies including multiple training sessions. These findings are broadly consistent with cognitive theories of anxiety and depression that propose an interactive effect of cognitive biases and stressors on these symptoms. 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From a psychotherapeutic perspective, the study of well-being has as its main goal the constructive transformation of individual lives, and measures of subjective well-being act as a key element in pursuit of this goal. Not surprisingly, a great deal of research indicates that there is a strong correlation between elevated levels of subjective well-being and effective functioning in areas such as work and income, health and longevity, and social relations (Diener, Fujita, Tay, & Biswas-Diener, 2012; Diener, 2012, 2013). Elevated subjective well-being has been found to be strongly correlated with high levels of sociality; it is most likely that causality between these variables is bidirectional in that individuals possessing a large number of friends and family manifest higher levels of subjective well-being, and individuals with high well-being generally have more productive social relationships than those with low levels of life satisfaction (Brannan, Biswas-Diener, Mohr, Mortazavi, & Stein, 2013; Diener, 2012, 2013). Clearly supportive relationships have a causal influence on high levels of subjective well-being, and studies have shown that people are generally happier around other people (Kahneman et al., 2006; Kahneman & Krueger, 2006). Additionally, married individuals manifest higher levels of subjective well-being than non-married individuals (Kahneman & Krueger, 2006).

Other studies have shown that individuals who start with high subjective levels of well-being generally possess higher levels of social ability, self-confidence, warmth, and leadership ability, and tend to create constructive social support systems (Ashkanasy & Humphrey, 2011; Brown, Diekman, Tennial, & Solomon, 2011; Cunningham, 1988; Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987). Individuals possessing high life satisfaction before marriage are more likely to become married and sustain happy marriages (Lyubomirsky & Layous, 2013; Oishi, Diener, & Lucas, 2007). Those with high subjective well-being tend to earn more money irrespective of occupation, and are more likely to be satisfied with work (Diener, Nickerson, Lucas, & Sandvik, 2002; Sutin, Costa, Miech, & Eaton, 2009; Zhong & Mitchell, 2012). In other words, individuals with high levels of well-being create career success and economic success, have higher ratings from superiors, are seen as more productive, creative, and dependable and are generally seen as excellent organizational citizens (Staw, Sutton, & Pelled, 1994). Health and longevity are also improved by subjective well-being. Individuals with high subjective well-being report less unpleasant physical symptoms, better overall health (Røysamb, Tambs, Reichborn-Kjennerud, Neale, & Harris, 2003), are more resistant to viruses, have stronger immune systems and healthier cardiovascular systems, have fewer lifestyle diseases, and enjoy longer lives (Diener & Chan, 2011; Røysamb et al., 2003).

Individuals who pursue high subjective levels of well-being engage more often in altruistic activities (Lum & Lightfoot, 2005; Thomas, Gray, & McGinty, 2012), are more cooperative (Bogaert, Boone, & Declerck, 2008; Salanova et al., 2013; Wilt et al., 2012), have higher levels of confidence in government, and have lower levels of intolerance for racial groups and immigrants (Diener & Tov, 2007; Wolbring, 2013). Consequently, the well-being of individuals derives from a healthy society, and highly subjective levels of well-being contribute toward stable and productive societies. But even though high levels of well-being generally cause beneficial functioning at both individual and societal levels, if reported levels are too extreme they may be detrimental to achievement in specific areas (Oishi et al., 2007). It may be that an inordinate striving for ecstatic levels of well-being may be ironically detrimental if continuous euphoria is seen to be a desirous goal.

Well-being has been studied in various psychological frameworks based on biological theories analyzing genetic predispositions (Archontaki, Lewis, & Bates, 2013; Diener, 1996; Franz et al., 2012; Fujita & Diener, 2005; Nistor, 2011; Røysamb et al., 2003), telic theories relating to goal achievement (Brunstein, 1993; Lyubomirsky, Dickerhoof, et al., 2011; Sheldon & Lyubomirsky, 2006), need theories (Ryff & Singer, 1996; Tay & Diener, 2011), and Self-Determination Theory (Carpentier et al., 2011; Gagné & Deci, 2005; Kasser, Rosenblum, & Sameroff, 2014; Lyubomirsky, 2011; Ryan & Deci, 2000; Sheldon, 2014). Also, both top-down theories (which maintain that a positive state of mind induces constructive experience and interpretation) and bottom-up theories (which posit that negative and positive moments are added together to produce perceived subjective well-being) have been employed to analyze well-being (Lyubomirsky & Tucker, 1998; Røysamb et al., 2003; Schimmack, Krause, Wagner, & Schupp, 2009). Related to these diametrically opposed perspectives, it is an open question as to whether well-being is a trait inclining individuals to react positively or a state which simply manifests due to the accumulation of constructive experiences.

Many cognitive theories investigating processes such as attention, interpretation, and memory suggest that individuals with high levels of subjective well-being have a tendency to focus on positive stimuli, interpret events in a positive light, and remember events with a positive memory bias (Hoshino, 1991; Verde, Stone, Hatch, & Schnall, 2010). Additionally, the tendency to direct attention toward others seems to be a significant predictor of well-being. Individuals who ruminate are inclined to worry and report lower subjective well-being (Kross, Duckworth, Ayduk, Tsukayama, & Mischel, 2011; Tkach & Lyubomirsky, 2006; Tran, et al., 2011). Focusing attention inward may cause individuals to experience significantly lower levels of well-being. Individuals with high subjective well-being generally interpret neutral or ambiguous events positively. Dispositionally happy individuals may have no difference in the amount of negative and positive events in their lives, and simply may tend to remember events in a positive way by way of a protective memory bias.

Some theories of the causes of well-being are evolutionary, and among other things, imply that feelings of well-being assist in survival (Huang & Bargh, 2014; Toates, 2006). The evolutionary survival value of negative emotions such as anxiety, fear, and anger are clear, however, well-being also provides adaptive advantages. For example, a “broaden and build theory” (Fredrickson, 2001; Fredrickson, 2004; Garland et al., 2010; Tugade, Fredrickson, & Barrett, 2004; Tugade & Fredrickson, 2004) posits that positive emotions permit individuals to expand cognitive and behavior repertoires thereby constructively impacting psychological, social, and intellectual abilities over time. The implication is that elevated subjective well-being and constructive affect produce a condition in which individuals may explore environments and goals. From this perspective, well-being clearly contributes adaptive advantages which facilitate evolutionary success and survival.

Social Comparison and Well-Being

From the perspective of social comparison theory, individuals generally experience higher levels of well-being if they perceive that they are better off than others (Diener, Inglehart, et al., 2012; Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999; Lyubomirsky, Boehm, et al., 2011; Neff, 2003; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012; Posten et al., 2014; Wood, 1989). In fact, some studies indicate that such relative standards derived from social comparison are the most important factor in predicting personal satisfaction (Diener, Larsen, & Emmons, 1984; Graham, Bradshaw, Surood, & Kline, 2014). Additionally, proponents of adaptation theory (Abbey, 1987; Diener, Lucas, & Scollon, 2006; Diener et al., 2003; Mancini et al., 2011; Sheldon & Lyubomirsky, 2012; Tugade et al., 2004; Waterman, 2007) hold that individuals use their own past as a standard for comparison. In other words, if current life conditions are perceived to be better than those of the past, higher levels of well-being occur. However, theories of hedonic adaptation propose that the potency of the influence of past events on current levels of happiness decreases over time, and current events tend to become the new standard of comparison in the creation of feelings of well-being, giving rise to the ‘hedonic treadmill’ effect (Fujita & Diener, 2005; Lyubomirsky, 2011; Mancini et al., 2011; Waterman, 2007) in which more recent events only temporarily increase subjective well-being to become the new standard for self-comparison. Hence, individual happiness ‘set points’ change over time and are impacted by both positive and negative life-altering events.

The malleability of set points due to external influences is analogous to the epigenetic mapping between genes and the transmission of information in cellular metabolism that is modifiable within the context of environmental interactions (Huang & Bargh, 2014; Lipton, 2008). According to this theory, genes are not able to turn themselves on and off; for this they need external influences. These epigenetic factors are consciously controllable and can substantially modify genes. Gene switches are comparable to computer programs and changing beliefs modifies the instructions. Genes can be switched into on states and off states by feelings, emotions, and thoughts. These modifications take place in the cell membrane that responds to the energy of belief. The cell membrane possesses chemical receptors as well as energy receptors that are sensitive to emotions and thoughts. The cell membrane acts intelligently through channeling proteins and switching genes permitting environment influences on proteins that are vital for the activation of DNA. The programming language that cell walls understand is the language of energy and emotions. Emotional choices create energy patterns and blockages that are the environment in which the cell develops. Through epigenetics, the environmental programming given to cells modulates genetic activity. Therefore, belief transmitted chemically and energetically through the cell wall and switching DNA is a key to self-healing and transformation. The epigenetic explanation demonstrates much greater control than that implied by biological determinism; modification of emotions, thoughts, and behaviors is the key to transformation at both the molecular level and macro level of the whole organism.

Numerous studies have considered connections between macro levels of well-being and the relationship to numerous factors such as gender, education levels, age, religion, marriage, divorce, social relationships in general, income, and culture. With respect to gender, well-being studies have indicated that men and women exhibit similar levels of subjective well-being (Fujita, Diener, & Sandvik, 1991; Huang & Bargh, 2014; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012; Sherman et al., 2010). Numerous studies show a slight correlation between education level and well-being, but the link connecting intelligence and subjective well-being is minimal, while emotional intelligence is highly correlated (Brett et al., 2012; Wojcik & Ditto, 2014). Although youth has been consistently correlated with well-being (Angner, 2011; Brett et al., 2012; Cameron, 1975), numerous studies have shown that life satisfaction oftentimes increases with age (Hyde, Maher, & Elavsky, 2013; Warr, Butcher, & Robertson, 2004; Zhang & Leung, 2002). Generally speaking, life satisfaction has been found to increase among individuals from ages 40 to 65, with both negative and positive affect minimally decreasing into old age with substantial declines in well-being only occurring near death (Hyde et al., 2013; Warr et al., 2004; Zhang & Leung, 2002). Cross culturally, the relationship between subjective well-being and age is consistent; however, life satisfaction declines substantially in economically challenged countries (Blanchflower & Oswald, 2011; Swift et al., 2014). Studies have shown that religiously and spiritually oriented individuals manifest higher levels of well-being based on religious participation, strength of affiliation, prayer, and relationship with God (Dierendonck & Mohan, 2006; Messay et al., 2012; Newton & McIntosh, 2010; Rosmarin, Pirutinsky, Cohen, Galler, & Krumrei, 2011; Sillick & Cathcart, 2014; Wilmoth, Adams-Price, Turner, Blaney, & Downey, 2014; Witter et al., 1985). It is possible that the linkage is due to an enhanced sense of purpose and meaning, social networks, and support systems.

As individuals are generally happier in groups and while experiencing social interactions, the quality and number of social relationships appears to be causative of high levels of subjective well-being (Caunt et al., 2013; Diener & Chan, 2011; Diener & Scollon, 2014; Mogilner et al., 2010; Ng & Diener, 2014). In groups, individuals manifest more positive affect, whereas loneliness is highly correlated with depression (Dolphin & Hennessy, 2014; Masi et al., 2010). Additionally, social interactions tend to buffer major life stressors such as unemployment and bereavement (Lyubomirsky, 2011; Mancini et al., 2011; McKee-Ryan, Song, Wanberg, & Kinicki, 2005; Myers & Diener, 1995). Subjective well-being levels have been found to be higher with married individuals, however, due to hedonic adaptation, individuals tend to return to baseline happiness set points after marriage (Bao, 2012; Uglanova & Staudinger, 2013). As a concomitant to this phenomena, divorced individuals show lower levels of average well-being, and divorce has shown to cause substantial declines in subjective well-being without the rebound effect to prior levels of well-being (Lucas, 2005, 2007). Again, it may be the case that many individuals who divorce had lower levels of well-being prior to marriage. Such correlations with respect to marriage and divorce and well-being have been shown to be consistent across cultures (Lee & Ono, 2012; Nes, Røysamb, Harris, Czajkowski, & Tambs, 2010).

The relationship between unemployment, income and well-being patterns has been studied with unemployment being highly correlated with negative impact on subjective well-being, with individuals generally not returning to happiness baseline set points even after gaining employment (Diener, Inglehart, et al., 2012; Kahneman & Krueger, 2006; Lyubomirsky, 2011; Oishi et al., 2007; Verme, 2011). Therefore, it seems that unemployment may even impact long-term happiness. However, the relationship between income level and well-being is positively correlated, but yields diminishing returns as increased income levels substantially increase well-being for those at poverty levels or in economically undeveloped nations, but wealth and well-being correlations decrease, demonstrating a declining marginal utility (Naudé, Amorós, & Cristi, 2014). Also, individuals who view money and material possessions as primary interests tend to manifest low levels of satisfaction and positive affect (Kasser et al., 2014; Norris, Lambert, DeWall, & Fincham, 2012; Stillman, Fincham, Vohs, Lambert, & Phillips, 2012). Cross culturally, life satisfaction has been highly correlated with national income level (Wolbring et al., 2013), and yet nationally oriented social and psychological factors are more correlated with emotional well-being. Hence, though income level impacts emotional well-being, numerous other factors are even more impactful. More precisely, the effects of culture in industrialized societies and associated economic development are correlated with high levels of subjective well-being (Davidson, Pacek, & Radcliff, 2013; Tay & Diener, 2011). However, in many cultures poverty is not found to be devastating of life satisfaction (Biswas-Diener & Patterson, 2010; Diener, Oishi, & Ryan, 2013). For example, low income individuals in the United States have lower levels of life satisfaction and higher levels of negative affect than many individuals living in even more dire circumstances in Calcutta (Diener, Ng, Harter, & Arora, 2010; Diener et al., 2003; Tay & Diener, 2011). It seems that other factors such as human rights, democratic rights, and longevity may be explanatory of varying levels of subjective well-being.

Along with economic indicators such as the GDP and social indicators such as literacy rates or crime, more comprehensive measures of quality of life which monitor well-being may be useful (Brett et al., 2012; Carpentier et al., 2011; Diener & Diener, 2011; Diener, Inglehart, et al., 2012; Diener et al., 2003; Emmons & Stern, 2013; Forgeard, Jayawickreme, Kern, & Seligman, 2011; Gámez, Chmielewski, Kotov, Ruggero, & Watson, 2011; Jordan, Masters, Hooker, Ruiz, & Smith, 2013; Pavot, 2013). This would reflect the fact that many individuals see happiness and well-being as more important than merely materialistic goals; this would also be applicable in modern societies where individuals have the ability to seek more a fulfilling life than that provided by economic subsistence alone. Therefore, new measures of well-being are necessary to provide a more comprehensive picture of the functioning of well-being in modern societies and varieties of cultural contexts where individuals experience varying levels of subjective well-being and psychological needs. Thus, research such as the present study, with a view to examining the efficacy of psychotherapeutic interventions and the nexus with subjective well-being are significant.

Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy

MBCT utilizes elements derived from cognitive behavioral therapy and ancient Buddhist mindfulness practices to treat a wide range of psychological conditions including depression (Batink, Peeters, Geschwind, van Os, & Wichers, 2013), anxiety disorders (King et al., 2013; McManus, Muse, Surawy, Hackmann, & Williams, 2014; Surawy, McManus, Muse, & Williams, 2014), bipolar disorders (Cotton et al., 2015; Williams et al., 2008), pain management (Moore & Martin, 2014), chronic unhappiness (Collard, Avny, & Boniwell, 2008; Mason & Hargreaves, 2001), and insomnia (Ong, Ulmer, & Manber, 2012; Yook, Lee, Ryu, & Kim, 2008). Essentially the therapeutic goal of MBCT is the incorporation and realization of a radically new perspective and mode of being in relation to feelings and thoughts rather than addressing specific cognitive difficulties. The mindfulness construct itself has been defined as follows: Mindfulness is the awareness that emerges through paying attention on purpose, in the present moment, and nonjudgmentally to things as they are (Kabat-Zinn, 2003).

Numerous practices exist aimed at developing mindfulness such as meditation, walking meditation, breathing exercises, body scanning, and increased awareness of everyday activities. The goal of these methods is the promotion of augmented awareness of individual thoughts and feelings rather than pronounced effort at modification of specific thought content. As such, MBCT integrates elements of mindfulness and cognitive therapy, but with a modified goal orientation (Baer, Smith, & Hopkins, 2006; Collard et al., 2008; Kabat-Zinn, 2003; McManus et al., 2014). The emphasis is laid upon acceptance of thoughts and emotions, present moment awareness, and self-compassion rather than engaging in attempts to fight or avoid unwanted feelings and thoughts, which oftentimes intensifies psychological difficulties. Hence, in this sense MBCT is radically different from traditional CBT in that the main focus is simply placed upon awareness of feelings and thoughts and concomitant metacognitive awareness rather than alteration of thought content. Although this fundamental difference in perspective exists, the resulting diminution of destructive thought patterns occurs via either approach. For example, from the viewpoint of MBCT, a thought such as “I am no good” may be seen as simply another impermanent cognition that rises and sets during meditation, whereas the traditional approach of CBT advocates challenging the rational validity of the statement. Methodologically, mindfulness permits the flow of thoughts and feelings without effort at transforming or avoiding rather than challenging dysfunctional beliefs and creating new interpretations. Hence, MBCT takes an intuitive thought process focused perspective rather than a thought content focused one.

Summarizing, the underlying mechanism in MBCT transformation is founded upon the enhancement of metacognitive awareness through the realization of an altered mode of being wherein an individual is able to become aware of the discrepancy between a subjective viewpoint of how things ‘should be’ versus how things ‘are in reality’. Of course such an awareness can clearly become a source of increased suffering and dissatisfaction unless the focus of attention is integrated with acceptance of the present moment reality. Through the cultivation of nonjudgmental current moment awareness along with acceptance, negative cycles of rumination about the past or fears of the future may be minimized by decreasing generalized cognitive reactivity. In this way individual attention may be intentionally allocated to more flexible behavioral and cognitive responses. By consciously labeling feelings and thoughts as mental events, stressing cognitions inevitably diminish and less demand is placed upon cognitive energy resources. Effectively, present moment awareness may be utilized to enhance psychological well-being and emotional balance by minimizing habitual reaction patterns and promoting conscious response to experiences. Instead of avoiding or suppressing experiences or cognitions through elaboration and becoming enmeshed in their content, mindfulness promotes the observation of these elements as transient events in the mind through non-identified detachment, the adoption of a nonjudgmental attitude toward both unpleasant and pleasant experiences and generally increased openness and acceptance. As such, advanced mindfulness is well correlated with life satisfaction, optimism, positive affect, self-esteem, and diminished rumination (Caprara, Steca, Alessandri, Abela, & McWhinnie, 2011; Collard et al., 2008; Grossman, 2010). Hence, the range of conditions to which MBCT is applicable is extensive, its connection to traditional CBT clear, and its efficacy is well established.

The Search for Meaning in Life and Well-Being

Numerous studies have confirmed a connection between well-being and meaning in life (Heintzelman & King, 2014; Heintzelman, Trent, & King, 2013; Hicks, Schlegel, & King, 2010; Hicks, Trent, Davis, & King, 2012; Kashdan et al., 2013; McIntosh et al., 2011; Schlegel, Hicks, King, & Arndt, 2011; Steger & Kashdan, 2008; Steger & Frazier, 2005; Stillman et al., 2012). The human desire for self-comprehension and understanding of the external world and universe is made manifest by cognitive and behavioral pursuits. It seems that through self-understanding and comprehending the universe at large, humans attempt to comprehend their place in life. However, there is a great deal of variance in the efforts from individual to individual relative to an active search for meaning, particularly in terms of the intensity of the effort applied to creating or augmenting the purpose of life. Since the search for meaning acts as a fundamental motivational force, it seems that it must necessarily be part of a healthy psychological existence wherein individuals pursue new opportunities and challenges based on the desire to comprehend and organize experiences.

Although some researchers have intimated that the search for meaning is indicative of frustrated needs (Flanagan, 2010; Steger & Kashdan, 2008) or conflicting motivations (Cozzolino & Blackie, 2013; Cranney, 2013; Ritchie, Sedikides, Wildschut, Arndt, & Gidron, 2011), it may be the case that the quest for meaning is rooted in numerous underlying motivations. Possibly, deficits in happiness may stimulate the search for meaning, and it may be dependent on individual cognitive styles related to understanding and organizing information and individual cognitive and intellectual preferences. The quest for meaning may also be related to the fact that some individuals simply question everything, or to the fact that they have a propensity for the novel and are more curious than others. It may also be related to the pursuit of future goals or the inability to relinquish negative past experiences.

Constructive developmental theories that focus on self-understanding and socialization emphasize the development of meaning and the process of meaning making longitudinally (Cook-Greuter & Soulen, 2007; Cook-Greuter, 2004; Ingersoll & Cook-Greuter, 2007). Consideration is inevitably given to individual interpretations of experience over time by elaborating the ongoing process of self-understanding, development, and concomitant meaning system evolution and psychosocial growth. This theory posits that individuals actively construct methods of understanding themselves in the world, that identifiable stages and patterns of consciousness develop in specific invariant sequences, that orders of consciousness are inevitably more complex through time, and finally that levels of consciousness dictate and influence subjective perception and awareness. From a horizontal perspective, the search for meaning may be primarily related to personality traits such as openness to experience, and it is therefore a desirable psychological quality that compels individuals to search for meaning when they feel it is lacking. In other words, individuals may search for meaning due to being compelled to frustration in their personal growth and simply see the quest for meaning as a significant element in that quest.

It may also be the case that the search for meaning is directly associated with cognitive styles, particularly with the tendency to question authority and the status quo, and a negative viewpoint toward both the past and the present (Eastwood, Frischen, Fenske, & Smilek, 2012; Kim, Seto, Davis, & Hicks, 2014; Park, Park, & Peterson, 2010; Steger, Oishi, & Kesebir, 2011). From this viewpoint the search for meaning relates to opening up new avenues for life fulfillment, rumination on negative past experiences, and a feeling of futility toward current circumstances. In other words, both positive and negative motivations and orientations may be influential in spurring a search for meaning. It is therefore possible that those seeking meaning in life may not have a future time perspective, but are rather focused more on the past and present. Therefore, the search for meaning may not truly express a fundamental psychological need to comprehend existence, but may in fact represent psychological traits and correlation with numerous personality and cognitive variables resulting from psychological factors such as unhappiness about present circumstances and past experiences, over-thinking, and anxiety in addition to positive factors such as curiosity, receptivity, investigating, questioning, and absorption or flow.

The Pursuit of Happiness

Deeply embedded in our culture is the notion of the right or even duty of every individual to pursue happiness. In fact, it is an integral dimension in the lives of most individuals and even an obsession for some (Layous & Lyubomirsky, 2012; Lyubomirsky, Dickerhoof, et al., 2011; Oishi et al., 2007; Sheldon & Lyubomirsky, 2006; Zhong & Mitchell, 2012). From a research point of view, many attempts have been made to ascertain the value of individual strategies to promote self-reported happiness through an examination of the relationship between happiness strategies, personality traits, and subjective levels of well-being with (a) happiness associated with frequency of positive affective states of consciousness (Garland et al., 2010; Nickerson, Diener, & Schwarz, 2011; Nisbet, Zelenski, & Murphy, 2011); (b) judgments of happiness relating to generalized affective self-appraisals and inherently subjective affect ratings (Diener & Scollon, 2014); (c) long-term happiness represented by the experience of positive well-being over long periods of time (Caunt et al., 2013; Lyubomirsky, Dickerhoof, et al., 2011). Investigations of the causes of happiness involve demographics, life circumstances, intentional behaviors, and also personality traits (Caunt et al., 2013; Kaczmarek et al., 2013; Lyubomirsky & Layous, 2013). Research has found that ethnicity, age, and gender play a negligible role, explaining only minimally variances in happiness levels (Bailey & Snyder, 2010; Herian, Tay, Hamm, & Diener, 2014; Nolen-Hoeksema & Aldao, 2011). Some studies have indicated that biologically based, enduring dispositional personality traits account for a significant percentage of subjective well-being (Hampson, 2012; Kandler, Bleidorn, Riemann, Angleitner, & Spinath, 2011; Olesen, 2011).

Extraversion and neuroticism have been found to be strongly correlated with well-being and happiness with extraverts reporting higher levels than introverts and neurotic individuals reporting lower levels of well-being than those who are emotionally stable (Aghajani et al., 2013; Quevedo et al., 2011; Zhang & Tsingan, 2013). It is possible that extraversion permits individuals to be exposed to a greater level of mood-relevant information, and is involved in a causal sequence conducive to happiness through seeking out social behaviors and activities that increase positive moods and overall happiness synergistically, involving conscious self-regulatory actions and strategies protective of increased happiness levels. As extraverts are inevitably involved in a greater number of social situations, these may act as an inducement for constructive sociability and an inevitable engagement in volitional happiness increasing strategies. As intentional behavior is amenable to conscious modification, it may be key to prescriptive programs for increase in well-being such as CBT/REBT. In other words, individuals may engage in intentional activities to consciously promote long-term happiness. Of course, activities need to be selected properly to avoid those that either do nothing or are actually detrimental.

In summary, it seems that circumstantial factors are explanatory for only a minute portion of variation in happiness, while personality and dispositional traits are critical. Substantial portions of happiness variance may be influenced by intentional behaviors and strategies to control mood through self-regulatory mechanisms to control both transient mood and even affect long-term happiness (Labroo, Mukhopadhyay, & Dong, 2014; Livingstone & Srivastava, 2012; Warner & Vroman, 2011). Such mechanisms may include (a) social affiliation, which is strongly tied to happiness and a reduction of dysphoria (Querstret & Cropley, 2013) and is associated with increases in happiness through social activity (Layous, Nelson, & Lyubomirsky, 2013); (b) efforts to ward off unwanted thoughts that may unintentionally maintain or even exacerbate negative emotion (Gruber, Harvey, & Gross, 2012; McRae et al., 2012; Webb, Miles, & Sheeran, 2012); (c) an instrumental commitment to and realization of personal goals or goal pursuit associated with well-being and positive moods (Herrmann & Brandstätter, 2013; Sheldon, 2014); (d) active leisure, which has been associated with well-being possibly due to a redirection of focus away from the individual self (Engberg et al., 2012; Mobily, 2014) resulting in lower levels of anxiety, depression, and stress to improve mood and increase the probability of ‘flow’(Havitz, Kaczynski, & Mannell, 2013); (e) religion, which has been found to be a strong predictor of well-being (Hill et al., 2012; Wilmoth et al., 2014) possibly by providing increased social connectedness and life purpose as well as diminishing maladaptive behaviors (Neff & Pommier, 2013); (f) direct attempts at simply assuming an attitude of happiness through conscious acting out the expression of happiness (Chang, Zhang, Hitchman, Qiu, & Liu, 2014; Kemp & Kopp, 2011; Shafir et al., 2013).

The Art of Happiness

Subjective factors seem to be relatively important in explaining happiness (Owens & Derakshan, 2013; Owens, Koster, & Derakshan, 2012). It seems that individuals actively filter and respond to life events, and this subjective process may explain the differential influence of objective factors. Therefore, analyzing the behaviors, goals, and cognitive differences between exceptionally happy individuals through an examination of the motivational, behavioral, and cognitive processes through which these individuals create and sustain happiness through deriving satisfaction from their experiences forms the basis of a happiness art of living. The ways in which happy people evaluate and respond differently than less happy individuals has been researched and measured, and provides useful insights (Diener, Inglehart, et al., 2012; Holmes & Mathews, 2010; Lyubomirsky & Ross, 1997; Lyubomirsky & Tucker, 1998; Schwartz et al., 2002). Since happiness seems to be a subjective phenomena, it seems appropriate that information gathered relative to happiness levels is best derived from the subjective evaluation of individuals under consideration through such assessments as those used in this dissertation: (a) Subjective Happiness Scale, (b) Personal Growth Initiative Scale, (c) Meaning in Life Questionnaire, (d) Satisfaction with Life Scale, and (e) Gratitude Questionnaire.

It seems that happiness represents not merely a transient construct related to mood states, but rather a more fundamental enduring phenomena (Caunt et al., 2013; Kaczmarek et al., 2013; Lyubomirsky & Layous, 2013). It may be that happy individuals respond to events and utilize distinctly different decision-making strategies manifesting consistent patterns of content with their options and decisions. In relation to CBT/REBT, perfectionistic thinking may relate to finding the absolute optimal choice vs. simply finding an acceptable option. In fact, the perfectionistic decision-making strategy is actually negatively correlated with happiness (Brockmann & Yan, 2013; Chang et al., 2011; Johnston et al., 2012; Lyubomirsky, 2011; Purvis, Howell, & Iyer, 2011; Steger et al., 2006). It seems that exhaustively searching for optimal decision options may produce objectively better outcomes on a transient basis, but that such perfectionistic oriented individuals manifest increased post-decision regret and therefore lower levels of happiness than happy individuals, who tend to be more content with non-optimal solutions by ceasing to review the ramifications of already completed decisions. Happy individuals consistently manifest such a non-perfectionistic pattern of decision-making and post-decisional rationalization and contentment with a non-optimal decision through a protective pattern of decision response which tends to increase self-esteem by engaging in a dissonance-reducing post-decision reaction; this maintains positive emotions and self-worth (Lyubomirsky, 2011; Sharot, Fleming, Yu, Koster, & Dolan, 2012). Conversely, unhappy individuals’ post-decisional evaluations manifest dissatisfaction with a choice, irrespective of whether decisions were related to inconsequential or consequential matters.

Another factor influencing happiness levels relates to social comparisons with others. Happy individuals exhibit a relative insensitivity with regard to social comparisons, and thereby are able to maintain a positive emotional state in spite of the inevitable fluctuations of their own social conditions relative to others (Kassam, Morewedge, Gilbert, & Wilson, 2011; Lyubomirsky, Boehm, et al., 2011; Lyubomirsky & Tucker, 1998; Schwartz et al., 2002; Wood, 1989). It seems that the self-esteem and moods of happy individuals are somewhat impervious to peer comparisons. Also, happy individuals seem to be less involved with and concerned about micromanaging their emotional lives than unhappy individuals, who a tend to engage in lengthy ruminations reflecting on their own feelings, cognitions, and weaknesses (Bollich, Johannet, & Vazire, 2011; Koster, De Lissnyder, Derakshan, De Raedt, & Lissnyder, 2011; Lyubomirsky, Kasri, & Zehm, 2003; Michl, McLaughlin, Shepherd, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2013; Simsek, 2013; Verhaeghen, Joormann, & Aikman, 2014). This may appear to be counterintuitive, as many individuals believe that self-analysis and introspection are in fact beneficial keys to solving personal problems and even becoming enlightened. Therefore, although such self-reflective practices may increase self-knowledge and produce insight, they may do so at the cost of individual happiness. It may be that over-rumination involving prolonged self-reflection may involve a high cost and even be related to creating an intensifying depressive affect, and is therefore maladaptive from the viewpoint of personal happiness. Some evidence has shown that dispositionally happy individuals are less inclined to self-reflection (Lyubomirsky, Boehm, et al., 2011; Schwartz et al., 2002) and therefore may avoid some of these negative consequences, impairments, and cognitive pitfalls such as negative bias thinking, impaired concentration, dysphoria, decreased problem solving ability, and increased generalized stress levels (Brown & Brown, 2011). Happy individuals appear to be somewhat immune to self-reflection and introspection regarding the negative effects of failure by spending less time focusing on themselves (Kross et al., 2011; Stein & Grant, 2014; Tsai & Lau, 2013; Yoon & Joormann, 2012). Also, happy individuals use relatively fewer negatively biased words and experience relatively less negative thoughts in free association tasks (Hertel & Brozovich, 2010; Kashdan, Weeks, & Savostyanova, 2011; Kuo, Edge, & Ramel, 2011; Layous, Chancellor, Lyubomirsky, Wang, & Doraiswamy, 2011). Thus, it seems that unhappy individuals tend to spend more time dwelling on failure and associated memories from past failures, thereby impacting mood depression, self-confidence, and impairing performance and concentration. Happy individuals, though aware of failure, are able to compartmentalize negative experiences and minimize disappointment. As such, the cognitive processing strategies that characterize happy individuals avoid excessive self-reflection, which may usurp cognitive resources and precipitate self-perpetuating cycles of negative affect and diminished happiness.

One of the main alternative strategies utilized by happy individuals to avoid obsessive self-reflection is the constructive use of distraction and absorption in enjoyable activities and thoughts (Carpentier et al., 2011; Teismann, Michalak, Willutzki, & Schulte, 2012). Such constructive distractions may be particularly beneficial when the attention causes absorption and a sense of self transcendence (Csikszentmihalyi, 2014b). Attentional focus then seems to induce more positive moods than self-reflecting activities and is a highly effective strategy for improving mood and general happiness levels.

Obviously, individual responses to external events vary greatly, and response style is highly impactful on the level of happiness experienced (Lyubomirsky & Dickerhoof, 2011; Pe, Koval, & Kuppens, 2013). Happy individuals tend to interpret their life experiences more positively and their negative life experiences less negatively than unhappy individuals, and utilize different cognitive strategies such as humor or dwelling on avenues of improvement to respond to events. In other words, happy individuals manifest a proclivity toward positively biased cognition and a readiness to evaluate events, new situations, and people positively, thereby sustaining their individual happiness and increasing the probability of eliciting positive outcomes and responses from others.

Although happiness seems to be impacted by varying responses to life events, through hedonic adaptation happiness levels seem to reset to a particular point over time (Jacobs Bao, Lyubomirsky, & Bao, 2013; Layous & Lyubomirsky, 2012; Layous et al., 2011; Lyubomirsky, 2011; Sheldon & Lyubomirsky, 2006; Sheldon & Lyubomirsky, 2012; Uglanova & Staudinger, 2013). This certainly indicates that it may be at least difficult, if not impossible, for individuals to modify dispositional happiness, but fortunately, other research indicates that modification of levels of well-being and happiness is correlated with various motivational and cognitive factors yielding volitional strategies for self-transformation in therapeutic intervention (Caunt et al., 2013; Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2010; Huang & Bargh, 2014; Kaczmarek et al., 2013; Lyubomirsky, Dickerhoof, et al., 2011; Morf & Horvath, 2010; Sheldon & Lyubomirsky, 2006; Tkach & Lyubomirsky, 2006; Vella-Brodrick, 2012). In fact numerous strategies are actually causal and amenable to direct manipulation, such as direct changes in commitment to activities, engaging in acts of kindness, and practicing gratitude (Vella-Brodrick, 2012).

A number of aspects Tibetan Buddhist thought are resonant with these aspects of positive psychology and CBT as numerous points of tangency exist between the explanation of the cause of afflictive emotions and the realization of enduring happiness (Ekman & Davidson, 2005; Kabat-Zinn, 2003; Rapgay & Bystrisky, 2009; Wallace, 2001). The aforementioned substantial body of studies on well-being set points indicates that even significant events only transiently alter individual states of happiness; individuals tend to return to their dispositional happiness set point. This coincides with the essence of the Tibetan Buddhist construct of sukha which essentially refers to a fundamental sense of well-being, compassion, reduced vulnerability to the vicissitudes of life, and an enhanced sense of interconnectedness with all living beings.

The Tibetan Buddhist and CBT systems both contain methods for modifying affective traits and cultivating long-term, enduring happiness through the cultivation of positive attributes of mind through continuing persistent effort. Both systems acutely focus on the interaction between emotion, thoughts, words, and actions. Both systems attempt to assist individuals in reducing suffering (duhkha) and achieving permanent happiness (sukha). Additionally, both CBT and Tibetan Buddhism posit that radical transformation of consciousness is necessary to realize these goals, and both systems strive to achieve emotional balance by learning to distinguish between subjective appearances and conceptual superimpositions as opposed to objective reality. Through proper training the goal for both is to perceive sense material and mental states in an undistorted manner free from subjective projections. Both systems attempt to realize mental states that are in actuality conducive to long-term well-being i.e. to employ skillful methods. Each system clearly distinguishes between affective states that are stimulated by transient physical and mental stimuli and a deeper awareness derived from mindful attention to emotion and cognition that ultimately creates an experience of happiness that is not contingent upon particular places, times, or circumstances. Both Tibetan Buddhism and CBT reject suppression as a tool to subdue destructive mental states and rather attempt to identify, through increased awareness, the manner in which they arise, are experienced, and their consequent emotional and mental impact. In other words, both require the cultivation and refinement of introspective abilities to monitor mental states and activities in order to enable the individual to become aware of disruptive and afflictive emotions and thoughts.

Individual Differences in Subjective Happiness

A purely objectivist view of happiness predicated on the idea that happy individuals are essentially those enjoying special advantages has been found to be lacking support (Diener & Scollon, 2014; Lyubomirsky, Dickerhoof, et al., 2011). In contrast, the theory that individuals create their own experiences via the manner in which they perceive, interpret, and remember actual experiences and events which then cause happiness has conversely found much support (Layous & Lyubomirsky, 2012; Lyubomirsky & Layous, 2013; Lyubomirsky, Dickerhoof, et al., 2011; Lyubomirsky, Sheldon, et al., 2005). Therefore, it seems that individual differences in happiness levels are directly linked, causally based on the manner in which individuals perceive, interpret, and view both major and minor life situations and events. Chronically happy and unhappy individuals ultimately experience life events in ways that support and bolster their affective dispositions. The cognitive mechanisms by which happiness is maintained have been identified, indicating that happy individuals experience less negative affect and more positive affect based situationally on judgments (Hellén & Sääksjärvi, 2011; Murakami, 2014). Additionally, (a) a sense of humor (Crawford & Caltabiano, 2011; Isen et al., 1987; Lyubomirsky & Tucker, 1998), (b) an ability to solve problems (Anderson, Goddard, & Powell, 2011), and (c) cognitive appraisal (Lee-Flynn, Pomaki, Delongis, Biesanz, & Puterman, 2011; Williams, Hundt, & Nelson-Gray, 2014; Zalewski, Lengua, Wilson, Trancik, & Bazinet, 2011) are effective strategies in moderating the effects of adverse and stressful life events and minimizing psychological distress. Happy individuals seem to be exceptionally skillful in relating to negative events and even turning those into positives. Obviously, it is almost certainly the case that causality is bidirectional, cyclical, and acting as a feedback loop with respect to happiness causing positive interpretations and cognitions about events as well as promoting a constructive construal of life events which then increases and maintains happiness. Ultimately, happy individuals seem to experience, interpret, and respond to external situations in ways that promote positive emotions and self-regard, and this manifests in decision-making and viewing the world and themselves positively in spite of contrary negative life events.

Summary

As a springboard for the research to be pursued in the next chapter, it may be of value to concisely summarize the material presented up to this point in the dissertation. First, the fundamental philosophic structures upon which the two key elements of the current study are based are noteworthy: REBT/CBT is deeply influenced by General Semantics and the MBTI is directly derived from Jungian psychological types. Additionally, both the MBTI and REBT/CBT have been assiduously analyzed and researched, clearly providing overwhelming evidence of substantial philosophical and psychological value. In particular, REBT/CBT has been found to be impressively useful in treating multitudinous clinical problems. However, as reflected in the previous discussion, it is not a panacea. Therefore, the study to be pursued here examines the question of whether there exists a simple and direct method for utilizing the MBTI predicatively to ascertain proactively the utility of REBT/CBT for an arbitrary individual. Additionally analyzed, and possibly more importantly, is the possibility of utilizing the MBTI to determine if in fact REBT/CBT may even produce deleterious effects for a given individual. These issues represent the focus of the study to be pursued in Chapter 3.

Chapter 3 – Method

Purpose of the Study

This study was designed to test the hypothesis that a relationship exists between Jungian psychological types, as measured by the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator of personality variables, and the utility of Cognitive Behavioral therapy restructuring methods (See Appendix D) to produce psychological growth. This was measured by the following assessments: Subjective Happiness Scale, Personal Growth Initiative Scale, Meaning in Life Questionnaire, Satisfaction with Life Scale, and Gratitude Questionnaire (See Appendix A).

Design

All students from my introductory computer science classes at Santa Monica College were included in the study. Hence, no exclusion criteria were utilized with respect to ethnicity, gender, race, or age. The reason for such broad inclusion is that such classes represent a wide-ranging spectrum of diversity within these categories. The sample consisted of 281 students (149 females and 132 males). Subjects were told that they were taking part in a learning experiment by way of a consent form (See Appendix B).

A MBTI test was administered at the beginning of the study by means of a spreadsheet (See Appendix C). As a result of the MBTI assessment, all participants were classified on a percentage basis from 0 to 100 according to four dichotomous dimensions: 1. Extraversion-Introversion, 2. Sensing-Intuition, 3. Thinking-Feeling, and 4.Judging-Perceiving. Hence, sixteen weighted type classifications were possible (ISTJ, ISFJ, INFJ, INTJ, ISTP, ISFP, INFP, INTP, ESTP, ESFP, ENFP, ENTP, ESTJ, ESFJ, ENFJ, ENTJ).

After ascertaining individual psychological type, questionnaires were administered via Surveymonkey for each of the six positive psychology questionnaires used in the study (See Appendix A). Subjects were then exposed by means of readings and written summaries to CBT/REBT concepts throughout a 5 week period (See Appendix D). Finally, the six positive psychology questionnaires were administered for a second time to determine the effect of exposure to CBT concepts.

Confidentiality

Since confidentiality and the protection of privacy of research subjects is of utmost importance, all data submitted have been stored for the duration of the study on my personal computer in an encrypted state in password protected files. Physical access to this computer is completely restricted. Additionally, the minimum necessary participant identification was collected. Although the names of individuals taking the Myers-Briggs spreadsheet assessment were collected, all data collected for this project has been reported without any identifying information. The questionnaires submitted to Surveymonkey do not have any identifying information. Additionally, after data collection, deidentification and confidentiality were ensured through deletion of all materials submitted after data consolidation.

Statistical Analysis

The data collected was subjected to numerous and varied statistical tests. The spreadsheet used to categorize subjects into the 16 Meyers Briggs typologies was subjected to a two sample F-Test for variances followed by a mean-matched pairs test to compare 3 groups from the study (all, females, males) to standard population percentages derived from the full MBTI test. Additionally, a correlation and regression test was implemented to further validate the use of the abbreviated version of the personality test.

Next, after confirming approximately equal variances (homoscedasticity) via Bartlett’s test, an ANOVA test was applied to the before and after difference of the normalized results for the all three categories in the study (‘all subjects’, ‘females’, and ‘males’) to determine whether differences existed in the 16 MBTI types in response to the CBT concepts exposure. After ascertaining whether outcomes were asymmetric by way of an ANOVA test, a two sample F-Test for equality of variances and a Ryan-Joiner test for data normality was applied to each of the 16 types in each of the ‘all’, females’, and ‘males’ categories to justify the use of a dependent mean-matched pairs T-test on the same 48 sets of data. Again, tests were applied to normalized data.

Finally, each of the 8 dichotomous MBTI categories (extroversion, introversion, sensing, intuition, thinking, feeling, judging, and perceiving) was individually analyzed with respect to strength relative to the continuum of opposite poles (e.g. 100 extroversion to 100 introversion) for subjects in the first and fourth quartiles (I>75%, I<25% etc.). After confirming homoscedasticity via Bartlett’s test, an ANOVA test was applied to the before and after difference of the normalized results for all 16 categories to investigate differential effects. This was followed by statistical scrutiny by way of a two sample F-Test for equality of variances and a Ryan-Joiner test for data normality which was followed by a mean-matched test applied to the before and after normalized data difference.

The results of these statistical investigations are given in detail in Appendix F and are summarized in the next chapter.

Chapter 4 – Summary of Data Analysis

Although this summary of the data analysis from Appendix F may seem unwieldy, the final results and conclusions are in fact straightforward and simple. First, an analysis was given of the validity of the abridged personality test given to the subjects (all subjects, females, and males) by way of a spreadsheet (See Appendix C) relative to the full version of the MBTI. After the applicability of a T-test applied to before and after data was indicated by a two sample F-Test for variances and a Ryan-Joiner test for normality (both significance levels < .01), a T-test was performed at a 99% confidence level for the data for all three groups indicating a statistically significant correlation (p < .01) with the full version of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. In addition, a Correlation and Regression test was applied to all three categories and yielded a coefficient of determination > .99 in all cases.

Next, after confirming homoscedasticity via Bartlett’s test (df=15, sig level =.05) an ANOVA test on the normalized data differences to ascertain differential effects from CBT exposure for all three categories (‘All Subjects’, ‘Females’, and ‘Males’) indicated that there were statistically significant differences (p <.01). Following these results, each of the 16 MBTI combinations for the ‘all subjects’, ‘females’, and ‘males’ categories were analyzed to determine which ones experienced changes from the CBT exposure. For each of these 48 categories a two sample F-Test for variances and a Ryan-Joiner test for normality were utilized to justify the application of a T-test. All 48 categories were tested at a .01 significance level and were found to be approximately normal and exhibiting homoscedasticity. Each of the 48 categories were then subjected to a before/after mean-matched pairs test which yielded the following results: two categories (ISTJ and INTJ) showed statistically significant positive transformation (p < .01) from the CBT exposure in each of the subject categories (all, female, and male), and all other cases indicated that there was no significant change in any of the remaining 42 categories i.e. all other groups showed no improvement and no adverse effects from the CBT concept exposure.

The fact that only ISTJ and INTJ yielded any change, led to the hypothesis that I, T, and J may be individually responsible for positive transformation. An investigation into all 8 dichotomous dimensions based on strength of personality type (i.e. >75% or <25%) was therefore pursued. First, a Bartlett’s Test was done to confirm homoscedasticity (significance level = 5%) followed by an ANOVA applied to the ‘all subjects’ category for each of the 16 strength categories (I>75%, I<25%, etc.), which resulted in differences being indicated (p < .01). Each of these 16 categories was then tested at a 5% significance level via a two sample F-test for variances and a Ryan-Joiner test for normality to justify the application of a T test. As all 16 categories were tested at a .01 significance level and were found to be approximately normal and homoscedastic, a T-test was applied to the before and after normalized data which indicated that I > 75%, T > 75%, and J > 75% demonstrated statistically significant improvement (p < .02) after CBT concept exposure, and that all other categories demonstrated no change at a 5% significance level. ¹

Summarizing, consistent with expectations these results indicate that with respect to change from CBT exposure, clear differences exist among the 16 Myers-Briggs types. In particular, two typologies (ISTJ and INTJ) are strongly correlated with successful outcomes as measured by the happiness and goal assessment questionnaires. Additionally, the results indicate that no typologies experienced negative impact from exposure to CBT/REBT concepts. In other words, at worst, 14 typologies demonstrated no progress from concept exposure. Finally, 3 individual personality dimensions (I > 75%, T > 75%, and J > 75%) manifested clear positive change from the CBT concept exposure. The implications of these results are next discussed in chapter 5.

Chapter 5 – Conclusion and Recommendations

This section gives a summary of the conclusions derived from the statistical findings given in Appendix F and Chapter 4, considers limitations of the study, and makes recommendations for further research. The underlying theoretical formulations of cognitive behavioral therapy and the Myers-Briggs type indicator assessment, specifically Korzybski’s General Semantics (Ellis, 2007; Korzybski, 1994; Levinson, 2010) and Jungian personality types (Capraro & Capraro, 2002; Carlyn, 1977; Corr, 1996; Karn, Syed-Abdullah, Cowling, & Holcombe, 2007; Myers, & Myers, 2010; Saggino & Kline, 1996) respectively, provide a firm philosophic, theoretical substructure that support their utilitarian value in research and psychotherapeutic application. Nevertheless, clear, simple, and practical clinical results have also been implicated in this pilot study. In fact, the research presented in this dissertation was conducted to investigate the utility of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator as a predictor of success or failure in the use of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy and Rational Emotive Behavioral Therapy in clinical psychology by quantitatively testing the hypothesis that there exists a relationship between Jungian psychological types, as measured by the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator of personality variables and, after exposure to Cognitive Behavioral Therapy concepts, psychological growth measured by the following: Subjective Happiness Scale, Personal Growth Initiative Scale, Meaning in Life Questionnaire, Satisfaction with Life Scale , and Gratitude Questionnaire. However, the current study does not represent actual hypothesis testing and therefore the efficacy of the correlations which have emerged are preliminary and in no way generalize beyond the present study. As this pilot study represents an initial stage in the design and implementation of the overall research process, larger scale studies could prove fruitful.

The most salient results of the current study are that ISTJ, INTJ, I > 75%, T > 75%, and J > 75% demonstrate constructive change. This was derived from the fact that both dependent matched-means tests for the 16 MBTI types before and after subject groups and independent matched-means tests for the independent categories E-I, S-N, T-F, and P-J indicated an overwhelmingly positive relationship between these particular personality variables and development, as measured by the various questionnaires mentioned above and administered to subjects after exposure to basic cognitive restructuring concepts. The use of these methodologies permitted a clear analysis of the patterns of Myers-Briggs personality and improved outlook. The general pattern of findings provides evidence that personality type may be highly influential with respect to improvement of outlook derived from cognitive behavioral therapy. Hence, not only was the initial hypothesis, simply relating to the fact that differences in the 16 personality types would exist validated, but potentially a very simple method for predicting the utility of cognitive behavioral restructuring methods through solely finding the strengths of the I, T, and J types unexpectedly emerged. These results suggest that a simple clinical test of personality type may be utilized to decide therapeutic direction for this modality. Clearly this suggests a method for maximizing the effectiveness of the utilization of this method in psychotherapeutic clinical settings. The present study indicates that it may be quite advantageous to consider the various Jungian type manifestations since they are most likely so impactful on the outcomes of rational emotive behavior therapy and cognitive behavioral therapy. When personality typology indicates that a particular individual would most likely benefit by these modalities, it is highly desirable to utilize such methods; otherwise the results indicate that these approaches may be effectively a waste of time.

In one sense the results of the current study should not be surprising. Even casual consideration of the three types that manifested strongly constructive transformation as measured by the psychological growth surveys lends support to this view. Prior research (Campbell & Heller, 1987; Edwards, 2003; Edwards, Lanning, & Hooker, 2002; Lorr, 1991) on these personality dimensions indicates that ‘introverted-thinking’ typologies are inclined to use exact wording to express ideas, notice minute differentiations in the underlying definition of things, and are prone to analysis and classification. Also, they tend to examine every facet of an issue and attempt to construct systems and models which are free from logical inconsistency to solve generalized problems while at the same time minimizing risk and effort. Introverted thinking types zealously endeavor to find a precise wording to unambiguously express ideas in as concise a manner as possible (Beebe, 2012; Cahill & Polich, 1992). Internally they make every effort to engage the fundamental qualities and fine distinctions that lie at the essence of an object or subject before categorizing or naming it. Hence, they are profoundly inclined to internal reasoning in the derivation of classes and subcategories, general principles and subsidiary principles. Their systems are used in analysis, problem-solving, and the evolution of ideas by considering multifaceted issues and flushing out inconsistencies. This requires constant vigilance with respect to logical inconsistencies regarding fundamental frameworks and systemic axiomatic statements in the pursuit of models used to evaluate the universe at large. Judging types usually employ planned structures and organization in daily tasks utilizing guidelines and fixed methods to complete goal directed tasks in a step-by-step manner, and thinking types are inclined to utilize logic and principles to arrive at decisions dispassionately and rationally (Campbell & Heller, 1987; Edwards et al., 2002; Lorr, 1991). REBT and CBT are obviously attractive to and would be ideal candidate systems for such types.

The present results also suggest that correlations may be found not only between the Myers-Briggs type indicator and specific psychotherapeutic modalities, but also between other personality assessments such as self-report inventories (MMPI-2, Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire, California Personality Inventory, NEO Personality Inventory), projective personality tests (Rorschach test, Thematic Apperception Test), the five-factor model, Cattell’s 16PF Trait Theory, Allport’s Trait Theory, (Bouchard, McGue, Hur, & Horn, 1998; Kasser et al., 2014; King et al., 1999; McCrae & Costa, 1997; McCrae et al., 1999; Sherman, Nave, & Funder, 2010; Steger & Kashdan, 2008) and the numerous varieties of psychotherapeutic theories of personality and concomitant interventions.² In other words, the results presented here suggest that practical targeted assessment screening tests may have remarkable utility in ascertaining the viability of a particular modality to be utilized in a clinical setting. It may be feasible, appropriate, and even essential to select intervention strategies based on simple personality assessments rather than leaving it to psychotherapists’ intuitive heuristics. Instead, utilizing the actuality of strong correlations between assessments and treatment modalities, clinicians may more accurately guide clients to the proper type of treatment rather than relying on their ‘default mode’ or favorite system by simply administering a personality assessment and guiding the client to the indicated associated treatment modality. Any systematic method of choosing a client appropriate type of therapy would necessarily facilitate consciousness growth. Of course, before implementing a program based on the results of this pilot study, obviously further research is in order to probe and validate the results of this dissertation in particular and more generally to investigate other psychological assessments and relationships to varieties of psychotherapeutic modalities.

Criticisms of the Study

Of course, as with nearly all research this study has limitations. Issues concerning the generalizability of the findings are raised by the use of the community college students who served as subjects for the study. In fact, this may be the primary weakness given that subjects were chosen from a highly restricted group of community college students with an interest in technology, mostly under the age of 25 years old. Additionally, the pool of subjects was not seeking ‘treatment’. This obviously places limits on the generalizability of the findings. Future research may possibly attempt to rectify this through the utilization of a more diverse pool of subjects in terms of age, educational interest, gender, socioeconomic status, race, ethnicity, income, occupation, and religious affiliation, and spirituality. Research of this nature might allow further elucidation of the processes by which the expression of happiness behaviors may be measured and realized.

Another limitation of the current study is the fact that the distribution of individuals in both the study and in the general population in each of the 16 MBTI groups is not uniform and therefore, in spite of the total of 281 subjects altogether, some groups consisted of only a few individuals and therefore conclusions may be subject to statistical error. One solution to this may be to do a study on a much broader scale to wash this effect out. Additionally, methodological issues must also be noted with regards to the self-selection to opt into the study, and also by the fact that subjects were given extra credit for participating.

Another fundamental criticism of the study is related to the fact that as an assessment device the MBTI is not without criticism (Boyle, 1995; Capraro & Capraro, 2002; Lorr, 1991). The rigid classifications of such tests as the Myers-Briggs type indicator has been criticized in the light of Jung’s views on psychological types by warnings that such objective scoring necessarily leads to fallacious assumptions and conclusions (Boyle, 1995; Bradway & Detloff, 1976; Carlyn, 1977; Corr, 1996). Also, the utility of measuring Jungian psychological types through the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator has been criticized due to its dichotomous scoring and forced-choice response formats (Boyle, 1995; Capik & Gozum, 2014; Harvey & Murry, 2010; Ried, 2014; Vispoel & Kim, 2014; Webb, 1964). Differential weighting of item responses and alternative measurements have been suggested such as the Personal Preferences Self-Description Questionnaire (Ghaderi, 2005; Kier, Melancon, & Thompson, 1998; Leach, 2006; Light, Joyce, & Frampton, 2009; Marsh, Ellis, Parada, Richards, & Heubeck, 2005; Sarafino & Graham, 2006; Vacha-Haase, Thompson, & Vacha-Haase, 2002). The Singer-Loomis Type Deployment Inventory, Personal Preferences Self-Description Questionnaire and the five-factor model have also been proposed as alternatives to Jungian personality measurement of psychometric properties (Andreassen et al., 2013; Arnau, Rosen, & Thompson, 2000; Bjørnebekk et al., 2013; Furnham, 1996; Gore & Widiger, 2013; Kristjansson, 2012; Lorr, 1991; MacDonald, 1995; McAdams, 1992; Murray & Russ, 1981; Samuel, South, & Griffin, 2015; Saucier, 1994; Trull, 2012; Walker & Jackson, 2014; Widiger & Presnall, 2013; Wiggins & Schwartz, 1991).

In addition to these findings, even if the MBTI assessment is hypothesized as a valid predictor of psychological types, some studies indicate little or no utility in some domains. For example, one study showed that the selection of psychotherapeutic orientation and personality variables related to student enrollment in theoretical counseling courses showed no statistically significant relationship for preference of theory as measured by the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (Freeman, Hayes, Kuch, & Taub, 2007) and the relationship between environmental circumstances and internal personal attributes as they relate to job satisfaction indicates that MBTI psychological types may be unrelated to job satisfaction (Thomas, Buboltz, & Winkelspecht, 2004). Another study generally investigated the relationship between self-knowledge, wisdom and maturity, and balancing polarities of the MBTI psychological types. A subtle analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of preferences and concomitant limitations was delineated concluding that no one-dimensional behavioral guide may be derived from a simplistic analysis of type preferences (Boyle, 1995; Capraro & Capraro, 2002; Edwards, 2003; Lloyd, 2012(a)). However, the remarkable results of the current pilot study demonstrating strong correlations between two MBTI types and improved outlook from CBT concept exposure diverge from these opposing studies and lend support to the superabundance of previously mentioned research supporting the predictive value of the MBTI.

A final criticism is that the application of a horizontal treatment modality such as CBT may not be useful when addressing issues in the vertical dimension. In fact, this may ironically be the case in regard to Analytical Psychology. As positive and negative archetypal opposites necessarily coexist, manifesting in both light and dark aspects, Jung believed that a union of opposites was necessary to avoid enantiodromia (psychic imbalance due to the unconscious development of a polar opposite). In fact, he conceived that enlightenment and individuation are possible only by harmonizing and ultimately transcending dualities. The balancing of dualities does not come about through repression of a polar opposite, but rather by experiencing, through awareness and acceptance, both the light and dark aspects of each archetype. From this perspective, within Analytical Psychology or any modality focused on the vertical dimension of psychological growth and development, it may be necessary to utilize psychological type and the innate drive towards wholeness and well-being to facilitate deeper psychic structural change and spiritual transformation within a multidimensional context.

Future Research

Despite the aforementioned limitations, the preponderance of studies previously mentioned in this dissertation indicates that the MBTI is a research assessment tool of longstanding value. Hence, the conclusions of the present research validly suggest numerous courses for future research and practice. In accord with much research in positive psychology (Frisch, 2013; Green, Oades, & Grant, 2006; Henderson, Knight, & Richardson, 2013; Landor, 2013; Mak, Ng, & Wong, 2011; Niven, Totterdell, Holman, & Headley, 2012; O’Brien, 2012; Rusk & Waters, 2014; Schueller, 2011; Steger & Kashdan, 2013), the present study indicates that certain types of individuals can undoubtedly influence their own well-being via cognitive restructuring methods. Hence, additionally, the present results shed light on the theoretical philosophic positions advocated by those who hold the viewpoint of automatic processing (Baumeister, Crescioni, & Alquist, 2011; Ebert & Wegner, 2011; Ent & Baumeister, 2014; McKenna, 2012; Pronin & Kugler, 2010; Simonton, 2013), as well as the practical application by therapists attempting to not only alleviate suffering but increase happiness in clients. As alluded to in the literature review, even though individuals seem to carry automatic default response mechanisms (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Bargh, Lombardi, & Higgins, 1988; Bargh, Schwader, Hailey, Dyer, & Boothby, 2012; Bargh & Ferguson, 2000; Bargh, 2011; Huang & Bargh, 2014; Macrae & Johnston, 1998; McConnell, Shoda, & Skulborstad, 2012; Orbell & Verplanken, 2010; Ockenfels, & Mussweiler, 2014; Teachman, Joormann, Steinman, & Gotlib, 2012), it at least appears that a few targeted types are able to realize transformation through cognitive restructuring (Ehlers et al., 2010; Fisk, 2010; Lyubomirsky, Boehm, Kasri, & Zehm, 2011). Additionally, even though the literature review gave ample consideration to the possibility of automaticity of cognitive processes, the fact that some categories realized constructive change, through concept exposure alone, diminishes the likelihood of the automatic processing perspective being ultimately true. The fact that constructive change was produced in the current research lends support to the fundamental claims of positive psychology relative to the possibility of self-transformation which advocate the viability of utilizing specific transformational strategies to effect psychological well-being (Crawford & Caltabiano, 2011; Fredrickson, 2001; Layous, Chancellor, Lyubomirsky, Wang, & Doraiswamy, 2011; Lyubomirsky, King, & Diener, 2005; Rashid, 2014; Schueller & Seligman, 2010; Sheldon & Lyubomirsky, 2012; Tay & Diener, 2011; Thoen & Robitschek, 2013; Tugade & Fredrickson, 2004). Follow up studies to this dissertation may hopefully attempt to further validate the findings presented here and possibly establish a broader based link between personality assessments as a predictor and improvement based, not only on psychological growth measured by the scales such as those utilized in this study, but other metrics such as IQ tests, achievement tests, employment tests, attitude tests, objective personality tests (Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory-III, and the Beck Depression Inventory), projective tests, interest tests, and aptitude tests (Capraro & Capraro, 2002; Gámez, Chmielewski, Kotov, Ruggero, & Watson, 2011; Huang & Bargh, 2014; Kahneman & Krueger, 2006; Kashdan et al., 2013; Lyubomirsky et al., 2011; McCrae et al., 1997; Pavot, Diener, Colvin, & Sandvik, 1991; Staw, Sutton, & Pelled, 1994). Additionally, these research extensions would shed light on other treatment approachesincluding clinical social work, marriage and family therapy, psychiatric nursing, sex therapy, religious or spiritual counseling, pastoral counseling, and life coaching.

In conclusion, my hope is that findings from the present thesis will pave the way for future research investigating the various dimensions of happiness and its relation to personality assessment variables. Advances in these domains may inform conceptual models of happiness and also lead to improved, focused therapeutic treatment in clinical psychology. As with the analysis of any constructs related to human beings, there may be no simplistic formula for achieving happiness. It may be that the complex amalgamation of goals, self-evaluations, values, feelings, and behaviors is beyond the reach of any formulaic, algorithmic, scientific analysis and research. And yet, the search seems to be appropriate even if it is arduous or endless.

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APPENDIX A – Positive Psychology Questionnaires

Subjective Happiness Scale (SHS)

Lyubomirsky, Ph.D.

Permission to use this questionnaire granted by Dr. Lyubomirsky by email on 10-25-2014.

WHAT THE QUESTIONNAIRE MEASURES:

The SHS is a 4-item scale of global subjective happiness. Two items ask respondents to characterize themselves using both absolute ratings and ratings relative to peers, whereas the other two items offer brief descriptions of happy and unhappy individuals and ask respondents the extent to which each characterization describes them. The SHS has been validated in 14 studies with a total of 2,732 participants. Data has been collected in the United States from students on two college campuses and one high school campus, from community adults in two California cities, and from older adults, as well as from students and community adults in Moscow, Russia. Results have indicated that the SHS has high internal consistency, which has been found to be stable across samples. Test-retest and self-peer correlations have suggested good to excellent reliability, and construct validation studies of convergent and discriminant validity have confirmed the use of this scale to measure the construct of subjective happiness.

Subjective Happiness Scale (SHS)

*1. Gender:

female male

*2. From the personality test your Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) was:

ISTJ ISFJ INFJ INTJ ISTP ISFP INFP INTP ESTP ESFP ENFP ENTP ESTJ ESFJ ENFJ ENTJ

*3. In general, I consider myself:

very unhappy unhappy slightly unhappy neither unhappy nor happy slightly happy happy very happy

*4. Compared to most of my peers, I consider myself:

very unhappy unhappy slightly unhappy neither unhappy nor happy slightly happy happy very happy

*5. Some people are generally very happy. They enjoy life regardless of what is going on, getting the

most out of everything. To what extent does this characterization describe you?

Absolutely Untrue Mostly Untrue Somewhat Untrue Can’t Say True or False Somewhat True Mostly True Absolutely True

*6. Some people are generally not very happy. Although they are not depressed, they never seem as happy as they might be. To what extent does this characterization describe you?

Absolutely Untrue Mostly Untrue Somewhat Untrue Can’t Say True or False Somewhat True Mostly True Absolutely True

REFERENCES:

(Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999; Lyubomirsky & Ross, 1997, 1999; Lyubomirsky, 2001)

Personal Growth Initiative Scale (PGIS)

Christine Robitschek, Ph.D.

Permission to use this questionnaire granted by Dr. Robitschek by email on 10-25-2014.

WHAT THE QUESTIONNAIRE MEASURES:

The PGIS is a self-report instrument that yields a single scale score for personal growth initiative. Personal growth initiative is a person’s active and intentional involvement in changing and developing as a person. The PGIS consists of nine items that are rated on a Likert scale from 1 = Strongly Disagree to 6 = Strongly Agree. Item scores are summed to obtain a total PGI score. There is evidence that the PGIS is strongly positively related to psychological well-being and negatively related to psychological distress. Reliability and validity evidence has been strong. The PGIS takes about 5 minutes to complete, and there is no time limit.

Personal Growth Initiative Scale

*1. From the personality test your Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) was:

ISTJ ISFJ INFJ INTJ ISTP ISFP INFP INTP ESTP ESFP ENFP ENTP ESTJ ESFJ ENFJ ENTJ

*2. I know how to change specific things that I want to change in my life.

Definitely disagree Mostly disagree Somewhat disagree Somewhat agree Mostly agree Definitely agree

*3. I have a good sense of where I am headed in my life.

Definitely disagree Mostly disagree Somewhat disagree Somewhat agree Mostly agree Definitely agree

*4. If I want to change something in my life, I initiate the transition process.

Definitely disagree Mostly disagree Somewhat disagree Somewhat agree Mostly agree Definitely agree

*5. I can choose the role that I want to have in a group.

Definitely disagree Mostly disagree Somewhat disagree Somewhat agree Mostly agree Definitely agree

*6. I know what I need to do to get started toward reaching my goals.

Definitely disagree Mostly disagree Somewhat disagree Somewhat agree Mostly agree Definitely agree

*7. I have a specific action plan to help me reach my goals.

Definitely disagree Mostly disagree Somewhat disagree Somewhat agree Mostly agree Definitely agree

*8. I take charge of my life.

Definitely disagree Mostly disagree Somewhat disagree Somewhat agree Mostly agree Definitely agree

*9. I know what my unique contribution to the world might be.

Definitely disagree Mostly disagree Somewhat disagree Somewhat agree Mostly agree Definitely agree

*10. I have a plan for making my life more balanced.

Definitely disagree Mostly disagree Somewhat disagree Somewhat agree Mostly agree Definitely agree

References:

(Robitschek & Ashton, 2012; Robitschek, 1998; Robitschek & Cook, 1999; Robitschek & Kashubeck, 1999; Whittaker & Robitschek, 2001)

Meaning in Life Questionnaire (MLQ)

Michael F. Steger, Patricia Frazier, Shigehiro Oishi, and Matthew Kaler

Permission to use this questionnaire granted by Dr. Steger by email on 10-25-2014.

WHAT THE QUESTIONNAIRE MEASURES:

The Meaning in Life Questionnaire assesses two dimensions of meaning in life using 10 items rated on a seven-point scale from “Absolutely True” to “Absolutely Untrue.” The Presence of Meaning subscale measures how full respondents feel their lives are of meaning. The Search for Meaning subscale measures how engaged and motivated respondents are in efforts to find meaning or deepen their understanding of meaning in their lives. The MLQ has good reliability, test-retest stability, stable factor structure, and convergence among informants. Presence is positively related to well-being, intrinsic religiosity, extraversion and agreeableness, and negatively related to anxiety and depression. Search is positively related to religious quest, rumination, past-negative and present-fatalistic time perspectives, negative affect, depression, and neuroticism, and negatively related to future time perspective, close-mindedness (dogmatism), and well-being. Presence relates as expected with personal growth self-appraisals, and altruistic and spiritual behaviors as assessed through daily diaries. The MLQ takes about 5 minutes to complete.

MLQ

Please take a moment to think about what makes your life and existence feel important and significant to you. Please respond to the following statements as truthfully and accurately as you can, and also please remember that these are very subjective questions and that there are no right or wrong answers.

Meaning in Life (Search) Questionnaire

*1. Gender:

female male

*2. From the personality test your Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) was:

ISTJ ISFJ INFJ INTJ ISTP ISFP INFP INTP ESTP ESFP ENFP ENTP ESTJ ESFJ ENFJ ENTJ

*3. I am looking for something that makes my life feel meaningful

Absolutely Untrue Mostly Untrue Somewhat Untrue Can’t Say True or False Somewhat True Mostly True Absolutely True

*4. I am always looking to find my life’s purpose.

Absolutely Untrue Mostly Untrue Somewhat Untrue Can’t Say True or False Somewhat True Mostly True Absolutely True

*5. I am always searching for something that makes my life feel significant.

Absolutely Untrue Mostly Untrue Somewhat Untrue Can’t Say True or False Somewhat True Mostly True Absolutely True

*6. I am seeking a purpose or mission for my life.

Absolutely Untrue Mostly Untrue Somewhat Untrue Can’t Say True or False Somewhat True Mostly True Absolutely True

*7. I am searching for meaning in my life.

Absolutely Untrue Mostly Untrue Somewhat Untrue Can’t Say True or False Somewhat True Mostly True Absolutely True

Meaning in Life (Presence) Questionnaire

*1. Gender:

female male

*2. From the personality test your Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) was:

ISTJ ISFJ INFJ INTJ ISTP ISFP INFP INTP ESTP ESFP ENFP ENTP ESTJ ESFJ ENFJ ENTJ

*3. I understand my life’s meaning.

Absolutely Untrue Mostly Untrue Somewhat Untrue Can’t Say True or False Somewhat True Mostly True Absolutely True

*4. My life has a clear sense of purpose.

Absolutely Untrue Mostly Untrue Somewhat Untrue Can’t Say True or False Somewhat True Mostly True Absolutely True

*5. I have discovered a satisfying life purpose.

Absolutely Untrue Mostly Untrue Somewhat Untrue Can’t Say True or False Somewhat True Mostly True Absolutely True

*6. I have a good sense of what makes my life meaningful.

Absolutely Untrue Mostly Untrue Somewhat Untrue Can’t Say True or False Somewhat True Mostly True Absolutely True

*7. My life has no clear purpose.

Absolutely Untrue Mostly Untrue Somewhat Untrue Can’t Say True or False Somewhat True Mostly True Absolutely True

Note – #7 is reverse-coded

REFERENCES:

(Steger et al., 2006; Steger & Frazier, 2005)

Satisfaction with Life Scale

Ed Diener, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

Permission to use this questionnaire granted by Dr. Diener by email on 10-25-2014.

WHAT THE QUESTIONNAIRE MEASURES:

The Satisfaction with Life Scale was developed to assess satisfaction with people’s lives as a whole. The scale does not assess satisfaction with specific life domains, such as health or finances, but allows subjects to integrate and weigh these domains in whatever way they choose. It takes only a few minutes to complete.

Satisfaction with Life Scale

*1. Gender:

female male

*2. From the personality test your Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) was:

ISTJ ISFJ INFJ INTJ ISTP ISFP INFP INTP ESTP ESFP ENFP ENTP ESTJ ESFJ ENFJ ENTJ

*3. In most ways my life is close to my ideal.

strongly disagree disagree slightly disagree neutral slightly agree agree strongly agree

*4. The conditions of my life are excellent.

strongly disagree disagree slightly disagree neutral slightly agree agree strongly agree

*5. I am satisfied with life.

strongly disagree disagree slightly disagree neutral slightly agree agree strongly agree

*6. So far I have gotten the important things I want in life.

strongly disagree disagree slightly disagree neutral slightly agree agree strongly agree

*7. If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing.

strongly disagree disagree slightly disagree neutral slightly agree agree strongly agree

REFERENCES:

(Diener, Emmons, Larson et al., 1985; Pavot et al., 1991; Pavot & Diener, 1993)

Gratitude Questionnaire

Michael E. McCullough, Ph.D., Robert A. Emmons, Ph.D., Jo-Ann Tsang, Ph.D.

Permission to use this questionnaire granted by Dr. McCullough by email on 10-25-2014.

WHAT THE QUESTIONNAIRE MEASURES:

The GQ-6 is a short, self-report measure of the disposition to experience gratitude. Participants answer 6 items on a 1 to 7 scale (1 = “strongly disagree”, 7 = “strongly agree”). Two items are reverse-scored to inhibit response bias. The GQ-6 has good internal reliability, with alphas between .82 and .87, and there is evidence that the GQ-6 is positively related to optimism, life satisfaction, hope, spirituality and religiousness, forgiveness, empathy and prosocial behavior, and negatively related to depression, anxiety, materialism and envy. The GQ-6 takes less than 5 minutes to complete, but there is no time limit.

Gratitude Questionnaire

*1. Gender:

female male

*2. From the personality test your Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) was:

ISTJ ISFJ INFJ INTJ ISTP ISFP INFP INTP ESTP ESFP ENFP ENTP ESTJ ESFJ ENFJ ENTJ

*3. I have so much in life to be thankful for.

strongly disagree disagree slightly disagree neutral slightly agree agree strongly agree

*4. If I had to list everything that I felt grateful for, it would be a very long list.

strongly disagree disagree slightly disagree neutral slightly agree agree strongly agree

*5. When I look at the world, I don’t see much to be grateful for.

strongly disagree disagree slightly disagree neutral slightly agree agree strongly agree

*6. I am grateful to a wide variety of people.

strongly disagree disagree slightly disagree neutral slightly agree agree strongly agree

*7. As I get older I find myself more able to appreciate the people, events, and situations

that have been part of my life history.

strongly disagree disagree slightly disagree neutral slightly agree agree strongly agree

*8. Long amounts of time can go by before I feel grateful to something or someone.

strongly disagree disagree slightly disagree neutral slightly agree agree strongly agree

REFERENCES:

(Emmons & Mishra, 2011; McCullough et al., 2002)

APPENDIX B – Informed Consent For Participants

California Institute for Human Science

Department of Psychology

Study Name: A PILOT STUDY EXPLORING THE MYERS-BRIGGS TYPE INDICATOR AS A PREDICTOR OF SUCCESS IN COGNITIVE BEHAVIORAL THERAPY

Principal Investigator: Dan Hurley

PLEASE READ THIS DOCUMENT CAREFULLY.

YOU MUST BE AT LEAST 18 YEARS OF AGE TO GIVE YOUR CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH.

Research participation is voluntary, and you have the right to withdraw at any time, without prejudice, should you object to the nature of the research. You are entitled to ask questions and to receive an explanation after your participation.

Description of the Study

This is a study in which a number of different kinds of psychological tests and measures are being evaluated. To do this, I will ask you to do the following:

1. A Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) test will be administered via spreadsheet at the beginning of the study.

2. The following questionnaires will be filled out before exposure to Rational Emotive Behavior/Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (REBT/CBT) concepts:

Meaning in Life (Search) Questionnaire (Before) at

http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/X8KG6JG

Meaning in Life (Presence) Questionnaire (Before) http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/XK55TDB

Gratitude Questionnaire (Before) at

http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/XKZFGQN

Satisfaction with Life Scale (Before) at

http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/KFH833H

Personal Growth Initiative Scale (Before) at

http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/CSHQFPB

Subjective Happiness Scale (Before) at

http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/X88QB2C

3. Rational Emotive Behavior/Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (REBT/CBT) concepts are found at:

http://dhurley.com/CBT/CBT1.docx

http://dhurley.com/CBT/CBT2.docx

http://dhurley.com/CBT/CBT3.docx

http://dhurley.com/CBT/CBT4.docx

http://dhurley.com/CBT/CBT5.docx

http://dhurley.com/CBT/CBT6.docx

http://dhurley.com/CBT/CBT7.docx

http://dhurley.com/CBT/CBT8.docx

http://dhurley.com/CBT/CBT9.docx

http://dhurley.com/CBT/CBT10.docx

http://dhurley.com/CBT/CBT11.docx

http://dhurley.com/CBT/CBT12.docx

4. The following questionnaires will be filled out after exposure to Rational Emotive Behavior/Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (REBT/CBT) concepts:

Gratitude Questionnaire (After) at

http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/BMDQLZP;

Satisfaction with Life Scale (After) at

http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/BMD38QN;

Personal Growth Initiative Scale (After) at

http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/BMYK5PW;

Subjective Happiness Scale (After) at

http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/BMYRQTX;

Meaning in Life (Search) Questionnaire (After) at

http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/BM272S9

Meaning in Life (Presence) Questionnaire (After) at http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/BM2B9JG

Purpose of the Study

This study was designed to test the hypothesis that a relationship exists between Jungian psychological types, as measured by the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator of Personality Variables, and the utility of Cognitive Behavioral therapy restructuring concepts (Appendix D) to produce psychological growth. This will be measured by the following assessments: Subjective Happiness Scale (SHS), Personal Growth Initiative Scale (PGIS), Meaning in Life Questionnaire (MLQ), Satisfaction with Life Scale, and Gratitude Questionnaire (Appendix A).

Possible Risks

a) When filling out questionnaires, you may come across a question or answer choice that you find unpleasant, upsetting, or otherwise objectionable. For instance, a few of the questions may cause you to think about negative emotional states.

b) You may feel that you have performed poorly on a test. For the questionnaires I am evaluating, there are no right or wrong answers.

Possible Benefits

a) When your participation is complete, you will be given an opportunity to learn about this research, which may be useful to you in your course or in understanding yourself and others.

b) You will have an opportunity to contribute to psychological science by participating in this research.

Compensation for your Time:

You will receive extra credit in your computer science course. You will receive extra credit simply by virtue of taking the online questionnaires. You are free to withdraw your participation at any time without penalty. Alternative means of earning extra credit are available. Please consult your class syllabus for information regarding alternative means of earning credit or extra credit in your course.

Confidentiality

Your identity will be protected. All data will be kept in secured files, in accord with Federal regulations, and the American Psychological Association. All identifying information will be removed from questionnaires as soon as your participation is complete. Additionally, all emails and survey questionnaires will be deleted. No one will be able to know which are your questionnaire responses.

Finally, remember that it is no individual person’s responses that interests me; I am studying the usefulness of the tests in question for people in general.

Opportunities to Ask Questions

Any technical questions about this research may be directed to:

Principal Investigator: Dan Hurley Email: DanHurley@dhurley.com

Opportunities to Withdraw at Will

If you decide now or at any point to withdraw this consent or stop participating, you are free to do so at no penalty to yourself. You are free to skip specific questions and continue participating at no penalty.

Additionally, if you find that you are experiencing any negative effects from participation in this study, you may contact Santa Monica Colleges on campus psychological services in the Liberal Arts Building, Room 110, (310) 434-4503.

Opportunities to be Informed of Results

In all likelihood, the results will be fully available around 9-1-2015. Preliminary results will be available earlier. If you wish to be told the results of this research, please contact:

Principal Investigator: Dan Hurley Email: DanHurley@dhurley.com

I will either meet with you or direct you to where you can read a copy of the results. In addition, there is a chance that the results from this study will be published in a scientific psychology journal, which would be available in many libraries. In such an article, participants would be identified in general terms as undergraduate students at a large community college.

Your response to the online questionnaires mentioned above indicates that you voluntarily agree to participate in this study.

APPENDIX C – Myers-Briggs Assessment

The following abbreviated Myers-Briggs Excel spreadsheet was developed by Dr. Richard Scholl (Leonard, Beauvais, & Scholl, 1995; Leonard, Scholl, & Kowalski, 1999). Permission to use the spreadsheet granted by Dr. Scholl by email on 10-24-2014.

http://dhurley.com/MBTIHurley.xls

APPENDIX D – Presentation on CBT/REBT

(Branch & Willson, 2010).

Note: Study participants will be sent a copy of the following presentation of CBT concepts. They will be asked to read and summarize in their own words what they mean and how they might apply them in their own lives.

CBT 1

A (actuator activating event) + B (beliefs and meanings about the event) =

C (emotional and behavioral consequence)

✓ A is the activating event. An activating event means a real external event that has occurred, a future event that you anticipate occurring or an internal event in your mind, such as an image, memory or dream.

The ‘A’ is often referred to as your ‘trigger’.

✓ B is your beliefs. Your beliefs include your thoughts, your personal rules, the demands you make (on yourself, the world and other people) and the meanings that you attach to external and internal events.

✓ C is the consequences. Consequences include your emotions, behaviors and physical sensations that accompany different emotions.

Catastrophising: Turning Mountains Back Into Molehills

Catastrophising is taking a relatively minor negative event and imagining all sorts of disasters resulting from that one small event.

Consider these examples of catastrophising:

✓ You’re at a party and you accidentally stumble headlong into a flower arrangement. After you extract yourself from the foliage, you scurry home and conclude that everyone at the party witnessed your little trip and laughed at you.

✓ You’re waiting for your teenage daughter to return home after an evening at the cinema with friends. The clock strikes 10:00 p.m., and you hear no reassuring rattle of her key in the door. By 10:05 p.m., you start imagining her accepting a lift home from a friend who drives recklessly.

At 10:10 p.m., you’re convinced she’s been involved in a head-on collision and paramedics are at the scene. By 10:15 p.m., you’re weeping over her grave.

Spotting Errors in Your Thinking

✓ Your new partner declines an invitation to have dinner with your parents. Before giving him a chance to explain his reasons, you put down the phone and decide that this is his way of telling you the relationship’s over. Furthermore, you imagine that right now he’s ringing friends and telling them what a mistake it was dating you. You decide you’re never going to find another partner and will die old and lonely.

Catastrophising leads many an unfortunate soul to misinterpret a social faux pas as a social disaster, a late arrival as a car accident or a minor disagreement as total rejection.

Nip catastrophic thinking in the bud by recognizing it for what it is – just thoughts. When you find yourself thinking of the worst possible scenario, try the following strategies:

✓ Put your thoughts in perspective. Even if everyone at the party did see your flower-arranging act, are you sure no one was sympathetic?

Surely you aren’t the only person in the world to have tripped over in public. Chances are, people are far less interested in your embarrassing moment than you think. Falling over at a party isn’t great, but in the grand scheme of things it’s hardly society-page news.

✓ Consider less terrifying explanations. What other reasons are there for your daughter being late? Isn’t being late for curfew a common feature of adolescence? Perhaps the film ran over, or she got caught up chat-ting and forgot the time. Don’t get so absorbed in extreme emotions that you’re startled to find your daughter in the doorway apologizing about missing the bus.

✓ Weigh up the evidence. Do you have enough information to conclude that your partner wants to leave you? Has he given you any reason to think this before? Look for evidence that contradicts your catastrophic assumption. For example, have you had more enjoyable times together than not?

✓ Focus on what you can do to cope with the situation, and the people or resources that can come to your aid. Engaging in a few more social encounters can help you put your party faux pas behind you. You can repair a damaged relationship – or find another. Even an injury following an accident can be fixed with medical care.

No matter how great a travesty you create in your mind, the world’s unlikely to end because of it – even if the travesty comes to pass. You’re probably far more capable of surviving embarrassing and painful events than you give yourself credit for – human beings can be very resilient.

CBT 2

All-or-Nothing Thinking: Finding Somewhere In-between

All-or-nothing or black-or-white thinking is extreme thinking that can lead to extreme emotions and behaviors. People either love you or hate you, right? Something’s either perfect or a disaster. You’re either responsibility-free or totally to blame? Sound sensible? We hope not!

All-or-nothing thinking.

Unfortunately, humans fall into the all-or-nothing trap all too easily:

✓ Imagine you’re trying to eat healthily in order to lose weight and you cave in to the temptation of a doughnut. All-or-nothing thinking may lead you to conclude that your plan is in ruins and then to go on to eat the other 11 doughnuts in the pack.

✓ You’re studying a degree course and you fail one module. All-or-nothing thinking makes you decide that the whole endeavor is pointless. Either you get the course totally right or it’s just a write-off.

Consider the humble thermometer as your guide to overcoming the tendency of all-or-nothing thinking. A thermometer reads degrees of temperature, not only ‘hot’ and ‘cold’. Think like a thermometer – in degrees, not extremes. You can use the following pointers to help you change your thinking:

Spotting Errors in Your Thinking

✓ Be realistic. You can’t possibly get through life without making mistakes. One doughnut doesn’t a diet ruin. Remind yourself of your goal, forgive yourself for the minor slip, and resume your diet.

✓ Develop ‘both–and’ reasoning skills. An alternative to all-or-nothing thinking is both–and reasoning. You need to mentally allow two seeming opposites to exist together. You can both succeed in your overall educational goals and fail a test or two. Life is not a case of being either a success or a failure. You can both assume that you’re an okay person as you are and strive to change.

All-or-nothing thinking can sabotage goal-directed behavior. You’re far more likely to throw in the towel at the first sign of something blocking your goal when you refuse to allow a margin for error. Beware of ‘either/or’ statements and global labels such as ‘good’ and ‘bad’ or ‘success’ and ‘failure’. Neither people nor life situations are often that cut and dry.

CBT 3

Fortune-Telling: Stepping Away From the Crystal Ball

Introducing CBT Basics

✓ You’ve been feeling a bit depressed lately and you aren’t enjoying your-self like you used to. Someone from work invites you to a party, but you decide that if you go you won’t have a good time. The food will unpalatable, the music will be irksome and the other guests are sure to find you boring. So, you opt to stay in and bemoan the state of your social life.

✓ You fancy the bloke who sells you coffee every morning on the way to the office, and you’d like to go out with him on a date. You predict that if you ask him, you’ll be so anxious that you’ll say something stupid.

Anyway, he’s bound to say no thanks – someone that attractive must surely be in a relationship.

✓ You always thought that hang-gliding would be fun, but you’ve got an anxious disposition. If you try the sport, you’re sure to lose your nerve at the last minute and just end up wasting your time and money.

You’re better off letting the future unfold without trying to guess how it may turn out. Put the dustcover back on the crystal ball, flog the Ouija board on eBay, leave the tarot cards alone and try the following strategies instead:

✓ Test out your predictions. You really never know how much fun you might have at a party until you get there – and the food could be amazing. Maybe the chap at the coffee shop has got a partner, but you won’t be sure until you ask.

✓ Be prepared to take risks. Isn’t it worth possibly losing a bit of cash for the opportunity to try a sport you’ve always been interested in?

And can’t you bear the possibility of appearing a trifle nervous for the chance to get to know someone you really like? There’s a saying ‘a ship is safe in a harbor’, but that’s not what ships are built for. Learning to live experimentally and taking calculated risks is a recipe for keeping life interesting and rewarding.

✓ Understand that your past experiences don’t determine your future experiences. Just because the last party you went to turned out to be a dreary homage to the seventies, the last person you asked out went a bit green, and that scuba-diving venture resulted in a severe case of the bends doesn’t mean that you’ll never have better luck again.

Typically, fortune-telling stops you from taking action. It can also become a bit of a self-fulfilling prophecy. If you keep telling yourself that you won’t enjoy that party, you’re liable to make that prediction come true. Same goes for meeting new people and trying new things. So, put on your party gear, ask him out for dinner and book yourself in for some hang-gliding.

CBT 4

Mind-Reading: Taking Your Guesses with a Pinch of Salt

So, you think you know what other people are thinking, do you? With mind-reading, the tendency is often to assume that others are thinking negative things about you or have negative motives and intentions.

Here are some examples of mind-reading tendencies:

✓ You’re chatting with someone and they look over your shoulder as you’re speaking, break eye contact and (perish the thought) yawn. You conclude immediately that the other person thinks your conversation is mind-numbing and that he’d rather be talking to someone else.

✓ Your boss advises that you book some time off to use up your annual leave. You decide that he’s saying this because he thinks your work is rubbish and wants the opportunity to interview for your replacement while you’re on leave.

✓ You pass a neighbor on the street. He says a quick hello but doesn’t look very friendly or pleased to see you. You think that he must be annoyed with you about your dog howling at the last full moon and is making plans to report you to environmental health.

You can never know for certain what another person is thinking, so you’re wise to pour salt on your negative assumptions. Stand back and take a look at all the evidence to hand. Take control of your tendency to mind-read by trying the following:

✓ Generate some alternative reasons for what you see. The person you’re chatting with may be tired, be preoccupied with his own thoughts or just have spotted someone he knows.

✓ Consider that your guesses may be wrong. Are your fears really about your boss’s motives, or do they concern your own insecurity about your abilities at work? Do you have enough information or hard evidence to conclude that your boss thinks your work is substandard? Does it follow logically that ‘consider booking time off’ means ‘you’re getting the sack’?

✓ Get more information (if appropriate).Ask your neighbor whether your dog kept him up all night, and think of some ways to muffle your pet next time the moon waxes.

You tend to mind-read what you fear most. Mind-reading is a bit like putting a slide in a slide projector. What you project or imagine is going on in other people’s minds is very much based on what’s already in yours.

CBT 5

Emotional Reasoning: Reminding Yourself That Feelings Aren’t Facts

Surely we’re wrong about this one. Surely your feelings are real hard evidence of the way things are? Actually, no! Often, relying too heavily on your feelings as a guide leads you off the reality path. Here are some examples of emotional reasoning:

✓ Your partner has been spending long nights at the office with a co-worker for the past month. You feel jealous and suspicious of your partner. Based on these feelings, you conclude that your partner’s having an affair with his co-worker.

✓ You feel guilty out of the blue. You conclude that you must have done something wrong otherwise you wouldn’t be feeling guilty.

✓ You wake up feeling anxious, with a vague sense of dread. You assume that there must be something seriously wrong in your life and search your mind frantically for the source of your ill- feeling.

Often your feelings are simply due to a thought or memory that you may not even be totally aware of having had. Other times they can be symptoms of another disorder such as depression or anxiety problems.

Some of the feelings you experience on waking are left over from dreams that you may or may not remember. As a rule of thumb, it pays to be somewhat skeptical about the validity of your feelings in the first instance. Your feelings can be misleading.

When you spot emotional reasoning taking over your thoughts, take a step back and try the following:

1. Take notice of your thoughts. Take notice of thoughts such as ‘I’m feeling nervous, something must be wrong’ and ‘I’m so angry, and that really shows how badly you’ve behaved’, and recognize that feelings are not always the best measure of reality, especially if you’re not in the best emotional shape at the moment.

2. Ask yourself how you’d view the situation if you were feeling calmer.

Look to see if there is any concrete evidence to support your interpretation of your feelings. For example, is there really any evidence that something bad is going to happen?

3. Give yourself time to allow your feelings to subside. When you’re feeling calmer, review your conclusions and remember that it is quite possible that your feelings are the consequence of your present emotional state (or even just fatigue) rather than indicators of the state of reality.

4. If you can’t find any obvious and immediate source of your unpleasant feelings – overlook them. Get into the shower despite your sense of dread, for example. If a concrete reason to be anxious does exist, it won’t get dissolved in the shower. If your anxiety is all smoke and mirrors, you may well find it washes down the drain.

The problem with viewing your feelings as factual is that you stop looking for contradictory information – or for any additional information at all. Balance your emotional reasoning with a little more looking at the facts that support and contradict your views.

CBT 6

Overgeneralizing: Avoiding the Part/Whole Error

Overgeneralizing is the error of drawing global conclusions from one or more events. When you find yourself thinking ‘always’, ‘never’, ‘people are . . .’ or ‘the world’s . . .’, you may well be overgeneralizing.

You might recognize overgeneralizing in the following examples:

✓ You feel down. When you get into your car to go to work, it doesn’t start.

You think to yourself, ‘Things like this are always happening to me.

Nothing ever goes right’, which makes you feel even more gloomy.

✓ You become angry easily. Travelling to see a friend, you’re delayed by a fellow passenger who cannot find the money to pay her train fare. You think, ‘This is typical! Other people are just so stupid’, and you become tense and angry.

✓ You tend to feel guilty easily. You yell at your child for not understanding his homework and then decide that you’re a thoroughly rotten parent.

Situations are rarely so stark or extreme that they merit terms like ‘always’ and ‘never’. Rather than overgeneralizing, consider the following:

Spotting Errors in Your Thinking

✓ Get a little perspective. How true is the thought that nothing ever goes right for you? How many other people in the world may be having car trouble at this precise moment?

✓ Suspend judgement. When you judge all people as stupid, including the poor creature waiting in line for the train, you make yourself more out-raged and are less able to deal effectively with a relatively minor hiccup.

✓ Be specific. Would you be a totally rotten parent for losing patience with your child? Can you legitimately conclude that one incident of poor parenting cancels out all the good things you do for your little one? Perhaps your impatience is simply an area you need to target for improvement.

Shouting at your child in a moment of stress no more makes you a rotten parent than singing him a favorite lullaby makes you a perfect parent.

Condemning yourself on the basis of making a mistake does nothing to solve the problem, so be specific and steer clear of global conclusions. Change what you think you can and need to but also forgive yourself (and others) for singular errors or misdeeds.

CBT 7

Labeling: Giving Up the Rating Game

Labels, and the process of labeling people and events, are everywhere. For example, people who have low self-esteem may label themselves as ‘worthless’, ‘inferior’ or ‘inadequate’

If you label other people as ‘no good’ or ‘useless’, you’re likely to become angry with them. Or perhaps you label the world as ‘unsafe’ or ‘totally unfair’? The error here is that you’re globally rating things that are too complex for a definitive label. The following are examples of labeling:

✓ You read a distressing article in the newspaper about a rise in crime in your city. The article activates your belief that you live in a thoroughly dangerous place, which contributes to you feeling anxious about going out.

✓ You receive a poor mark for an essay. You start to feel low and label yourself as a failure.

✓ You become angry when someone cuts in front of you in a traffic queue.

You label the other driver as a total loser for his bad driving.

Strive to avoid labeling yourself, other people and the world around you.

Accept that they’re complex and ever. Recognize evidence that doesn’t fit your labels, in order to help you weaken your conviction in your global rating. For example:

✓ Allow for varying degrees. Think about it: The world isn’t a dangerous place but rather a place that has many different aspects with varying degrees of safety and risk.

✓ Celebrate complexities. All human beings – yourself included – are unique, multifaceted and ever-changing. To label yourself as a failure on the strength of one failing is an extreme form of overgeneralizing.

Likewise, other people are just as complex and unique as you. One bad action doesn’t equal a bad person.

When you label a person or aspect of the world in a global way, you exclude potential for change and improvement. Accepting yourself as you are is a powerful first step towards self-improvement.

CBT 8

Making Demands: Thinking Flexibly

Albert Ellis, founder of rational emotive behavior therapy, one of the first cognitive-behavioral therapies, places demands at the very heart of emotional problems. Thoughts and beliefs that contain words like ‘must’, ‘should’, ‘need’, ‘ought’, ‘got to’ and ‘have to’ are often problematic because they’re extreme and rigid.

The inflexibility of the demands you place on yourself, the world around you and other people often means you don’t adapt to reality as well as you could.

Consider these possible examples:

✓ You believe that you must have the approval of your friends and colleagues. This leads you to feel anxious in many social situations and drives you to try to win everyone’s approval – possibly at great personal cost.

✓ You think that because you try very hard to be kind and considerate to others, they really ought to be just as kind and considerate in return.

Because your demand is not realistic – sadly, other people are governed by their own priorities – you often feel hurt about your friends (or even strangers) not acting the way you do yourself.

✓ You believe that you absolutely should never let people down. Therefore, you rarely put your own welfare first. At work, you do more than your fair share because you don’t assert yourself, and so you often end up feeling stressed and depressed.

Holding flexible preferences about yourself, other people and the world in general is the healthy alternative to inflexible rules and demands. Rather than making demands on yourself, the world and others, try the following techniques:

✓ Pay attention to language. Replace words like ‘must’, ‘need’ and ‘should’ with ‘prefer’, ‘wish’ and ‘want’.

✓ Limit approval seeking. Can you manage to have a satisfying life even if you don’t get the approval of everyone you seek it from? Specifically, you’ll feel more confident in social situations if you recognize your preference for approval rather than viewing approval as a dire need.

✓ Understand that the world doesn’t play to your rules. In fact, other people tend to have their own rulebooks. So, no matter how much you value considerate behavior, your friends may not give it the same value. If you can give others the right to not live up to your standards, you’ll feel less hurt when they fail to do so.

✓ Retain your standards, ideals and preferences, and ditch your rigid demands about how you, others and the world ‘have to’ be. So keep acting consistently with how you would like things to be rather than becoming depressed or irate about things not being the way you believe they must be.

When you hold rigid demands about the way things ‘have got to be’, you have no margin for deviation or error. You leave yourself vulnerable to experiencing exaggerated emotional disturbance when things in life just don’t go your way.

CBT 9

Mental Filtering: Keeping an Open Mind

Mental filtering is a bias in the way you process information, in which you acknowledge only information that fits with a belief you hold. The process is much like a filter on a camera lens that allows in only certain kinds of light.

Information that doesn’t fit tends to be ignored. If you think any of the following, you’re making the ‘mental filtering’ thinking error:

✓ You believe you’re a failure, so you tend to focus on your mistakes at work and overlook successes and achievements. At the end of the week, you often feel disappointed about your lack of achievement – but this is probably largely the result of you not paying attention to your successes.

✓ You believe you’re unlikeable, and really notice each time your friend is late to call back or seems too busy to see you. You tend to disregard the ways in which people act warmly towards you, thus sustaining your view that you’re unlikeable.

To combat mental filtering, look more closely at situations you feel down about. Deliberately collecting evidence that contradicts your negative thoughts can help you to correct your information-processing bias. Try the following:

✓ Examine your filters closely. For example, are you sifting your achievements through an ‘I’m a failure’ filter? If so, then only failure-related information gets through. If you look for a friend’s achievements over the same week without a filter, you’re likely to find him in far greater possession of success. So drop the filter when assessing yourself in the same way you do when looking at your friends’ achievements.

Spotting Errors in Your Thinking

✓ Gather evidence. Imagine you’re collecting evidence for a court case to prove that your negative thought isn’t true. What evidence do you cite? Would, for example, an assertion that you’re unlikeable stand up in court against the proof of your friends behaving warmly towards you?

If you only ever take in information that fits with your negative thinking, you can very easily end up reinforcing undesirable thinking habits. The fact that you don’t see the positive stuff about yourself, or your experiences, doesn’t mean it isn’t there.

CBT 10

Disqualifying the Positive: Keeping the Baby When Throwing Out the Bathwater

Disqualifying the positive is related to the biased way that people can process information. Disqualifying the positive is a mental response to a positive event that transforms it into a neutral or negative event.

The following are examples of disqualifying the positive:

✓ You convince yourself that you’re worthless and unlovable. You respond to a work promotion by thinking, ‘This doesn’t count, because anyone could get this sort of thing.’ The result: Instead of feeling pleased, you feel quite disappointed.

✓ You think you’re pathetic and feel low. A friend tells you you’re a very good friend, but you disqualify this in your mind by thinking, ‘She’s only saying that because she feels sorry for me. I really am pathetic.’

Hone your skills for accepting compliments and acknowledging your good points. You can try the following strategies to improve your skills:

✓ Become aware of your responses to positive ‘data’. Practise acknowledging and accepting positive feedback and acknowledging good points about yourself, others and the world. For example, you could override your workplace disappointment by recognizing that you’re the one who got the promotion. You can even consider that the promotion may well have been a result of your hard work.

✓ Practice accepting a compliment graciously with a simple thank you.

Rejecting a sincerely delivered compliment is rather like turning down a gift. Steer your thinking towards taking in positive experiences. When others point out attributes you have, start deliberately making a note of those good points. Even if your current thinking bias leads you to doubt the validity of a compliment or good experience, try considering that you may well be wrong to do so. Trust what others say for a change!

If you frequently disqualify or distort your positive attributes or experiences, you can easily sustain a negative belief, even in the face of overwhelming positive evidence.

CBT 11

Low Frustration Tolerance: Realizing You Can Bear the ‘Unbearable’

Low frustration tolerance refers to the error of assuming that when something’s difficult to tolerate, it’s ‘intolerable’. This thinking error means magnifying discomfort and not tolerating temporary discomfort when it’s in your interest to do so for longer-term benefit.

The following are examples of low frustration tolerance:

✓ You often procrastinate on college assignments, thinking, ‘It’s just too much hassle. I’ll do it later when I feel more in the mood.’ You tend to wait until the assignment’s nearly due and it becomes too uncomfortable to put off any longer. Unfortunately, waiting until the last moment means that you can rarely put as much time and effort into your course-work as you need to in order to reach your potential.

✓ You want to overcome your anxiety of travelling away from home by facing your fear directly. And yet, each time you try to travel farther on the train, you become anxious, and think ‘This is so horrible, I can’t stand it’, and quickly return home, which reinforces your fear rather than helping you experience travel as less threatening.

The best way to overcome low frustration tolerance is to foster an alternative attitude of high frustration tolerance. You can achieve this way of thinking by trying the following:

✓ Pushing yourself to do things that are uncomfortable or unpleasant.

For example, you can train yourself to work on assignments even if you aren’t in a good mood, because the end result of finishing work in good time, and to a good standard, outweighs the hassle of doing something you find tedious.

✓ Giving yourself messages that emphasize your ability to withstand pain. To combat a fear of travel, you can remind yourself that feeling anxious is really unpleasant, but you can stand it. Ask yourself whether, in the past, you’ve ever withstood the feelings you’re saying you presently ‘can’t stand’.

Telling yourself you can’t stand something has two effects. First, it leads you to focus more on the discomfort you’re experiencing. Second, it leads you to underestimate your ability to cope with discomfort. Many things can be difficult to tolerate, but rating them as ‘intolerable’ often makes situations seem more daunting than they really are.

CBT 12

Personalizing: Removing Yourself from the Center of the Universe

Personalizing involves interpreting events as being related to you personally and overlooking other factors. This can lead to emotional difficulties, such as feeling hurt easily or feeling unnecessarily guilty.

Spotting Errors in Your Thinking

Here are some examples of personalizing:

✓ You may tend to feel guilty if you know a friend is upset and you can’t make him feel better. You think, ‘If I was really a good friend, I’d be able to cheer him up. I’m obviously letting him down.’

✓ You feel hurt when a friend you meet in a shop leaves quickly after saying only a hurried ‘hello’. You think, ‘He was obviously trying to avoid talking to me. I must have offended him somehow.’

You can tackle personalizing by considering alternative explanations that don’t revolve around you. Think about the following examples:

✓ Imagine what else may contribute to the outcome you’re assuming personal responsibility for. Your friend may have lost his job or be suffering from depression. Despite your best efforts to cheer him up, these factors are outside your control.

✓ Consider why people may be responding to you in a certain way.

Don’t jump to the conclusion that someone’s response relates directly to you. For example, your friend may be having a difficult day or be in a big hurry – he may even feel sorry for not stopping to talk to you.

Because you really aren’t the center of the universe, look for explanations of events that have little or nothing to do with you.

APPENDIX E – Collected data

	All	Females	Males
ISTJ	33	10	23
ISFJ	39	28	11
INFJ	4	3	1
INTJ	5	1	4
ISTP	15	3	12
ISFP	25	15	10
INFP	12	7	5
INTP	9	3	6
ESTP	12	5	7
ESFP	24	15	9
ENFP	23	14	9
ENTP	9	4	5
ESTJ	24	9	15
ESFJ	35	25	10
ENFJ	7	5	2
ENTJ	5	2	3
Totals	281	149	132

All Subjects – Average before and after CBT concept exposure
ISTJBeforeAfterGratitude Questionnaire29.51534.636Satisfaction with Life Scale27.81834.182Meaning in Life (Presence)29.27334.182Meaning in Life (Search)28.75834.394Personal Growth Initiative Scale38.84843.303Subjective Happiness Scale23.36426.818

ISFJBeforeAfterGratitude Questionnaire32.56132.989Satisfaction with Life Scale26.52128.255Meaning in Life (Presence)33.15532.652Meaning in Life (Search)27.90329.201Personal Growth Initiative Scale37.08536.841Subjective Happiness Scale20.80421.178

INFJBeforeAfterGratitude Questionnaire30.00030.495Satisfaction with Life Scale29.09129.687Meaning in Life (Presence)31.10130.303Meaning in Life (Search)30.30329.798Personal Growth Initiative Scale36.40438.000Subjective Happiness Scale24.99024.394

INTJBeforeAfterGratitude Questionnaire28.82633.348Satisfaction with Life Scale28.17433.871Meaning in Life (Presence)27.87134.045Meaning in Life (Search)27.04532.955Personal Growth Initiative Scale37.52341.348Subjective Happiness Scale21.69726.652

ISTPBeforeAfterGratitude Questionnaire33.23734.919Satisfaction with Life Scale28.10429.222Meaning in Life (Presence)29.95729.669Meaning in Life (Search)29.41228.543Personal Growth Initiative Scale41.00340.437Subjective Happiness Scale22.66224.071

ISFPBeforeAfterGratitude Questionnaire31.79732.422Satisfaction with Life Scale29.61130.068Meaning in Life (Presence)27.37528.237Meaning in Life (Search)27.59127.725Personal Growth Initiative Scale38.11139.399Subjective Happiness Scale24.58724.730

INFPBeforeAfterGratitude Questionnaire32.35633.072Satisfaction with Life Scale29.28428.971Meaning in Life (Presence)28.63929.803Meaning in Life (Search)31.01930.976Personal Growth Initiative Scale38.77939.693Subjective Happiness Scale24.62024.846

INTPBeforeAfterGratitude Questionnaire29.43428.914Satisfaction with Life Scale29.68228.929Meaning in Life (Presence)28.76829.581Meaning in Life (Search)29.76830.899Personal Growth Initiative Scale38.14637.480Subjective Happiness Scale22.40922.788

ESTPBeforeAfterGratitude Questionnaire33.31234.255Satisfaction with Life Scale27.69328.684Meaning in Life (Presence)28.02627.978Meaning in Life (Search)29.58029.684Personal Growth Initiative Scale37.48938.463Subjective Happiness Scale24.12623.727

ESFPBeforeAfterGratitude Questionnaire32.91233.461Satisfaction with Life Scale28.99728.529Meaning in Life (Presence)30.18229.512Meaning in Life (Search)29.69430.276Personal Growth Initiative Scale40.10440.956Subjective Happiness Scale23.91224.906

ENFPBeforeAfterGratitude Questionnaire31.78730.988Satisfaction with Life Scale32.59832.540Meaning in Life (Presence)31.58230.279Meaning in Life (Search)31.67031.791Personal Growth Initiative Scale41.47642.618Subjective Happiness Scale24.96925.101

ENTPBeforeAfterGratitude Questionnaire33.60933.215Satisfaction with Life Scale23.75825.327Meaning in Life (Presence)28.27927.745Meaning in Life (Search)28.40629.127Personal Growth Initiative Scale37.51537.288Subjective Happiness Scale19.12421.288

ESTJBeforeAfterGratitude Questionnaire33.24533.588Satisfaction with Life Scale26.87427.867Meaning in Life (Presence)28.15828.476Meaning in Life (Search)27.92528.279Personal Growth Initiative Scale39.87841.050Subjective Happiness Scale21.81321.172

ESFJBeforeAfterGratitude Questionnaire33.96132.764Satisfaction with Life Scale29.61530.012Meaning in Life (Presence)30.54230.948Meaning in Life (Search)30.06431.436Personal Growth Initiative Scale39.49140.927Subjective Happiness Scale22.12721.527

ENFJBeforeAfterGratitude Questionnaire32.37932.273Satisfaction with Life Scale31.89431.076Meaning in Life (Presence)30.22730.758Meaning in Life (Search)30.98531.636Personal Growth Initiative Scale38.19739.045Subjective Happiness Scale21.90922.591

ENTJBeforeAfterGratitude Questionnaire28.22229.990Satisfaction with Life Scale27.29328.535Meaning in Life (Presence)29.30328.444Meaning in Life (Search)29.23230.768Personal Growth Initiative Scale35.22235.384Subjective Happiness Scale24.53525.071
Female Subjects – Average before and after CBT concept exposure
ISTJBefore AfterGratitude Questionnaire30.80035.600Satisfaction with Life Scale26.70032.700Meaning in Life (Presence)29.70035.000Meaning in Life (Search)28.10035.100Personal Growth Initiative Scale38.80042.700Subjective Happiness Scale23.00027.100

ISFJBefore AfterGratitude Questionnaire30.71430.036Satisfaction with Life Scale29.39329.679Meaning in Life (Presence)35.39333.107Meaning in Life (Search)27.67929.036Personal Growth Initiative Scale40.00041.286Subjective Happiness Scale23.07123.679

INFJBefore AfterGratitude Questionnaire30.00029.333Satisfaction with Life Scale27.00026.667Meaning in Life (Presence)31.33331.000Meaning in Life (Search)31.00029.333Personal Growth Initiative Scale37.33338.000Subjective Happiness Scale22.66723.000

INTJBefore AfterGratitude Questionnaire29.00033.000Satisfaction with Life Scale28.00033.000Meaning in Life (Presence)27.00033.000Meaning in Life (Search)26.00034.000Personal Growth Initiative Scale37.00041.000Subjective Happiness Scale21.00027.000

ISTPBefore AfterGratitude Questionnaire30.33331.667Satisfaction with Life Scale27.00026.667Meaning in Life (Presence)29.66728.333Meaning in Life (Search)26.33325.000Personal Growth Initiative Scale39.66739.333Subjective Happiness Scale25.33325.000

ISFPBefore AfterGratitude Questionnaire33.40032.933Satisfaction with Life Scale29.86729.533Meaning in Life (Presence)28.46729.933Meaning in Life (Search)27.80028.933Personal Growth Initiative Scale40.66741.467Subjective Happiness Scale23.86724.800

INFPBefore AfterGratitude Questionnaire32.71431.857Satisfaction with Life Scale30.85730.286Meaning in Life (Presence)26.42928.429Meaning in Life (Search)30.14330.000Personal Growth Initiative Scale40.57141.286Subjective Happiness Scale23.28623.571

INTPBefore AfterGratitude Questionnaire29.66728.333Satisfaction with Life Scale29.33328.000Meaning in Life (Presence)29.00029.000Meaning in Life (Search)30.00030.667Personal Growth Initiative Scale37.33336.667Subjective Happiness Scale20.66720.000

ESTPBefore AfterGratitude Questionnaire31.40033.200Satisfaction with Life Scale30.60029.600Meaning in Life (Presence)24.80027.600Meaning in Life (Search)29.60030.600Personal Growth Initiative Scale39.60039.200Subjective Happiness Scale20.80020.800

ESFPBefore AfterGratitude Questionnaire33.73334.267Satisfaction with Life Scale28.73328.467Meaning in Life (Presence)29.06728.133Meaning in Life (Search)28.73327.333Personal Growth Initiative Scale39.06740.600Subjective Happiness Scale23.20023.667

ENFPBefore AfterGratitude Questionnaire30.78629.429Satisfaction with Life Scale31.92930.714Meaning in Life (Presence)31.64329.643Meaning in Life (Search)30.14328.500Personal Growth Initiative Scale37.71438.929Subjective Happiness Scale24.64326.357

ENTPBefore AfterGratitude Questionnaire32.25033.250Satisfaction with Life Scale25.50027.000Meaning in Life (Presence)28.00029.000Meaning in Life (Search)27.50028.500Personal Growth Initiative Scale41.00040.250Subjective Happiness Scale21.25024.250

ESTJBefore AfterGratitude Questionnaire32.88932.333Satisfaction with Life Scale30.11129.556Meaning in Life (Presence)30.66729.111Meaning in Life (Search)27.44428.000Personal Growth Initiative Scale39.44441.778Subjective Happiness Scale23.22222.333

ESFJBefore AfterGratitude Questionnaire33.64031.760Satisfaction with Life Scale30.80030.040Meaning in Life (Presence)30.64029.680Meaning in Life (Search)30.44029.680Personal Growth Initiative Scale40.16042.600Subjective Happiness Scale22.88023.200

ENFJBefore AfterGratitude Questionnaire34.40035.200Satisfaction with Life Scale32.80032.400Meaning in Life (Presence)29.60030.200Meaning in Life (Search)29.80030.800Personal Growth Initiative Scale39.80038.000Subjective Happiness Scale24.00022.800

ENTJBefore AfterGratitude Questionnaire29.50031.500Satisfaction with Life Scale29.50029.000Meaning in Life (Presence)30.00031.000Meaning in Life (Search)29.00031.000Personal Growth Initiative Scale36.50035.500Subjective Happiness Scale25.00026.000

Male Subjects – Average before and after CBT concept exposure
ISTJBefore AfterGratitude Questionnaire28.95734.217Satisfaction with Life Scale28.30434.826Meaning in Life (Presence)29.08733.826Meaning in Life (Search)29.04334.087Personal Growth Initiative Scale38.87043.565Subjective Happiness Scale23.52226.696

ISFJBefore AfterGratitude Questionnaire33.36434.273Satisfaction with Life Scale25.27327.636Meaning in Life (Presence)32.18232.455Meaning in Life (Search)28.00029.273Personal Growth Initiative Scale35.81834.909Subjective Happiness Scale19.81820.091

INFJBefore AfterGratitude Questionnaire30.00031.000Satisfaction with Life Scale30.00031.000Meaning in Life (Presence)31.00030.000Meaning in Life (Search)30.00030.000Personal Growth Initiative Scale36.00038.000Subjective Happiness Scale26.00025.000

INTJBefore AfterGratitude Questionnaire28.75033.500Satisfaction with Life Scale28.25034.250Meaning in Life (Presence)28.25034.500Meaning in Life (Search)27.50032.500Personal Growth Initiative Scale37.75041.500Subjective Happiness Scale22.00026.500

ISTPBefore AfterGratitude Questionnaire34.50036.333Satisfaction with Life Scale28.58330.333Meaning in Life (Presence)30.08330.250Meaning in Life (Search)30.75030.083Personal Growth Initiative Scale41.58340.917Subjective Happiness Scale21.50023.667

ISFPBefore AfterGratitude Questionnaire31.10032.200Satisfaction with Life Scale29.50030.300Meaning in Life (Presence)26.90027.500Meaning in Life (Search)27.50027.200Personal Growth Initiative Scale37.00038.500Subjective Happiness Scale24.90024.700

INFPBefore AfterGratitude Questionnaire32.20033.600Satisfaction with Life Scale28.60028.400Meaning in Life (Presence)29.60030.400Meaning in Life (Search)31.40031.400Personal Growth Initiative Scale38.00039.000Subjective Happiness Scale25.20025.400

INTPBefore AfterGratitude Questionnaire29.33329.167Satisfaction with Life Scale29.83329.333Meaning in Life (Presence)28.66729.833Meaning in Life (Search)29.66731.000Personal Growth Initiative Scale38.50037.833Subjective Happiness Scale23.16724.000

ESTPBefore AfterGratitude Questionnaire34.14334.714Satisfaction with Life Scale26.42928.286Meaning in Life (Presence)29.42928.143Meaning in Life (Search)29.57129.286Personal Growth Initiative Scale36.57138.143Subjective Happiness Scale25.57125.000

ESFPBefore AfterGratitude Questionnaire32.55633.111Satisfaction with Life Scale29.11128.556Meaning in Life (Presence)30.66730.111Meaning in Life (Search)30.11131.556Personal Growth Initiative Scale40.55641.111Subjective Happiness Scale24.22225.444

ENFPBefore AfterGratitude Questionnaire32.22231.667Satisfaction with Life Scale32.88933.333Meaning in Life (Presence)31.55630.556Meaning in Life (Search)32.33333.222Personal Growth Initiative Scale43.11144.222Subjective Happiness Scale25.11124.556

ENTPBefore AfterGratitude Questionnaire34.20033.200Satisfaction with Life Scale23.00024.600Meaning in Life (Presence)28.40027.200Meaning in Life (Search)28.80029.400Personal Growth Initiative Scale36.00036.000Subjective Happiness Scale18.20020.000

ESTJBefore AfterGratitude Questionnaire33.40034.133Satisfaction with Life Scale25.46727.133Meaning in Life (Presence)27.06728.200Meaning in Life (Search)28.13328.400Personal Growth Initiative Scale40.06740.733Subjective Happiness Scale21.20020.667

ESFJBefore AfterGratitude Questionnaire34.10033.200Satisfaction with Life Scale29.10030.000Meaning in Life (Presence)30.50031.500Meaning in Life (Search)29.90032.200Personal Growth Initiative Scale39.20040.200Subjective Happiness Scale21.80020.800

ENFJBefore AfterGratitude Questionnaire31.50031.000Satisfaction with Life Scale31.50030.500Meaning in Life (Presence)30.50031.000Meaning in Life (Search)31.50032.000Personal Growth Initiative Scale37.50039.500Subjective Happiness Scale21.00022.500

ENTJBefore AfterGratitude Questionnaire27.66729.333Satisfaction with Life Scale26.33328.333Meaning in Life (Presence)29.00027.333Meaning in Life (Search)29.33330.667Personal Growth Initiative Scale34.66735.333Subjective Happiness Scale24.33324.667

APPENDIX F – Statistical Data Analysis

Analysis of Percentages Comparing the Abbreviated MBTI with the Full MBTI Assessment for ‘All’, ‘Female’, and ‘Male’ categories

Briggs-Myers, I., McCaulley, M. H., Quenk, N. L., & Hammer, A. L. (2003). MBTI manual. A guide to the development and use of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. 3rd Edition. Menlo Park, CA: CPP Inc.

All subjects

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	General population	Subjects
Mean	6.26625	6.25
Variance	16.2131583	16.8516736
Observations	16	16
df	15	15
F	0.96210968
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.47067912
F Critical one-tail	0.41606907

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (General) = variance (Study)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

ISTJ	-0.144
ISFJ	-0.079
INFJ	0.037
INTJ	0.321
ISTP	0.062
ISFP	-0.097
INFP	0.130
INTP	0.097
ESTP	0.030
ESFP	-0.041
ENFP	-0.085
ENTP	-0.003
ESTJ	0.159
ESFJ	-0.156
ENFJ	0.009
ENTJ	0.021

Ryan-Joiner test for normality

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9718

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.914

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Mean-matched pairs T-test

Claim: µ(population) – µ(study) = 0

Sample size, n: 16

Difference Mean, d: 0.01625

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.1234436

Test Statistic, t: 0.5266 Critical t: ±2.9467

P-Value: 0.6062

99% Confidence interval:

-0.0746882 < µd < 0.1071882

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim that the mean difference between the two lists is 0.

Correlation and Regression test

Sample size, n: 16 Degrees of freedom: 14

Correlation Results:

Correlation coeff, r: 0.9997304 Critical r: ±0.6225903

P-value (two-tailed): 0.000

Reject the null hypothesis – Sample provides evidence to support linear correlation

Regression Results:

Y= b0 + b1x: Y Intercept, b0: -0.1382738 Slope, b1: 1.019473

Total Variation: 252.8976 Explained Variation: 252.7612

Unexplained Variation: 0.1363535

Standard Error: 0.0986891

Coeff of Det, R^2: 0.9994608

Conclusion:

The results of both the T-test (mean difference =0) and the correlation graph (approximately a 45 degree line), indicate that the percentages of individuals in the sample tested by means of the spreadsheet (Appendix C) matches well with the general population measured by the full MBTI test.

Percentage of females in each MBTI category in the general population vs study

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Expected	Observed
Mean	6.25	6.25
Variance	29.8916715	31.88
Observations	16	16
df	15	15
F	0.93763085
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.45119692
F Critical one-tail	0.41606907

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Expected) = variance (Observed)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

ISTJ	0.189
ISFJ	0.608
INFJ	-0.413
INTJ	0.129
ISTP	0.387
ISFP	-0.167
INFP	-0.098
INTP	-0.213
ESTP	-0.356
ESFP	0.033
ENFP	0.304
ENTP	-0.285
ESTJ	0.260
ESFJ	0.121
ENFJ	-0.056
ENTJ	-0.442

Ryan-Joiner test for normality

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9901

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.914

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Mean-matched pairs T-test

Claim: µ(population) – µ(study) = 0

Sample size, n: 16

Difference Mean, d: -2.914335e-16 Difference St Dev, sd: 0.3062025

Test Statistic, t: -0.0000 Critical t: ±2.9467

P-Value: 1.0000

99% Confidence interval:

-0.2255726 < µd < 0.2255726

Fail to reject the null hypothesis – Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim the mean difference between the two lists of data is 0.

Correlation and Regression Test

Sample size, n: 16 Degrees of freedom: 14

Correlation Results:

Correlation coeff, r: 0.9989947 Critical r: ±0.4973094

P-value (two-tailed): 0.000

Reject the null hypothesis – Sample provides evidence to support linear correlation

Regression Results:

Y= b0 + b1x: Y Intercept, b0: 0.2031185 Slope, b1: 0.967501

Total Variation: 448.5244 Explained Variation: 447.6231

Unexplained Variation: 0.9013337

Standard Error: 0.2537341 Coeff of Det, R^2: 0.9979904

Conclusion:

The results of both the T-test (mean difference =0) and the correlation graph (approximately a 45 degree line), indicate that the percentages of females in the sample tested by means of the spreadsheet (Appendix C) matches well with the general population of females measured by the full MBTI test.

Percentage of males in each category in the general population vs study

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Expected	Observed
Mean	6.25	6.25
Variance	14.632	17.48546067
Observations	16	16
df	15	15
F	0.83680952
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.36727296
F Critical one-tail	0.41606907

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Expected) = variance (Observed)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

ISTJ	-1.024
ISFJ	-0.233
INFJ	0.542
INTJ	0.270
ISTP	-0.591
ISFP	0.024
INFP	0.312
INTP	0.255
ESTP	0.297
ESFP	0.082
ENFP	-0.418
ENTP	0.212
ESTJ	-0.164
ESFJ	-0.076
ENFJ	0.085
ENTJ	0.427

Ryan-Joiner test for normality

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9557

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.914

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 1

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Mean-matched pairs T-test

Claim: µ(population) – µ(study) = 0

Sample size, n: 16

Difference Mean, d: -0.000625 Difference St Dev, sd: 0.408664

Test Statistic, t: -0.0061 Critical t: ±2.9467

P-Value: 0.9952

99% Confidence interval: -0.3016786 < µd < 0.3004286

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim that the mean difference between the two lists is 0.

Correlation and Regression

Sample size, n: 16 Degrees of freedom: 14

Correlation Results: Correlation coeff, r: 0.9987131 Critical r: ±0.6225903

P-value (two-tailed): 0.000

Reject the null hypothesis

Sample provides evidence to support linear correlation

Regression Results:

Y= b0 + b1x: Y Intercept, b0: -0.5702271 Slope, b1: 1.091336

Total Variation: 262.0781 Explained Variation: 261.404

Unexplained Variation: 0.6741198

Standard Error: 0.2194343 Coeff of Det, R^2: 0.9974278

Conclusion:

The results of both the T-test (mean difference =0) and the correlation graph (approximately a 45 degree line), indicate that the percentages of males in the sample tested by means of the spreadsheet (Appendix C) matches well with the general population of males measured by the full MBTI test.

ANOVA test on normalized data differences to establish differential effects from CBT concept exposure for the ‘All subjects’ category

‘Before mean’ minus ‘After mean’ for each group:

ISTJ	ISFJ	INFJ	INTJ	ISTP	ISFP	INFP	INTP
-0.122	-0.010	-0.012	-0.108	-0.040	-0.015	-0.017	0.012
-0.182	-0.050	-0.017	-0.163	-0.032	-0.013	0.009	0.022
-0.140	0.014	0.023	-0.176	0.008	-0.025	-0.033	-0.023
-0.161	-0.037	0.014	-0.169	0.025	-0.004	0.001	-0.032
-0.093	0.005	-0.033	-0.080	0.012	-0.027	-0.019	0.014
-0.123	-0.013	0.021	-0.177	-0.050	-0.005	-0.008	-0.014

ESTP	ESFP	ENFP	ENTP	ESTJ	ESFJ	ENFJ	ENTJ
-0.022	-0.013	0.019	0.009	-0.008	0.028	0.003	-0.042
-0.028	0.013	0.002	-0.045	-0.028	-0.011	0.023	-0.035
0.001	0.019	0.037	0.015	-0.009	-0.012	-0.015	0.025
-0.003	-0.017	-0.003	-0.021	-0.010	-0.039	-0.019	-0.044
-0.020	-0.018	-0.024	0.005	-0.024	-0.030	-0.018	-0.003
0.014	-0.035	-0.005	-0.077	0.023	0.021	-0.024	-0.019

Bartlett’s Test to confirm homoscedasticity

Significance level (%): 5


Summary statistics:

All	Minimum	Maximum	Mean
ISTJ	-0.182	-0.093	-0.137
ISFJ	-0.05	0.014	-0.015
INFJ	-0.033	0.023	-0.001
INTJ	-0.177	-0.08	-0.146
ISTP	-0.05	0.025	-0.013
ISFP	-0.027	-0.004	-0.015
INFP	-0.033	0.009	-0.011
INTP	-0.032	0.022	-0.004
ESTP	-0.028	0.014	-0.01
ESFP	-0.035	0.019	-0.009
ENFP	-0.024	0.037	0.004
ENTP	-0.077	0.015	-0.019
ESTJ	-0.028	0.023	-0.009
ESFJ	-0.039	0.028	-0.007
ENFJ	-0.024	0.023	-0.008
ENTJ	-0.044	0.025	-0.02



Chi-square (Observed value)	16.647
Chi-square (Critical value)	24.996
DF	15
p-value (one-tailed)	0.34
alpha	0.05

Test interpretation:
H0: The variances are identical.
Ha: At least one of the variances is different from another.
As the computed p-value is greater than the significance level alpha=0.05, one cannot reject the null hypothesis H0.

ANOVA results:

Source: DF: SS: MS: Test Stat, F: Critical F: P-Value:

Treatment: 15 0.185246 0.01235 19.444022 1.79322 0.000

Error: 80 0.050812 0.000635

Total: 95 0.236058

Reject the null hypothesis

Reject equality of means

Conclusion: There are differential effects within the 16 groups in the ‘All subjects’ category.

ANOVA test on normalized data differences to establish differential effects from CBT concept exposure for the ‘Females’ category

‘Before mean’ minus ‘After mean’ for each group:

ISTJ	ISFJ	INFJ	INTJ	ISTP	ISFP	INFP	INTP
-0.114	0.016	0.016	-0.095	-0.032	0.011	0.020	0.032
-0.171	-0.008	0.010	-0.143	0.010	0.010	0.016	0.038
-0.151	0.065	0.010	-0.171	0.038	-0.042	-0.057	0.000
-0.200	-0.039	0.048	-0.229	0.038	-0.032	0.004	-0.019
-0.081	-0.027	-0.014	-0.083	0.007	-0.017	-0.015	0.014
-0.146	-0.022	-0.012	-0.214	0.012	-0.033	-0.010	0.024

ESTP	ESFP	ENFP	ENTP	ESTJ	ESFJ	ENFJ	ENTJ
-0.043	-0.013	0.032	-0.024	0.013	0.045	-0.019	-0.048
0.029	0.008	0.035	-0.043	0.016	0.022	0.011	0.014
-0.080	0.027	0.057	-0.029	0.044	0.027	-0.017	-0.029
-0.029	0.040	0.047	-0.029	-0.016	0.022	-0.029	-0.057
0.008	-0.032	-0.025	0.016	-0.049	-0.051	0.038	0.021
0.000	-0.017	-0.061	-0.107	0.032	-0.011	0.043	-0.036

Bartlett’s Test to confirm homoscedasticity FemalesMinimumMaximumMeanStd. deviationISTJ-0.186-0.098-0.1340.031ISFJ-0.0680.019-0.0210.029INFJ-0.0420.036-0.0050.032INTJ-0.179-0.078-0.1410.039ISTP-0.0770.019-0.0240.039ISFP-0.0310.009-0.0140.017INFP-0.0330.006-0.0130.015INTP-0.0380.014-0.0120.025ESTP-0.0530.037-0.0060.034ESFP-0.0440.016-0.0130.026ENFP-0.0250.0290.0000.023ENTP-0.0640.034-0.0120.039ESTJ-0.0480.019-0.0170.023ESFJ-0.0660.036-0.0140.037ENFJ-0.0540.029-0.0140.031ENTJ-0.0570.048-0.0190.037		Bartlett’s Test to confirm homoscedasticity	Bartlett’s Test to confirm homoscedasticity	Bartlett’s Test to confirm homoscedasticity

Chi-square (Observed value)	16.647
Chi-square (Critical value)	24.996
DF	15
p-value (one-tailed)	0.340
alpha	0.05



Test interpretation:
H0: The variances are identical.
Ha: At least one of the variances is different from another.
As the computed p-value is greater than the significance level alpha=0.05, one cannot reject the null hypothesis H0. ANOVA results:Source: DF: SS: MS: Test Stat, F: Critical F: P-Value: Treatment: 15 0.248781 0.016585 13.110759 1.79322 0.000 Error: 80 0.101202 0.001265 Total: 95 0.349983 Reject the null hypothesisReject equality of means

Conclusion: There are differential effects within the 16 groups in the ‘Females’ category.

ANOVA test on normalized data differences to establish differential effects from CBT concept exposure for the ‘Males’ category.

ISTJ	ISFJ	INFJ	INTJ	ISTP	ISFP	INFP	INTP
-0.125	-0.022	-0.024	-0.113	-0.044	-0.026	-0.033	0.004
-0.186	-0.068	-0.029	-0.171	-0.050	-0.023	0.006	0.014
-0.135	-0.008	0.029	-0.179	-0.005	-0.017	-0.023	-0.033
-0.144	-0.036	0.000	-0.143	0.019	0.009	0.000	-0.038
-0.098	0.019	-0.042	-0.078	0.014	-0.031	-0.021	0.014
-0.113	-0.010	0.036	-0.161	-0.077	0.007	-0.007	-0.030

ESTP	ESFP	ENFP	ENTP	ESTJ	ESFJ	ENFJ	ENTJ
-0.014	-0.013	0.013	0.024	-0.017	0.021	0.012	-0.040
-0.053	0.016	-0.013	-0.046	-0.048	-0.026	0.029	-0.057
0.037	0.016	0.029	0.034	-0.032	-0.029	-0.014	0.048
0.008	-0.041	-0.025	-0.017	-0.008	-0.066	-0.014	-0.038
-0.033	-0.012	-0.023	0.000	-0.014	-0.021	-0.042	-0.014
0.020	-0.044	0.020	-0.064	0.019	0.036	-0.054	-0.012

Bartlett’s Test to confirm homoscedasticity			Bartlett’s Test to confirm homoscedasticity	Bartlett’s Test to confirm homoscedasticity	Bartlett’s Test to confirm homoscedasticity
Males	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. deviation
ISTJ	-0.186	-0.098	-0.134	0.031
ISFJ	-0.068	0.019	-0.021	0.029
INFJ	-0.042	0.036	-0.005	0.032
INTJ	-0.179	-0.078	-0.141	0.039
ISTP	-0.077	0.019	-0.024	0.039
ISFP	-0.031	0.009	-0.014	0.017
INFP	-0.033	0.006	-0.013	0.015
INTP	-0.038	0.014	-0.012	0.025
ESTP	-0.053	0.037	-0.006	0.034
ESFP	-0.044	0.016	-0.013	0.026
ENFP	-0.025	0.029	0.000	0.023
ENTP	-0.064	0.034	-0.012	0.039
ESTJ	-0.048	0.019	-0.017	0.023
ESFJ	-0.066	0.036	-0.014	0.037
ENFJ	-0.054	0.029	-0.014	0.031
ENTJ	-0.057	0.048	-0.019	0.037

Bartlett’s test / Two-tailed test (ISTJ):

Chi-square (Observed value)	9.805
Chi-square (Critical value)	24.996
DF	15
p-value (one-tailed)	0.832
alpha	0.05

Test interpretation:
H0: The variances are identical.
Ha: At least one of the variances is different from another.
As the computed p-value is greater than the significance level alpha=0.05, one cannot reject the null hypothesis H0.

ANOVA results:

Source: DF: SS: MS: Test Stat, F: Critical F: P-Value:

Treatment: 15 0.165298 0.01102 11.71049 1.79322 0.000

Error: 80 0.075282 0.000941

Total: 95 0.24058

Reject the null hypothesis

Reject equality of means

Conclusion: There are differential effects within the 16 groups in the ‘Males’ category.

Tests for homoscedasticity, data normality and differential effects from CBT concept exposure for each of the 16 MBTI categories for ‘All subjects’, ‘Females’, and ‘Males’

ISTJ – All subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	29.52	34.64	/ 42	0.70	0.82
Satisfaction with Life Scale	27.82	34.18	/35	0.79	0.98
Meaning in Life (Presence)	29.27	34.18	/35	0.84	0.98
Meaning in Life (Search)	28.76	34.39	/35	0.82	0.98
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	38.85	43.30	/48	0.81	0.90
Subjective Happiness Scale	23.36	26.82	/28	0.83	0.96

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.79833333	0.936666667
Variance	0.00261667	0.004226667
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	0.61908517
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.30578095
F Critical one-tail	0.1980069

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

-0.122	Gratitude Questionnaire
-0.182	Satisfaction with Life Scale
-0.140	Meaning in Life (Presence)
-0.161	Meaning in Life (Search)
-0.093	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
-0.123	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9879

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) < 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.1383333

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0343026

Test Statistic, t: -9.8782

Critical t: -2.0150

P-Value: 0.0001

90% Confidence interval:

-0.166552 < µd < -0.1101147

Reject the null hypothesis

Sample provides evidence to support the claim

Conclusion:

Reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence to support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure minus after CBT concept exposure is less than zero.

The results show that there was significant improvement in the ISTJ ‘All Subjects’ category.

ISTJ – Female subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	30.80	35.60	/ 42	0.73	0.85
Satisfaction with Life Scale	26.70	32.70	/35	0.76	0.93
Meaning in Life (Presence)	29.70	35.00	/35	0.85	1.00
Meaning in Life (Search)	28.10	35.10	/35	0.80	1.00
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	38.80	42.70	/48	0.81	0.89
Subjective Happiness Scale	23.00	27.10	/28	0.82	0.97

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.795	0.94
Variance	0.00187	0.00376
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	0.49734043
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.23082888
F Critical one-tail	0.1980069

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

-0.114	Gratitude Questionnaire
-0.171	Satisfaction with Life Scale
-0.151	Meaning in Life (Presence)
-0.200	Meaning in Life (Search)
-0.081	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
-0.146	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9907

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) < 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.145

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0413521

Test Statistic, t: -8.5891

Critical t: -2.0150

P-Value: 0.0002

90% Confidence interval:

-0.1790179 < µd < -0.1109821

Reject the null hypothesis

Sample provides evidence to support the claim

Conclusion:

Reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence to support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure minus after CBT concept exposure is less than zero.

The results show that there was significant improvement in the ISTJ ‘Female Subjects’ category.

ISTJ – Male Subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	28.96	34.22	/ 42	0.69	0.81
Satisfaction with Life Scale	28.30	34.83	/35	0.81	1.00
Meaning in Life (Presence)	29.09	33.83	/35	0.83	0.97
Meaning in Life (Search)	29.04	34.09	/35	0.83	0.97
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	38.87	43.57	/48	0.81	0.91
Subjective Happiness Scale	23.52	26.70	/28	0.84	0.95

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.80166667	0.935
Variance	0.00313667	0.00463
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	0.6774658
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.33979224
F Critical one-tail	0.1980069

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

-0.125	Gratitude Questionnaire
-0.186	Satisfaction with Life Scale
-0.135	Meaning in Life (Presence)
-0.144	Meaning in Life (Search)
-0.098	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
-0.113	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9678

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) < 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.1333333

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0320416

Test Statistic, t: -10.1929

Critical t: -2.0150

P-Value: 0.0001

90% Confidence interval:

-0.159692 < µd < -0.1069746

Reject the null hypothesis

Sample provides evidence to support the claim

Conclusion:

Reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence to support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure minus after CBT concept exposure is less than zero.

The results show that there was significant improvement in the ISTJ ‘Male Subjects’ category.

ISFJ All subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	32.56	32.99	/ 42	0.78	0.79
Satisfaction with Life Scale	26.52	28.26	/35	0.76	0.81
Meaning in Life (Presence)	33.15	32.65	/35	0.95	0.93
Meaning in Life (Search)	27.90	29.20	/35	0.80	0.83
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	37.09	36.84	/48	0.77	0.77
Subjective Happiness Scale	20.80	21.18	/28	0.74	0.76

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.8	0.815
Variance	0.0058	0.00383
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	1.51436031
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.32996683
F Critical one-tail	5.05032906

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

-0.010	Gratitude Questionnaire
-0.050	Satisfaction with Life Scale
0.014	Meaning in Life (Presence)
-0.037	Meaning in Life (Search)
0.005	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
-0.013	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.981

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.015

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0242899

Test Statistic, t: -1.5127

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.1908

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0404907 < µd < 0.0104907

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion:

Fail to reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence to support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure and after is zero.

The results indicate that there was no significant change in the ISFJ ‘All Subjects’ category.

ISFJ Female Subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	30.71	30.04	/ 42	0.73	0.72
Satisfaction with Life Scale	29.39	29.68	/35	0.84	0.85
Meaning in Life (Presence)	35.39	33.11	/35	1.01	0.95
Meaning in Life (Search)	27.68	29.04	/35	0.79	0.83
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	40.00	41.29	/48	0.83	0.86
Subjective Happiness Scale	23.07	23.68	/28	0.82	0.85

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.83666667	0.843333333
Variance	0.00878667	0.005426667
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	1.61916462
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.30489889
F Critical one-tail	5.05032906

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

0.016	Gratitude Questionnaire
-0.008	Satisfaction with Life Scale
0.065	Meaning in Life (Presence)
-0.039	Meaning in Life (Search)
-0.027	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
-0.022	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9397

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.0066667

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.037238

Test Statistic, t: -0.4385

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.6793

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0457455 < µd < 0.0324122

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion:

Fail to reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence to support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure and after is zero.

The results indicate that there was no significant change in the ISFJ ‘Female Subjects’ category.

ISFJ Male Subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	33.36	34.27	/ 42	0.79	0.82
Satisfaction with Life Scale	25.27	27.64	/35	0.72	0.79
Meaning in Life (Presence)	32.18	32.45	/35	0.92	0.93
Meaning in Life (Search)	28.00	29.27	/35	0.80	0.84
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	35.82	34.91	/48	0.75	0.73
Subjective Happiness Scale	19.82	20.09	/28	0.71	0.72

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.78166667	0.805
Variance	0.00589667	0.00603
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	0.97788834
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.4905112
F Critical one-tail	0.1980069

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

-0.022	Gratitude Questionnaire
-0.068	Satisfaction with Life Scale
-0.008	Meaning in Life (Presence)
-0.036	Meaning in Life (Search)
0.019	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
-0.010	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9796

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.0233333

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0307679

Test Statistic, t: -1.8576

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.1223

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0556223 < µd < 0.0089556

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion:

Fail to reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence to support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure and after is zero.

The results indicate that there was no significant change in the ISFJ ‘Male Subjects’ category.

INFJ All Subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	30.00	30.49	/ 42	0.71	0.73
Satisfaction with Life Scale	29.09	29.69	/35	0.83	0.85
Meaning in Life (Presence)	31.10	30.30	/35	0.89	0.87
Meaning in Life (Search)	30.30	29.80	/35	0.87	0.85
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	36.40	38.00	/48	0.76	0.79
Subjective Happiness Scale	24.99	24.39	/28	0.89	0.87

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.825	0.826666667
Variance	0.00559	0.003106667
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	1.79935622
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.26737734
F Critical one-tail	5.05032906

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

-0.012	Gratitude Questionnaire
-0.017	Satisfaction with Life Scale
0.023	Meaning in Life (Presence)
0.014	Meaning in Life (Search)
-0.033	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
0.021	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9561

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.0016667

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0240139

Test Statistic, t: -0.1700

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.8717

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0268677 < µd < 0.0235343

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion:

Fail to reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence to support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure and after is zero.

The results indicate that there was no significant change in the INFJ ‘All Subjects’ category.

INFJ – Female Subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	30.00	29.33	/ 42	0.71	0.70
Satisfaction with Life Scale	27.00	26.67	/35	0.77	0.76
Meaning in Life (Presence)	31.33	31.00	/35	0.90	0.89
Meaning in Life (Search)	31.00	29.33	/35	0.89	0.84
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	37.33	38.00	/48	0.78	0.79
Subjective Happiness Scale	22.67	23.00	/28	0.81	0.82

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.81	0.8
Variance	0.0054	0.00436
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	1.23853211
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.41006391
F Critical one-tail	5.05032906

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

0.016	Gratitude Questionnaire
0.010	Satisfaction with Life Scale
0.010	Meaning in Life (Presence)
0.048	Meaning in Life (Search)
-0.014	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
-0.012	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9445

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: 0.01

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0219089

Test Statistic, t: 1.1180

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.3144

95% Confidence interval:

-0.012992 < µd < 0.032992

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion:

Fail to reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence to support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure and after is zero.

The results indicate that there was no significant change in the INFJ ‘Female Subjects’ category.

INFJ – Male Subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	30.00	31.00	/ 42	0.71	0.74
Satisfaction with Life Scale	30.00	31.00	/35	0.86	0.89
Meaning in Life (Presence)	31.00	30.00	/35	0.89	0.86
Meaning in Life (Search)	30.00	30.00	/35	0.86	0.86
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	36.00	38.00	/48	0.75	0.79
Subjective Happiness Scale	26.00	25.00	/28	0.93	0.89

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.83333333	0.838333333
Variance	0.00722667	0.003656667
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	1.976299
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.23629904
F Critical one-tail	5.05032906

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

-0.024	Gratitude Questionnaire
-0.029	Satisfaction with Life Scale
0.029	Meaning in Life (Presence)
0.000	Meaning in Life (Search)
-0.042	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
0.036	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9653

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.005

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0339116

Test Statistic, t: -0.3612

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.7327

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0405881 < µd < 0.0305881

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion:

Fail to reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence do not support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure and after is different from zero.

The results show that there was no significant change in the INFJ ‘Male Subjects’ category.

INTJ – All Subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	28.83	33.35	/ 42	0.69	0.79
Satisfaction with Life Scale	28.17	33.87	/35	0.80	0.97
Meaning in Life (Presence)	27.87	34.05	/35	0.80	0.97
Meaning in Life (Search)	27.05	32.95	/35	0.77	0.94
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	37.52	41.35	/48	0.78	0.86
Subjective Happiness Scale	21.70	26.65	/28	0.77	0.95

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.76833333	0.913333333
Variance	0.00165667	0.005306667
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	0.31218593
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.11358262
F Critical one-tail	0.1980069

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

-0.108	Gratitude Questionnaire
-0.163	Satisfaction with Life Scale
-0.176	Meaning in Life (Presence)
-0.169	Meaning in Life (Search)
-0.080	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
-0.177	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.8977

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) < 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.145

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0432435

Test Statistic, t: -8.2134

Critical t: -2.0150

P-Value: 0.0002

90% Confidence interval:

-0.1805738 < µd < -0.1094262

Reject the null hypothesis

Sample provides evidence to support the claim

Conclusion:

Reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence to support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure minus after CBT concept exposure is less than zero.

The results show that there was significant improvement in the INTJ ‘All Subjects’ category.

INTJ – Female Subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	29.00	33.00	/ 42	0.69	0.79
Satisfaction with Life Scale	28.00	33.00	/35	0.80	0.94
Meaning in Life (Presence)	27.00	33.00	/35	0.77	0.94
Meaning in Life (Search)	26.00	34.00	/35	0.74	0.97
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	37.00	41.00	/48	0.77	0.85
Subjective Happiness Scale	21.00	27.00	/28	0.75	0.96

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.75333333	0.908333333
Variance	0.00138667	0.005176667
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	0.26786864
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.08729761
F Critical one-tail	0.1980069

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

-0.095	Gratitude Questionnaire
-0.143	Satisfaction with Life Scale
-0.171	Meaning in Life (Presence)
-0.229	Meaning in Life (Search)
-0.083	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
-0.214	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9765

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) < 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.155

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0595819

Test Statistic, t: -6.3723

Critical t: -2.0150

P-Value: 0.0007

90% Confidence interval:

-0.2040144 < µd < -0.1059856

Reject the null hypothesis

Sample provides evidence to support the claim

Conclusion:

Reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence to support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure minus after CBT concept exposure is less than zero.

The results show that there was significant improvement in the INTJ ‘Female Subjects’ category.

INTJ – Male Subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	28.75	33.50	/ 42	0.68	0.80
Satisfaction with Life Scale	28.25	34.25	/35	0.81	0.98
Meaning in Life (Presence)	28.25	34.50	/35	0.81	0.99
Meaning in Life (Search)	27.50	32.50	/35	0.79	0.93
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	37.75	41.50	/48	0.79	0.86
Subjective Happiness Scale	22.00	26.50	/28	0.79	0.95

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.77833333	0.918333333
Variance	0.00241667	0.005496667
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	0.4396604
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.19406773
F Critical one-tail	0.1980069

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

-0.113	Gratitude Questionnaire
-0.171	Satisfaction with Life Scale
-0.179	Meaning in Life (Presence)
-0.143	Meaning in Life (Search)
-0.078	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
-0.161	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9606

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) < 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.14

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0404969

Test Statistic, t: -8.4680

Critical t: -2.0150

P-Value: 0.0002

90% Confidence interval:

-0.1733144 < µd < -0.1066856

Reject the null hypothesis

Sample provides evidence to support the claim

Conclusion:

Reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence to support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure minus after CBT concept exposure is less than zero.

The results show that there was significant improvement in the INTJ ‘Male Subjects’ category.

ISTP – All Subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	33.24	34.92	/ 42	0.79	0.83
Satisfaction with Life Scale	28.10	29.22	/35	0.80	0.83
Meaning in Life (Presence)	29.96	29.67	/35	0.86	0.85
Meaning in Life (Search)	29.41	28.54	/35	0.84	0.82
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	41.00	40.44	/48	0.85	0.84
Subjective Happiness Scale	22.66	24.07	/28	0.81	0.86

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.825	0.838333333
Variance	0.00083	0.000216667
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	3.83076923
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.08339813
F Critical one-tail	5.05032906

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

-0.040	Gratitude Questionnaire
-0.032	Satisfaction with Life Scale
0.008	Meaning in Life (Presence)
0.025	Meaning in Life (Search)
0.012	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
-0.050	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9535

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.0133333

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0301109

Test Statistic, t: -1.0847

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.3276

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0449328 < µd < 0.0182661

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion:

Fail to reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence to support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure and after is zero.

The results indicate that there was no significant change in the ISTP ‘All Subjects’ category.

ISTP – Female Subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	30.33	31.67	/ 42	0.72	0.75
Satisfaction with Life Scale	27.00	26.67	/35	0.77	0.76
Meaning in Life (Presence)	29.67	28.33	/35	0.85	0.81
Meaning in Life (Search)	26.33	25.00	/35	0.75	0.71
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	39.67	39.33	/48	0.83	0.82
Subjective Happiness Scale	25.33	25.00	/28	0.90	0.89

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.80333333	0.79
Variance	0.00462667	0.00404
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	1.14521452
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.44267254
F Critical one-tail	5.05032906

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

-0.032	Gratitude Questionnaire
0.010	Satisfaction with Life Scale
0.038	Meaning in Life (Presence)
0.038	Meaning in Life (Search)
0.007	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
0.012	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9331

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: 0.0133333

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0258199

Test Statistic, t: 1.2649

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.2617

95% Confidence interval:

-0.013763 < µd < 0.0404296

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion:

Fail to reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence to support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure and after is zero.

The results indicate that there was no significant change in the ISTP ‘Female Subjects’ category.

ISTP – Male Subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	34.50	36.33	/ 42	0.82	0.87
Satisfaction with Life Scale	28.58	30.33	/35	0.82	0.87
Meaning in Life (Presence)	30.08	30.25	/35	0.86	0.86
Meaning in Life (Search)	30.75	30.08	/35	0.88	0.86
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	41.58	40.92	/48	0.87	0.85
Subjective Happiness Scale	21.50	23.67	/28	0.77	0.85

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.83666667	0.86
Variance	0.00170667	8E-05
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	21.3333333
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.0021951
F Critical one-tail	5.05032906

Since p < .05, reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.83666667	0.86
Variance	0.00170667	8E-05
Observations	6	6
Hypothesized Mean Difference	0
df	5
t Stat	-1.352168
P(T<=t) one-tail	0.11713087
t Critical one-tail	2.01504837
P(T<=t) two-tail	0.23426174
t Critical two-tail	2.57058183

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

-0.044	Gratitude Questionnaire
-0.050	Satisfaction with Life Scale
-0.005	Meaning in Life (Presence)
0.019	Meaning in Life (Search)
0.014	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
-0.077	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9677

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.0233333

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.042269

Test Statistic, t: -1.3522

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.2343

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0676919 < µd < 0.0210252

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion:

Fail to reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence do not support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure and after is different from zero.

The results show that there was no significant change in the ISTP ‘Male Subjects’ category.

ISFP – All Subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	31.80	32.42	/ 42	0.76	0.77
Satisfaction with Life Scale	29.61	30.07	/35	0.85	0.86
Meaning in Life (Presence)	27.37	28.24	/35	0.78	0.81
Meaning in Life (Search)	27.59	27.73	/35	0.79	0.79
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	38.11	39.40	/48	0.79	0.82
Subjective Happiness Scale	24.59	24.73	/28	0.88	0.88

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.80833333	0.821666667
Variance	0.00213667	0.001736667
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	1.2303263
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.41280819
F Critical one-tail	5.05032906

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

-0.015	Gratitude Questionnaire
-0.013	Satisfaction with Life Scale
-0.025	Meaning in Life (Presence)
-0.004	Meaning in Life (Search)
-0.027	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
-0.005	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.964

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.0133333

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0136626

Test Statistic, t: -2.3905

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.0624

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0276713 < µd < 0.0010047

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion:

Fail to reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence to support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure and after is zero.

The results indicate that there was no significant change in the ISFP ‘All Subjects’ category.

ISFP – Female Subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	33.40	32.93	/ 42	0.80	0.78
Satisfaction with Life Scale	29.87	29.53	/35	0.85	0.84
Meaning in Life (Presence)	28.47	29.93	/35	0.81	0.86
Meaning in Life (Search)	27.80	28.93	/35	0.79	0.83
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	40.67	41.47	/48	0.85	0.86
Subjective Happiness Scale	23.87	24.80	/28	0.85	0.89

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.825	0.843333333
Variance	0.00079	0.001386667
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	0.56971154
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.2759627
F Critical one-tail	0.1980069

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

0.011	Gratitude Questionnaire
0.010	Satisfaction with Life Scale
-0.042	Meaning in Life (Presence)
-0.032	Meaning in Life (Search)
-0.017	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
-0.033	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.941

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.0183333

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0292689

Test Statistic, t: -1.5343

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.1855

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0490491 < µd < 0.0123824

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion:

Fail to reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence to support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure and after is zero.

The results indicate that there was no significant change in the ISFP ‘Female Subjects’ category.

ISFP – Male Subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	31.10	32.20	/ 42	0.74	0.77
Satisfaction with Life Scale	29.50	30.30	/35	0.84	0.87
Meaning in Life (Presence)	26.90	27.50	/35	0.77	0.79
Meaning in Life (Search)	27.50	27.20	/35	0.79	0.78
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	37.00	38.50	/48	0.77	0.80
Subjective Happiness Scale	24.90	24.70	/28	0.89	0.88

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.8	0.815
Variance	0.00304	0.00227
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	1.33920705
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.37820222
F Critical one-tail	5.05032906

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

-0.026	Gratitude Questionnaire
-0.023	Satisfaction with Life Scale
-0.017	Meaning in Life (Presence)
0.009	Meaning in Life (Search)
-0.031	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
0.007	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9319

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.015

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0197484

Test Statistic, t: -1.8605

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.1219

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0357247 < µd < 0.0057247

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion:

Fail to reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence do not support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure and after is different from zero.

The results show that there was no significant change in the ISFP ‘Male Subjects’ category.

INFP – All Subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	32.36	33.07	/ 42	0.77	0.79
Satisfaction with Life Scale	29.28	28.97	/35	0.84	0.83
Meaning in Life (Presence)	28.64	29.80	/35	0.82	0.85
Meaning in Life (Search)	31.02	30.98	/35	0.89	0.89
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	38.78	39.69	/48	0.81	0.83
Subjective Happiness Scale	24.62	24.85	/28	0.88	0.89

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.835	0.846666667
Variance	0.00203	0.001506667
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	1.34734513
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.37576669
F Critical one-tail	5.05032906

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

-0.017	Gratitude Questionnaire
0.009	Satisfaction with Life Scale
-0.033	Meaning in Life (Presence)
0.001	Meaning in Life (Search)
-0.019	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
-0.008	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9922

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.0116667

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0147196

Test Statistic, t: -1.9415

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.1099

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0271139 < µd < 0.0037806

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion:

Fail to reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence to support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure and after is zero.

The results indicate that there was no significant change in the INFP ‘All Subjects’ category.

INFP – Female Subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	32.71	31.86	/ 42	0.78	0.76
Satisfaction with Life Scale	30.86	30.29	/35	0.88	0.87
Meaning in Life (Presence)	26.43	28.43	/35	0.76	0.81
Meaning in Life (Search)	30.14	30.00	/35	0.86	0.86
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	40.57	41.29	/48	0.85	0.86
Subjective Happiness Scale	23.29	23.57	/28	0.83	0.84

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.82666667	0.833333333
Variance	0.00222667	0.001746667
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	1.27480916
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.39820383
F Critical one-tail	5.05032906

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

0.020	Gratitude Questionnaire
0.016	Satisfaction with Life Scale
-0.057	Meaning in Life (Presence)
0.004	Meaning in Life (Search)
-0.015	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
-0.010	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9433

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.0066667

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0242212

Test Statistic, t: -0.6742

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.5301

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0320852 < µd < 0.0187519

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion:

Fail to reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence to support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure and after is zero.

The results indicate that there was no significant change in the INFP ‘Female Subjects’ category.

INFP – Male Subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	32.20	33.60	/ 42	0.77	0.80
Satisfaction with Life Scale	28.60	28.40	/35	0.82	0.81
Meaning in Life (Presence)	29.60	30.40	/35	0.85	0.87
Meaning in Life (Search)	31.40	31.40	/35	0.90	0.90
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	38.00	39.00	/48	0.79	0.81
Subjective Happiness Scale	25.20	25.40	/28	0.90	0.91

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.83833333	0.85
Variance	0.00301667	0.00244
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	1.2363388
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.41079517
F Critical one-tail	5.05032906

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

-0.033	Gratitude Questionnaire
0.006	Satisfaction with Life Scale
-0.023	Meaning in Life (Presence)
0.000	Meaning in Life (Search)
-0.021	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
-0.007	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.982

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.0116667

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0147196

Test Statistic, t: -1.9415

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.1099

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0271139 < µd < 0.0037806

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion:

Fail to reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence do not support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure and after is different from zero.

The results show that there was no significant change in the INFP ‘Male Subjects’ category.

INTP – All Subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	29.43	28.91	/ 42	0.70	0.69
Satisfaction with Life Scale	29.68	28.93	/35	0.85	0.83
Meaning in Life (Presence)	28.77	29.58	/35	0.82	0.85
Meaning in Life (Search)	29.77	30.90	/35	0.85	0.88
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	38.15	37.48	/48	0.79	0.78
Subjective Happiness Scale	22.41	22.79	/28	0.80	0.81

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.80166667	0.806666667
Variance	0.00309667	0.004426667
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	0.69954819
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.35227544
F Critical one-tail	0.1980069

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

0.012	Gratitude Questionnaire
0.022	Satisfaction with Life Scale
-0.023	Meaning in Life (Presence)
-0.032	Meaning in Life (Search)
0.014	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
-0.014	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9597

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.005

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0216795

Test Statistic, t: -0.5649

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.5965

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0277512 < µd < 0.0177512

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion:

Fail to reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence to support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure and after is zero.

The results indicate that there was no significant change in the INTP ‘All Subjects’ category.

INTP – Female Subjects


	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	29.67	28.33	/ 42	0.71	0.67
Satisfaction with Life Scale	29.33	28.00	/35	0.84	0.80
Meaning in Life (Presence)	29.00	29.00	/35	0.83	0.83
Meaning in Life (Search)	30.00	30.67	/35	0.86	0.88
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	37.33	36.67	/48	0.78	0.76
Subjective Happiness Scale	20.67	20.00	/28	0.74	0.71

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.79333333	0.775
Variance	0.00358667	0.00603
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	0.59480376
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.29122925
F Critical one-tail	0.1980069

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

0.032	Gratitude Questionnaire
0.038	Satisfaction with Life Scale
0.000	Meaning in Life (Presence)
-0.019	Meaning in Life (Search)
0.014	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
0.024	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.978

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: 0.0183333

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0240139

Test Statistic, t: 1.8701

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.1204

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0068677 < µd < 0.0435343

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion:

Fail to reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence to support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure and after is zero.

The results indicate that there was no significant change in the INTP ‘Female Subjects’ category.

INTP – Male Subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	29.33	29.17	/ 42	0.70	0.69
Satisfaction with Life Scale	29.83	29.33	/35	0.85	0.84
Meaning in Life (Presence)	28.67	29.83	/35	0.82	0.85
Meaning in Life (Search)	29.67	31.00	/35	0.85	0.89
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	38.50	37.83	/48	0.80	0.79
Subjective Happiness Scale	23.17	24.00	/28	0.83	0.86

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.80833333	0.82
Variance	0.00317667	0.00512
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	0.62044271
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.30658776
F Critical one-tail	0.1980069

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

0.004	Gratitude Questionnaire
0.014	Satisfaction with Life Scale
-0.033	Meaning in Life (Presence)
-0.038	Meaning in Life (Search)
0.014	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
-0.030	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9176

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.0116667

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0240139

Test Statistic, t: -1.1900

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.2875

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0368677 < µd < 0.0135343

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Fail to reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence to support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure and after is zero.

The results indicate that there was no significant change in the INTP ‘Male Subjects’ category.

ESTP – All Subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	33.31	34.26	/ 42	0.79	0.82
Satisfaction with Life Scale	27.69	28.68	/35	0.79	0.82
Meaning in Life (Presence)	28.03	27.98	/35	0.80	0.80
Meaning in Life (Search)	29.58	29.68	/35	0.85	0.85
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	37.49	38.46	/48	0.78	0.80
Subjective Happiness Scale	24.13	23.73	/28	0.86	0.85

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.81166667	0.823333333
Variance	0.00117667	0.000506667
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	2.32236842
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.18826283
F Critical one-tail	5.05032906

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

-0.022	Gratitude Questionnaire
-0.028	Satisfaction with Life Scale
0.001	Meaning in Life (Presence)
-0.003	Meaning in Life (Search)
-0.020	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
0.014	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9709

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.0116667

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.017224

Test Statistic, t: -1.6592

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.1580

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0297421 < µd < 0.0064088

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion:

Fail to reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence to support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure and after is zero.

The results indicate that there was no significant change in the ESTP ‘All Subjects’ category.

ESTP – Female Subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	31.40	33.20	/ 42	0.75	0.79
Satisfaction with Life Scale	30.60	29.60	/35	0.87	0.85
Meaning in Life (Presence)	24.80	27.60	/35	0.71	0.79
Meaning in Life (Search)	29.60	30.60	/35	0.85	0.87
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	39.60	39.20	/48	0.83	0.82
Subjective Happiness Scale	20.80	20.80	/28	0.74	0.74

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.79166667	0.81
Variance	0.00441667	0.0022
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	2.00757576
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.23131789
F Critical one-tail	5.05032906

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

-0.043	Gratitude Questionnaire
0.029	Satisfaction with Life Scale
-0.080	Meaning in Life (Presence)
-0.029	Meaning in Life (Search)
0.008	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
0.000	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9867

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.0183333

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0371035

Test Statistic, t: -1.2103

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.2802

95% Confidence interval:

-0.057271 < µd < 0.0206043

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion:

Fail to reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence to support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure and after is zero.

The results indicate that there was no significant change in the ESTP ‘Female Subjects’ category.

ESTP – Male Subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	34.14	34.71	/ 42	0.81	0.83
Satisfaction with Life Scale	26.43	28.29	/35	0.76	0.81
Meaning in Life (Presence)	29.43	28.14	/35	0.84	0.80
Meaning in Life (Search)	29.57	29.29	/35	0.84	0.84
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	36.57	38.14	/48	0.76	0.79
Subjective Happiness Scale	25.57	25.00	/28	0.91	0.89

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.82	0.826666667
Variance	0.00324	0.001306667
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	2.47959184
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.17078791
F Critical one-tail	5.05032906

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

-0.014	Gratitude Questionnaire
-0.053	Satisfaction with Life Scale
0.037	Meaning in Life (Presence)
0.008	Meaning in Life (Search)
-0.033	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
0.020	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9932

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.0066667

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0332666

Test Statistic, t: -0.4909

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.6443

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0415778 < µd < 0.0282445

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion:

Fail to reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence do not support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure and after is different from zero.

The results show that there was no significant change in the ESTP ‘Male Subjects’ category.

ESFP – All Subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	32.91	33.46	/ 42	0.78	0.80
Satisfaction with Life Scale	29.00	28.53	/35	0.83	0.82
Meaning in Life (Presence)	30.18	29.51	/35	0.86	0.84
Meaning in Life (Search)	29.69	30.28	/35	0.85	0.87
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	40.10	40.96	/48	0.84	0.85
Subjective Happiness Scale	23.91	24.91	/28	0.85	0.89

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.835	0.845
Variance	0.00083	0.00107
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	0.77570093
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.39363316
F Critical one-tail	0.1980069

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

-0.013	Gratitude Questionnaire
0.013	Satisfaction with Life Scale
0.019	Meaning in Life (Presence)
-0.017	Meaning in Life (Search)
-0.018	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
-0.035	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9577

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.01

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0219089

Test Statistic, t: -1.1180

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.3144

95% Confidence interval:

-0.032992 < µd < 0.012992

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion:

Fail to reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence to support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure and after is zero.

The results indicate that there was no significant change in the ESFP ‘All Subjects’ category.

ESFP – Female Subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	33.73	34.27	/ 42	0.80	0.82
Satisfaction with Life Scale	28.73	28.47	/35	0.82	0.81
Meaning in Life (Presence)	29.07	28.13	/35	0.83	0.80
Meaning in Life (Search)	28.73	27.33	/35	0.82	0.78
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	39.07	40.60	/48	0.81	0.85
Subjective Happiness Scale	23.20	23.67	/28	0.83	0.85

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.81833333	0.818333333
Variance	0.00013667	0.000776667
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	0.17596567
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.03973302
F Critical one-tail	0.1980069

Since p < .05, reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.81833333	0.818333333
Variance	0.00013667	0.000776667
Observations	6	6
Hypothesized Mean Difference	0
df	7
t Stat	8.9985E-15
P(T<=t) one-tail	0.5
t Critical one-tail	1.8945786
P(T<=t) two-tail	1
t Critical two-tail	2.36462425

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

-0.013	Gratitude Questionnaire
0.008	Satisfaction with Life Scale
0.027	Meaning in Life (Presence)
0.040	Meaning in Life (Search)
-0.032	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
-0.017	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9827

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -1.850372e-17

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0316228

Test Statistic, t: -0.0000

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 1.0000

95% Confidence interval:

-0.033186 < µd < 0.033186

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion:

Fail to reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence to support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure and after is zero.

The results indicate that there was no significant change in the ESFP ‘Female Subjects’ category.

ESFP – Male Subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	32.56	33.11	/ 42	0.78	0.79
Satisfaction with Life Scale	29.11	28.56	/35	0.83	0.82
Meaning in Life (Presence)	30.67	30.11	/35	0.88	0.86
Meaning in Life (Search)	30.11	31.56	/35	0.86	0.90
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	40.56	41.11	/48	0.84	0.86
Subjective Happiness Scale	24.22	25.44	/28	0.87	0.91

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.84333333	0.856666667
Variance	0.00130667	0.002106667
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	0.62025316
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.30647515
F Critical one-tail	0.1980069

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

-0.013	Gratitude Questionnaire
0.016	Satisfaction with Life Scale
0.016	Meaning in Life (Presence)
-0.041	Meaning in Life (Search)
-0.012	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
-0.044	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9488

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.0133333

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0250333

Test Statistic, t: -1.3047

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.2488

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0396042 < µd < 0.0129375

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion:

Fail to reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence to support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure and after is zero.

The results indicate that there was no significant change in the ESFP ‘Male Subjects’ category.

ENFP – All Subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	31.79	30.99	/ 42	0.76	0.74
Satisfaction with Life Scale	32.60	32.54	/35	0.93	0.93
Meaning in Life (Presence)	31.58	30.28	/35	0.90	0.87
Meaning in Life (Search)	31.67	31.79	/35	0.90	0.91
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	41.48	42.62	/48	0.86	0.89
Subjective Happiness Scale	24.97	25.10	/28	0.89	0.90

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.87333333	0.873333333
Variance	0.00358667	0.004666667
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	0.76857143
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.38987432
F Critical one-tail	0.1980069

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

0.019	Gratitude Questionnaire
0.002	Satisfaction with Life Scale
0.037	Meaning in Life (Presence)
-0.003	Meaning in Life (Search)
-0.024	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
-0.005	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9781

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: 0

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0219089

Test Statistic, t: 0.0000

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 1.0000

95% Confidence interval:

-0.022992 < µd < 0.022992

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion:

Fail to reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence to support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure and after before CBT concept exposure and after is zero.

The results indicate that there was no significant change in the ENFP ‘All Subjects’ category.

ENFP – Female Subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	30.79	29.43	/ 42	0.73	0.70
Satisfaction with Life Scale	31.93	30.71	/35	0.91	0.88
Meaning in Life (Presence)	31.64	29.64	/35	0.90	0.85
Meaning in Life (Search)	30.14	28.50	/35	0.86	0.81
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	37.71	38.93	/48	0.79	0.81
Subjective Happiness Scale	24.64	26.36	/28	0.88	0.94

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.845	0.831666667
Variance	0.00499	0.006536667
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	0.76338603
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.38712568
F Critical one-tail	0.1980069

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

0.032	Gratitude Questionnaire
0.035	Satisfaction with Life Scale
0.057	Meaning in Life (Presence)
0.047	Meaning in Life (Search)
-0.025	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
-0.061	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9289

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: 0.0133333

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.044121

Test Statistic, t: 0.7402

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.4924

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0329688 < µd < 0.0596355

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion:

Fail to reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence to support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure and after is zero.

The results indicate that there was no significant change in the ENFP ‘Female Subjects’ category.

ENFP – Male Subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	32.22	31.67	/ 42	0.77	0.75
Satisfaction with Life Scale	32.89	33.33	/35	0.94	0.95
Meaning in Life (Presence)	31.56	30.56	/35	0.90	0.87
Meaning in Life (Search)	32.33	33.22	/35	0.92	0.95
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	43.11	44.22	/48	0.90	0.92
Subjective Happiness Scale	25.11	24.56	/28	0.90	0.88

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.88833333	0.886666667
Variance	0.00361667	0.005626667
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	0.64277251
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.31975223
F Critical one-tail	0.1980069

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

0.013	Gratitude Questionnaire
-0.013	Satisfaction with Life Scale
0.029	Meaning in Life (Presence)
-0.025	Meaning in Life (Search)
-0.023	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
0.020	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9538

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: 0.0016667

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0248328

Test Statistic, t: 0.1644

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.8759

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0243937 < µd < 0.027727

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion:

Fail to reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence to support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure and after is zero.

The results indicate that there was no significant change in the ENFP ‘Male Subjects’ category.

ENTP – All Subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	33.61	33.22	/ 42	0.80	0.79
Satisfaction with Life Scale	23.76	25.33	/35	0.68	0.72
Meaning in Life (Presence)	28.28	27.75	/35	0.81	0.79
Meaning in Life (Search)	28.41	29.13	/35	0.81	0.83
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	37.52	37.29	/48	0.78	0.78
Subjective Happiness Scale	19.12	21.29	/28	0.68	0.76

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.76	0.778333333
Variance	0.00396	0.001336667
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	2.96259352
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.1291995
F Critical one-tail	5.05032906

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

0.009	Gratitude Questionnaire
-0.045	Satisfaction with Life Scale
0.015	Meaning in Life (Presence)
-0.021	Meaning in Life (Search)
0.005	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
-0.077	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9519

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.0183333

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0371035

Test Statistic, t: -1.2103

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.2802

95% Confidence interval:

-0.057271 < µd < 0.0206043

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion:

Fail to reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence to support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure and after is zero.

The results indicate that there was no significant change in the ENTP ‘All Subjects’ category.

ENTP – Female Subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	32.25	33.25	/ 42	0.77	0.79
Satisfaction with Life Scale	25.50	27.00	/35	0.73	0.77
Meaning in Life (Presence)	28.00	29.00	/35	0.80	0.83
Meaning in Life (Search)	27.50	28.50	/35	0.79	0.81
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	41.00	40.25	/48	0.85	0.84
Subjective Happiness Scale	21.25	24.25	/28	0.76	0.87

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.78333333	0.818333333
Variance	0.00166667	0.001296667
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	1.28534704
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.39484026
F Critical one-tail	5.05032906

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

-0.024	Gratitude Questionnaire
-0.043	Satisfaction with Life Scale
-0.029	Meaning in Life (Presence)
-0.029	Meaning in Life (Search)
0.016	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
-0.107	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9252

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 1

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 1

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.035

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0403733

Test Statistic, t: -2.1235

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.0871

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0773691 < µd < 0.0073691

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion:

Fail to reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence to support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure and after is zero.

The results indicate that there was no significant change in the ENTP ‘Female Subjects’ category.

ENTP – Male Subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	34.20	33.20	/ 42	0.81	0.79
Satisfaction with Life Scale	23.00	24.60	/35	0.66	0.70
Meaning in Life (Presence)	28.40	27.20	/35	0.81	0.78
Meaning in Life (Search)	28.80	29.40	/35	0.82	0.84
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	36.00	36.00	/48	0.75	0.75
Subjective Happiness Scale	18.20	20.00	/28	0.65	0.71

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.75	0.761666667
Variance	0.00604	0.002776667
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	2.17527011
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.20689303
F Critical one-tail	5.05032906

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

0.024	Gratitude Questionnaire
-0.046	Satisfaction with Life Scale
0.034	Meaning in Life (Presence)
-0.017	Meaning in Life (Search)
0.000	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
-0.064	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9854

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.0116667

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0348807

Test Statistic, t: -0.8193

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.4499

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0482717 < µd < 0.0249384

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion:

Fail to reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence do not support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure and after is different from zero.

The results show that there was no significant change in the ENTP ‘Male Subjects’ category.

ESTJ – All Subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	33.25	33.59	/ 42	0.79	0.80
Satisfaction with Life Scale	26.87	27.87	/35	0.77	0.80
Meaning in Life (Presence)	28.16	28.48	/35	0.80	0.81
Meaning in Life (Search)	27.92	28.28	/35	0.80	0.81
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	39.88	41.05	/48	0.83	0.86
Subjective Happiness Scale	21.81	21.17	/28	0.78	0.76

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.795	0.806666667
Variance	0.00043	0.001026667
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	0.41883117
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.18072969
F Critical one-tail	0.1980069

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

-0.008	Gratitude Questionnaire
-0.028	Satisfaction with Life Scale
-0.009	Meaning in Life (Presence)
-0.010	Meaning in Life (Search)
-0.024	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
0.023	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9227

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 1

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.0116667

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0183485

Test Statistic, t: -1.5575

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.1801

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0309222 < µd < 0.0075889

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion:

Fail to reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence to support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure and after is zero.

The results indicate that there was no significant change in the ESTJ ‘All Subjects’ category.

ESTJ – Female Subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	32.89	32.33	/ 42	0.78	0.77
Satisfaction with Life Scale	30.11	29.56	/35	0.86	0.84
Meaning in Life (Presence)	30.67	29.11	/35	0.88	0.83
Meaning in Life (Search)	27.44	28.00	/35	0.78	0.80
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	39.44	41.78	/48	0.82	0.87
Subjective Happiness Scale	23.22	22.33	/28	0.83	0.80

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.825	0.818333333
Variance	0.00167	0.001256667
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	1.32891247
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.38131217
F Critical one-tail	5.05032906

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

0.013	Gratitude Questionnaire
0.016	Satisfaction with Life Scale
0.044	Meaning in Life (Presence)
-0.016	Meaning in Life (Search)
-0.049	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
0.032	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9681

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: 0.0066667

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0361478

Test Statistic, t: 0.4518

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.6704

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0312681 < µd < 0.0446015

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion:

Fail to reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence to support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure and after is zero.

The results indicate that there was no significant change in the ESTJ ‘Female Subjects’ category.

ESTJ – Male Subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	33.40	34.13	/ 42	0.80	0.81
Satisfaction with Life Scale	25.47	27.13	/35	0.73	0.78
Meaning in Life (Presence)	27.07	28.20	/35	0.77	0.81
Meaning in Life (Search)	28.13	28.40	/35	0.80	0.81
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	40.07	40.73	/48	0.83	0.85
Subjective Happiness Scale	21.20	20.67	/28	0.76	0.74

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.78166667	0.8
Variance	0.00125667	0.00136
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	0.92401961
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.4665056
F Critical one-tail	0.1980069

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

-0.017	Gratitude Questionnaire
-0.048	Satisfaction with Life Scale
-0.032	Meaning in Life (Presence)
-0.008	Meaning in Life (Search)
-0.014	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
0.019	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9813

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.0183333

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0248328

Test Statistic, t: -1.8084

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.1303

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0443937 < µd < 0.007727

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion:

Fail to reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence do not support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure and after is different from zero.

The results show that there was no significant change in the ESTJ ‘Male Subjects’ category.

ESFJ – All Subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	33.96	32.76	/ 42	0.81	0.78
Satisfaction with Life Scale	29.62	30.01	/35	0.85	0.86
Meaning in Life (Presence)	30.54	30.95	/35	0.87	0.88
Meaning in Life (Search)	30.06	31.44	/35	0.86	0.90
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	39.49	40.93	/48	0.82	0.85
Subjective Happiness Scale	22.13	21.53	/28	0.79	0.77

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.83333333	0.84
Variance	0.00098667	0.00284
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	0.34741784
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.13536411
F Critical one-tail	0.1980069

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

0.028	Gratitude Questionnaire
-0.011	Satisfaction with Life Scale
-0.012	Meaning in Life (Presence)
-0.039	Meaning in Life (Search)
-0.030	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
0.021	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9671

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.0066667

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0273252

Test Statistic, t: -0.5976

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.5761

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0353427 < µd < 0.0220093

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion:

Fail to reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence to support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure and after is zero.

The results indicate that there was no significant change in the ESFJ ‘All Subjects’ category.

ESFJ – Female Subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	33.64	31.76	/ 42	0.80	0.76
Satisfaction with Life Scale	30.80	30.04	/35	0.88	0.86
Meaning in Life (Presence)	30.64	29.68	/35	0.88	0.85
Meaning in Life (Search)	30.44	29.68	/35	0.87	0.85
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	40.16	42.60	/48	0.84	0.89
Subjective Happiness Scale	22.88	23.20	/28	0.82	0.83

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.84833333	0.84
Variance	0.00113667	0.00192
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	0.59201389
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.28954302
F Critical one-tail	0.1980069

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

0.045	Gratitude Questionnaire
0.022	Satisfaction with Life Scale
0.027	Meaning in Life (Presence)
0.022	Meaning in Life (Search)
-0.051	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
-0.011	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9329

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: 0.0083333

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.033116

Test Statistic, t: 0.6164

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.5646

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0264197 < µd < 0.0430864

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion:

Fail to reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence to support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure and after is zero.

The results indicate that there was no significant change in the ESFJ ‘Female Subjects’ category.

ESFJ – Male Subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	34.10	33.20	/ 42	0.81	0.79
Satisfaction with Life Scale	29.10	30.00	/35	0.83	0.86
Meaning in Life (Presence)	30.50	31.50	/35	0.87	0.90
Meaning in Life (Search)	29.90	32.20	/35	0.85	0.92
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	39.20	40.20	/48	0.82	0.84
Subjective Happiness Scale	21.80	20.80	/28	0.78	0.74

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.82666667	0.841666667
Variance	0.00098667	0.004576667
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	0.21558631
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.0587693
F Critical one-tail	0.1980069

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

0.021	Gratitude Questionnaire
-0.026	Satisfaction with Life Scale
-0.029	Meaning in Life (Presence)
-0.066	Meaning in Life (Search)
-0.021	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
0.036	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9672

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.015

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.03937

Test Statistic, t: -0.9333

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.3935

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0563163 < µd < 0.0263163

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion:

Fail to reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence do not support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure and after is different from zero.

The results show that there was no significant change in the ESFJ ‘Male Subjects’ category.

ENFJ – All Subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	32.38	32.27	/ 42	0.77	0.77
Satisfaction with Life Scale	31.89	31.08	/35	0.91	0.89
Meaning in Life (Presence)	30.23	30.76	/35	0.86	0.88
Meaning in Life (Search)	30.98	31.64	/35	0.89	0.90
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	38.20	39.05	/48	0.80	0.81
Subjective Happiness Scale	21.91	22.59	/28	0.78	0.81

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.835	0.843333333
Variance	0.00355	0.002866667
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	1.23837209
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.41011721
F Critical one-tail	5.05032906

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

0.003	Gratitude Questionnaire
0.023	Satisfaction with Life Scale
-0.015	Meaning in Life (Presence)
-0.019	Meaning in Life (Search)
-0.018	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
-0.024	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9134

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.0083333

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.017224

Test Statistic, t: -1.1851

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.2892

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0264088 < µd < 0.0097421

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Fail to reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence to support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure and after is zero.

The results indicate that there was no significant change in the ENFJ ‘All Subjects’ category.

ENFJ – Female Subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	34.40	35.20	/ 42	0.82	0.84
Satisfaction with Life Scale	32.80	32.40	/35	0.94	0.93
Meaning in Life (Presence)	29.60	30.20	/35	0.85	0.86
Meaning in Life (Search)	29.80	30.80	/35	0.85	0.88
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	39.80	38.00	/48	0.83	0.79
Subjective Happiness Scale	24.00	22.80	/28	0.86	0.81

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.85833333	0.851666667
Variance	0.00181667	0.002536667
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	0.71616294
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.36152436
F Critical one-tail	0.1980069

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

-0.019	Gratitude Questionnaire
0.011	Satisfaction with Life Scale
-0.017	Meaning in Life (Presence)
-0.029	Meaning in Life (Search)
0.038	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
0.043	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9503

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: 0.0066667

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0326599

Test Statistic, t: 0.5000

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.6383

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0276077 < µd < 0.0409411

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion:

Fail to reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence to support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure and after is zero.

The results indicate that there was no significant change in the ENFJ ‘Female Subjects’ category.

ENFJ – Male Subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	31.50	31.00	/ 42	0.77	0.77
Satisfaction with Life Scale	31.50	30.50	/35	0.91	0.89
Meaning in Life (Presence)	30.50	31.00	/35	0.86	0.88
Meaning in Life (Search)	31.50	32.00	/35	0.89	0.90
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	37.50	39.50	/48	0.80	0.81
Subjective Happiness Scale	21.00	22.50	/28	0.78	0.81

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.835	0.843333333
Variance	0.00355	0.002866667
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	1.23837209
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.41011721
F Critical one-tail	5.05032906

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

0.012	Gratitude Questionnaire
0.029	Satisfaction with Life Scale
-0.014	Meaning in Life (Presence)
-0.014	Meaning in Life (Search)
-0.042	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
-0.054	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9834

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.0083333

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.017224

Test Statistic, t: -1.1851

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.2892

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0264088 < µd < 0.0097421

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion:

Fail to reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence do not support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure and after is different from zero.

The results show that there was no significant change in the ENFJ ‘Male Subjects’ category.

ENTJ – All Subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	28.22	29.99	/ 42	0.67	0.71
Satisfaction with Life Scale	27.29	28.54	/35	0.78	0.82
Meaning in Life (Presence)	29.30	28.44	/35	0.84	0.81
Meaning in Life (Search)	29.23	30.77	/35	0.84	0.88
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	35.22	35.38	/48	0.73	0.74
Subjective Happiness Scale	24.54	25.07	/28	0.88	0.90

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.79	0.81
Variance	0.00624	0.0056
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	1.11428571
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.45418449
F Critical one-tail	5.05032906

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

-0.042	Gratitude Questionnaire
-0.035	Satisfaction with Life Scale
0.025	Meaning in Life (Presence)
-0.044	Meaning in Life (Search)
-0.003	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
-0.019	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9502

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.02

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0275681

Test Statistic, t: -1.7770

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.1357

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0489309 < µd < 0.0089309

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion:

Fail to reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence to support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure and after is zero.

The results indicate that there was no significant change in the ENTJ ‘All Subjects’ category.

ENTJ – Female Subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	29.50	31.50	/ 42	0.70	0.75
Satisfaction with Life Scale	29.50	29.00	/35	0.84	0.83
Meaning in Life (Presence)	30.00	31.00	/35	0.86	0.89
Meaning in Life (Search)	29.00	31.00	/35	0.83	0.89
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	36.50	35.50	/48	0.76	0.74
Subjective Happiness Scale	25.00	26.00	/28	0.89	0.93

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.81333333	0.838333333
Variance	0.00494667	0.006256667
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	0.79062334
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.40142429
F Critical one-tail	0.1980069

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

-0.048	Gratitude Questionnaire
0.014	Satisfaction with Life Scale
-0.029	Meaning in Life (Presence)
-0.057	Meaning in Life (Search)
0.021	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
-0.036	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9484

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.025

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0327109

Test Statistic, t: -1.8721

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.1201

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0593279 < µd < 0.0093279

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion:

Fail to reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence to support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure and after is zero.

The results indicate that there was no significant change in the ENTJ ‘Female Subjects’ category.

ENTJ – Male Subjects

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data

	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	27.67	29.33	/ 42	0.66	0.70
Satisfaction with Life Scale	26.33	28.33	/35	0.75	0.81
Meaning in Life (Presence)	29.00	27.33	/35	0.83	0.78
Meaning in Life (Search)	29.33	30.67	/35	0.84	0.88
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	34.67	35.33	/48	0.72	0.74
Subjective Happiness Scale	24.33	24.67	/28	0.87	0.88

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.77833333	0.798333333
Variance	0.00661667	0.005376667
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	1.23062616
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.4127075
F Critical one-tail	5.05032906

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Normality test on differences to justify the application of a T test.

Before CBT concept exposure – After CBT concept exposure normalized differences:

-0.040	Gratitude Questionnaire
-0.057	Satisfaction with Life Scale
0.048	Meaning in Life (Presence)
-0.038	Meaning in Life (Search)
-0.014	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
-0.012	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9316

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 1

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.02

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0384708

Test Statistic, t: -1.2734

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.2589

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0603726 < µd < 0.0203726

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion:

Fail to reject the null hypothesis that the average difference equals 0.

Sample provides evidence do not support the claim that the average difference between the results before CBT concept exposure and after is different from zero.

The results show that there was no significant change in the ENTJ ‘Male Subjects’ category.

Investigation of the influence of the strength of an individual MBTI category (>75% or <25%) on the effects of CBT concept exposure for the ‘All subjects’ category

All subjects ‘before treatment – after treatment’ for normalized data:

I > 75%	I < 25%	T > 75%	T < 25%
-0.032	-0.019	-0.058	0.013
-0.065	-0.011	-0.06	0.006
-0.081	0.043	-0.064	-0.025
-0.042	0.029	-0.052	-0.016
-0.064	0.006	-0.035	0.023
-0.094	-0.014	-0.101	0.012

E > 75%	E < 25%	F > 75%	F < 25%
0.004	-0.002	-0.04	0.024
-0.019	-0.02	-0.007	0.044
-0.007	-0.033	-0.037	-0.047
-0.062	-0.04	0	0.018
-0.01	-0.01	0.014	-0.057
0.012	0.036	-0.082	0

J > 75%	J < 25%	S > 75%	S < 25%
-0.06	0.013	-0.038	0.03
-0.053	0.044	-0.004	0.016
-0.092	-0.026	-0.024	-0.023
-0.044	0.029	0.035	0.023
-0.027	-0.055	-0.03	-0.051
-0.058	-0.003	-0.041	-0.006

P > 75%	P < 25%	N > 75%	N < 25%
-0.048	0.041	-0.002	0.018
0	0.016	-0.05	-0.022
-0.042	-0.026	-0.069	-0.075
-0.002	0.016	0.005	-0.029
0.014	-0.042	0.024	-0.018
-0.08	-0.052	-0.036	0.033

Bartlett’s Test confirming homoscedasticity:
Significance level (%): 5


Summary statistics: VariableMinimumMaximumMeanStd. deviationI > 75%-0.094-0.032-0.0630.023I < 25%-0.0190.0430.0060.025T > 75%-0.101-0.035-0.0620.022T < 25%-0.0250.0230.0020.019E > 75%-0.0620.012-0.0140.026E < 25%-0.040.036-0.0120.027F > 75%-0.0820.014-0.0250.035F < 25%-0.0570.044-0.0030.041J > 75%-0.092-0.027-0.0560.021J < 25%-0.0550.04400.036S > 75%-0.0410.035-0.0170.029S < 25%-0.0510.03-0.0020.031P > 75%-0.080.014-0.0260.036P < 25%-0.0520.041-0.0080.037N > 75%-0.0690.024-0.0210.036N < 25%-0.0750.033-0.0160.038



Chi-square (Observed value)	7.661
Chi-square (Critical value)	24.996
DF	15
p-value (one-tailed)	0.937
alpha	0.05

Test interpretation:
H0: The variances are identical.
Ha: At least one of the variances is different from another.
As the computed p-value is greater than the significance level alpha=0.05, one cannot reject the null hypothesis H0.
The risk to Reject the null hypothesis H0 while it is true is 93.66%.

ANOVA test for differences:

Source: DF: SS: MS: Test Stat, F: Critical F: P-Value:

Treatment: 15 0.044391 0.002959 3.095617 1.79322 0.000553

Error: 80 0.07648 0.000956

Total: 95 0.120871

Reject the null hypothesis

Reject equality of means

Conclusion: There are differential effects within the 16 groups in the ‘All subjects’ category.

Introvert – All subjects > 75%

Normality Test on differences of Normalized data

-0.032	Gratitude Questionnaire
-0.065	Satisfaction with Life Scale
-0.081	Meaning in Life (Presence)
-0.042	Meaning in Life (Search)
-0.064	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
-0.094	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9858

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.83316667	0.896
Variance	0.00049337	0.0007124
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	0.69254164
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.34833803
F Critical one-tail	0.1980069

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data
	All	All		All	All
	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	34.27	35.64	/ 42	0.816	0.848
Satisfaction with Life Scale	29.36	31.64	/35	0.839	0.904
Meaning in Life (Presence)	28.36	31.18	/35	0.810	0.891
Meaning in Life (Search)	30.55	32.00	/35	0.873	0.914
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	39.82	42.91	/48	0.830	0.894
Subjective Happiness Scale	23.27	25.91	/28	0.831	0.925

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.0628333

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0233873

Test Statistic, t: -6.5809

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.0012

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0873768 < µd < -0.0382899

Reject the null hypothesis

Sample provides evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion: There was a differential effect from the CBT concept exposure for this group in the direction of positive change.

Introvert – All subjects < 25%

-0.019	Gratitude Questionnaire
-0.011	Satisfaction with Life Scale
0.043	Meaning in Life (Presence)
0.029	Meaning in Life (Search)
0.006	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
-0.014	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9526

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.83716667	0.831833333
Variance	0.00020217	0.000740567
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	0.27298915
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.09025272
F Critical one-tail	0.1980069

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data
	All	All		All	All
	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	34.30	35.10	/ 42	0.817	0.836
Satisfaction with Life Scale	29.90	30.30	/35	0.854	0.866
Meaning in Life (Presence)	29.50	28.00	/35	0.843	0.800
Meaning in Life (Search)	29.40	28.40	/35	0.840	0.811
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	39.50	39.20	/48	0.823	0.817
Subjective Happiness Scale	23.70	24.10	/28	0.846	0.861

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: 0.0053333

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0256333

Test Statistic, t: 0.5096

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.6320

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0215672 < µd < 0.0322338

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion: There was not a differential effect from the CBT concept exposure for this group.

Thinking – All subjects > 75%

-0.058	Gratitude Questionnaire
-0.060	Satisfaction with Life Scale
-0.064	Meaning in Life (Presence)
-0.052	Meaning in Life (Search)
-0.035	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
-0.101	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9292

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 1

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.8245	0.8865
Variance	0.0002083	0.0008743
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	0.23824774
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.07073039
F Critical one-tail	0.1980069

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data
	All	All		All	All
	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	34.33	36.75	/ 42	0.817	0.875
Satisfaction with Life Scale	29.33	31.42	/35	0.838	0.898
Meaning in Life (Presence)	28.17	30.42	/35	0.805	0.869
Meaning in Life (Search)	29.42	31.25	/35	0.840	0.893
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	39.08	40.75	/48	0.814	0.849
Subjective Happiness Scale	23.33	26.17	/28	0.833	0.935

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.062

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0220635

Test Statistic, t: -6.8832

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.0010

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0851542 < µd < -0.0388458

Reject the null hypothesis

Sample provides evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion: There was a differential effect from the CBT concept exposure for this group in the direction of positive change.

Thinking – All subjects < 25%

0.013	Gratitude Questionnaire
0.006	Satisfaction with Life Scale
-0.025	Meaning in Life (Presence)
-0.016	Meaning in Life (Search)
0.023	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
0.012	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9552

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.83916667	0.837166667
Variance	0.00054057	0.001701367
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	0.31772497
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.11696471
F Critical one-tail	0.1980069

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data
	All	All		All	All
	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	34.11	33.56	/ 42	0.812	0.799
Satisfaction with Life Scale	29.56	29.33	/35	0.844	0.838
Meaning in Life (Presence)	30.67	31.56	/35	0.876	0.902
Meaning in Life (Search)	29.78	30.33	/35	0.851	0.867
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	39.33	38.22	/48	0.819	0.796
Subjective Happiness Scale	23.33	23.00	/28	0.833	0.821

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: 0.002

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0188997

Test Statistic, t: 0.2592

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.8058

95% Confidence interval:

-0.017834 < µd < 0.021834

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion: There was not a differential effect from the CBT concept exposure for this group.

Judging – All subjects > 75%

-0.060	Gratitude Questionnaire
-0.053	Satisfaction with Life Scale
-0.092	Meaning in Life (Presence)
-0.044	Meaning in Life (Search)
-0.027	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
-0.058	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9613

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 1

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.819	0.874833333
Variance	0.0006392	0.001502967
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	0.4252922
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.1848669
F Critical one-tail	0.1980069

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data
	All	All		All	All
	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	34.00	36.54	/ 42	0.810	0.870
Satisfaction with Life Scale	29.46	31.31	/35	0.842	0.895
Meaning in Life (Presence)	29.15	32.38	/35	0.833	0.925
Meaning in Life (Search)	27.08	28.62	/35	0.774	0.818
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	39.23	40.54	/48	0.817	0.845
Subjective Happiness Scale	23.46	25.08	/28	0.838	0.896

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.0558333

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0212266

Test Statistic, t: -6.4430

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.0013

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0781092 < µd < -0.0335575

Reject the null hypothesis

Sample provides evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion: There was a differential effect from the CBT concept exposure for this group in the direction of positive change.

Judging – All subjects < 25%

0.013	Gratitude Questionnaire
0.044	Satisfaction with Life Scale
-0.026	Meaning in Life (Presence)
0.029	Meaning in Life (Search)
-0.055	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
-0.003	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9905

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.835	0.834666667
Variance	0.0002096	0.001099467
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	0.19063789
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.04647222
F Critical one-tail	0.1980069

Since p < .05, reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.835	0.834666667
Variance	0.0002096	0.001099467
Observations	6	6
Hypothesized Mean Difference	0
df	7
t Stat	0.02256698
P(T<=t) one-tail	0.49131275
t Critical one-tail	1.8945786
P(T<=t) two-tail	0.98262549
t Critical two-tail	2.36462425

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data
	All	All		All	All
	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	34.36	33.82	/ 42	0.818	0.805
Satisfaction with Life Scale	29.82	28.27	/35	0.852	0.808
Meaning in Life (Presence)	29.64	30.55	/35	0.847	0.873
Meaning in Life (Search)	29.18	28.18	/35	0.834	0.805
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	39.27	41.91	/48	0.818	0.873
Subjective Happiness Scale	23.55	23.64	/28	0.841	0.844

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: 0.0003333

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0364838

Test Statistic, t: 0.0224

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.9830

95% Confidence interval:

-0.037954 < µd < 0.0386207

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion: There was not a differential effect from the CBT concept exposure for this group.

Sensing – All subjects > 75%

-0.038	Gratitude Questionnaire
-0.004	Satisfaction with Life Scale
-0.024	Meaning in Life (Presence)
0.035	Meaning in Life (Search)
-0.030	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
-0.041	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9179

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.84216667	0.859333333
Variance	0.00099657	0.000961067
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	1.03693812
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.48460979
F Critical one-tail	5.05032906

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data
	All	All		All	All
	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	34.15	35.77	/ 42	0.813	0.852
Satisfaction with Life Scale	31.46	31.62	/35	0.899	0.903
Meaning in Life (Presence)	29.46	30.31	/35	0.842	0.866
Meaning in Life (Search)	29.69	28.46	/35	0.848	0.813
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	39.00	40.46	/48	0.813	0.843
Subjective Happiness Scale	23.46	24.62	/28	0.838	0.879

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.0171667

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0288126

Test Statistic, t: -1.4594

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.2043

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0474036 < µd < 0.0130703

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion: There was not a differential effect from the CBT concept exposure for this group.

Sensing – All subjects < 25%

0.030	Gratitude Questionnaire
0.016	Satisfaction with Life Scale
-0.023	Meaning in Life (Presence)
0.023	Meaning in Life (Search)
-0.051	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
-0.006	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9684

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

BeforeAfterMean0.837166670.839Variance0.000211770.0009716Observations66df55F0.21795664
P(F<=f) one-tail0.05998746
F Critical one-tail0.1980069

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

GroupAverage
Normalized Data
AllAll
AllAll
BeforeAfter
BeforeAfterGratitude Questionnaire34.5533.27/ 420.8230.792Satisfaction with Life Scale29.3628.82/350.8390.823Meaning in Life (Presence)29.8230.64/350.8520.875Meaning in Life (Search)29.7328.91/350.8490.826Personal Growth Initiative Scale39.1841.64/480.8160.867Subjective Happiness Scale23.6423.82/280.8440.851

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.0018333

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0313204

Test Statistic, t: -0.1434

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.8916

95% Confidence interval:

-0.034702 < µd < 0.0310354

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion: There was not a differential effect from the CBT concept exposure for this group.

Extravert – All subjects > 75%

0.004	Gratitude Questionnaire
-0.019	Satisfaction with Life Scale
-0.007	Meaning in Life (Presence)
-0.062	Meaning in Life (Search)
-0.010	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
0.012	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9241

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 1

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.87066667	0.8845
Variance	0.00195307	0.0013227
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	1.47657569
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.33966498
F Critical one-tail	5.05032906

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data
	All	All		All	All
	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	37.00	36.83	/ 42	0.881	0.877
Satisfaction with Life Scale	30.75	31.42	/35	0.879	0.898
Meaning in Life (Presence)	29.75	30.00	/35	0.850	0.857
Meaning in Life (Search)	29.42	31.58	/35	0.840	0.902
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	39.58	40.08	/48	0.825	0.835
Subjective Happiness Scale	26.58	26.25	/28	0.949	0.938

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.0138333

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0258567

Test Statistic, t: -1.3105

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.2470

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0409682 < µd < 0.0133015

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion: There was not a differential effect from the CBT concept exposure for this group.

Extravert – All subjects < 25%

-0.002	Gratitude Questionnaire
-0.020	Satisfaction with Life Scale
-0.033	Meaning in Life (Presence)
-0.040	Meaning in Life (Search)
-0.010	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
0.036	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9588

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.85883333	0.870333333
Variance	0.00286457	0.001653067
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	1.7328803
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.28046513
F Critical one-tail	5.05032906

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data
	All	All		All	All
	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	36.62	36.69	/ 42	0.872	0.874
Satisfaction with Life Scale	29.54	30.23	/35	0.844	0.864
Meaning in Life (Presence)	31.54	32.69	/35	0.901	0.934
Meaning in Life (Search)	27.31	28.69	/35	0.780	0.820
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	39.69	40.15	/48	0.827	0.837
Subjective Happiness Scale	26.00	25.00	/28	0.929	0.893

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.0115

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0271864

Test Statistic, t: -1.0361

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.3476

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0400303 < µd < 0.0170303

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion: There was not a differential effect from the CBT concept exposure for this group.

Feeling – All subjects > 75%

-0.040	Gratitude Questionnaire
-0.007	Satisfaction with Life Scale
-0.037	Meaning in Life (Presence)
0.000	Meaning in Life (Search)
0.014	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
-0.082	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9689

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.83383333	0.859
Variance	0.00184457	0.0034352
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	0.53696049
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.25571991
F Critical one-tail	0.1980069

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data
	All	All		All	All
	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	34.31	36.00	/ 42	0.817	0.857
Satisfaction with Life Scale	31.00	31.23	/35	0.886	0.892
Meaning in Life (Presence)	31.00	32.31	/35	0.886	0.923
Meaning in Life (Search)	27.31	27.31	/35	0.780	0.780
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	39.00	38.31	/48	0.813	0.798
Subjective Happiness Scale	23.00	25.31	/28	0.821	0.904

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.0251667

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0355495

Test Statistic, t: -1.7341

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.1434

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0624735 < µd < 0.0121402

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion: There was not a differential effect from the CBT concept exposure for this group.

Feeling – All subjects < 25%

0.024	Gratitude Questionnaire
0.044	Satisfaction with Life Scale
-0.047	Meaning in Life (Presence)
0.018	Meaning in Life (Search)
-0.057	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
0.000	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9615

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.83	0.832833333
Variance	0.0001744	0.001032567
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	0.16889951
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.03663141
F Critical one-tail	0.1980069

Since p < .05, reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.83	0.832833333
Variance	0.0001744	0.001032567
Observations	6	6
Hypothesized Mean Difference	0
df	7
t Stat	-0.1997679
P(T<=t) one-tail	0.42367073
t Critical one-tail	1.8945786
P(T<=t) two-tail	0.84734146
t Critical two-tail	2.36462425

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data
	All	All		All	All
	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	34.82	33.82	/ 42	0.829	0.805
Satisfaction with Life Scale	29.82	28.27	/35	0.852	0.808
Meaning in Life (Presence)	29.09	30.73	/35	0.831	0.878
Meaning in Life (Search)	29.18	28.55	/35	0.834	0.816
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	39.00	41.73	/48	0.813	0.869
Subjective Happiness Scale	23.00	23.00	/28	0.821	0.821

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.0028333

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0403307

Test Statistic, t: -0.1721

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.8701

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0451578 < µd < 0.0394911

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion: There was not a differential effect from the CBT concept exposure for this group.

Perceiving – All subjects > 75%

-0.048	Gratitude Questionnaire
0.000	Satisfaction with Life Scale
-0.042	Meaning in Life (Presence)
-0.002	Meaning in Life (Search)
0.014	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
-0.080	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.965

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.83966667	0.866
Variance	0.00173387	0.0033388
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	0.51930833
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.2446784
F Critical one-tail	0.1980069

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data
	All	All		All	All
	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	34.15	36.15	/ 42	0.813	0.861
Satisfaction with Life Scale	31.15	31.15	/35	0.890	0.890
Meaning in Life (Presence)	31.08	32.54	/35	0.888	0.930
Meaning in Life (Search)	27.54	27.62	/35	0.787	0.789
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	39.46	38.77	/48	0.822	0.808
Subjective Happiness Scale	23.46	25.69	/28	0.838	0.918

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.0263333

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0360758

Test Statistic, t: -1.7880

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.1338

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0641926 < µd < 0.0115259

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion: There was not a differential effect from the CBT concept exposure for this group.

Perceiving – All subjects < 25%

0.041	Gratitude Questionnaire
0.016	Satisfaction with Life Scale
-0.026	Meaning in Life (Presence)
0.016	Meaning in Life (Search)
-0.042	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
-0.052	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.965

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.837	0.844833333
Variance	0.0001396	0.001914167
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	0.07292991
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.00607365
F Critical one-tail	0.1980069

Since p < .05, reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.837	0.844833333
Variance	0.0001396	0.001914167
Observations	6	6
Hypothesized Mean Difference	0
df	6
t Stat	-0.4233959
P(T<=t) one-tail	0.34338174
t Critical one-tail	1.94318027
P(T<=t) two-tail	0.68676347
t Critical two-tail	2.44691185

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data
	All	All		All	All
	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	34.73	33.00	/ 42	0.827	0.786
Satisfaction with Life Scale	29.45	28.91	/35	0.842	0.826
Meaning in Life (Presence)	29.73	30.64	/35	0.849	0.875
Meaning in Life (Search)	29.00	28.45	/35	0.829	0.813
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	39.55	41.55	/48	0.824	0.866
Subjective Happiness Scale	23.82	25.27	/28	0.851	0.903

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.0078333

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0373332

Test Statistic, t: -0.5140

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.6292

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0470121 < µd < 0.0313454

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion: There was not a differential effect from the CBT concept exposure for this group.

Intuition – All subjects > 75%

-0.002	Gratitude Questionnaire
-0.050	Satisfaction with Life Scale
-0.069	Meaning in Life (Presence)
0.005	Meaning in Life (Search)
0.024	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
-0.036	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9829

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.83316667	0.8545
Variance	0.00038617	0.0014943
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	0.25842647
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.08191473
F Critical one-tail	0.1980069

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data
	All	All		All	All
	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	36.08	36.17	/ 42	0.859	0.861
Satisfaction with Life Scale	29.42	31.17	/35	0.840	0.890
Meaning in Life (Presence)	28.25	30.67	/35	0.807	0.876
Meaning in Life (Search)	29.00	28.83	/35	0.829	0.824
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	39.17	38.00	/48	0.816	0.792
Subjective Happiness Scale	23.75	24.75	/28	0.848	0.884

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.0213333

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0358646

Test Statistic, t: -1.4570

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.2049

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0589708 < µd < 0.0163042

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion: There was not a differential effect from the CBT concept exposure for this group.

Intuition – All subjects < 25%

0.018	Gratitude Questionnaire
-0.022	Satisfaction with Life Scale
-0.075	Meaning in Life (Presence)
-0.029	Meaning in Life (Search)
-0.018	Personal Growth Initiative Scale
0.033	Subjective Happiness Scale

Ryan-Joiner test for normality:

Test statistic, Rp (correlation coefficient): 0.9721

Critical value for 0.01 significance level: 0.841

Fail to reject normality with a 0.01 significance level.

Possible Outliers

Number of data values below Q1 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Number of data values above Q3 by more than 1.5 INTERQUARTILE RANGE: 0

Conclusion: The normality test justifies the application of the following mean-matched pairs T-test to determine differential before/after CBT concept exposure effects.

F-Test Two-Sample for Variances

	Before	After
Mean	0.8495	0.864666667
Variance	0.0025403	0.002079067
Observations	6	6
df	5	5
F	1.22184634
P(F<=f) one-tail	0.41566845
F Critical one-tail	5.05032906

Since p >.05, fail to reject claim: variance (Before) = variance (After)

Mean-matched pairs T-test on normalized differences:

	Group	Average		Normalized	Data
	All	All		All	All
	Before	After		Before	After
Gratitude Questionnaire	34.77	34.00	/ 42	0.828	0.810
Satisfaction with Life Scale	30.62	31.38	/35	0.875	0.897
Meaning in Life (Presence)	29.38	32.00	/35	0.840	0.914
Meaning in Life (Search)	27.77	28.77	/35	0.793	0.822
Personal Growth Initiative Scale	39.54	40.38	/48	0.824	0.841
Subjective Happiness Scale	26.23	25.31	/28	0.937	0.904

Claim: µ(before) – µ(after) = 0

Sample size, n: 6

Difference Mean, d: -0.0151667

Difference St Dev, sd: 0.0377434

Test Statistic, t: -0.9843

Critical t: ±2.5706

P-Value: 0.3702

95% Confidence interval:

-0.0547759 < µd < 0.0244426

Fail to reject the null hypothesis

Sample does not provide enough evidence to reject the claim

Conclusion: There was not a differential effect from the CBT concept exposure for this group.

1 The following exceptional cases occurred in relation to the two sample F-test for variances (p< .05) which necessitated a two-sample t-test assuming unequal variances before attempting a mean-matched pairs test: ISTP – Male Subjects, ESFP – Female Subjects, Judging – All subjects < 25%, Feeling – All subjects < 25%, and Perceiving – All subjects < 25%. In all of these cases the results of the two-sample t-test assuming unequal variances yielded the same results with respect to hypothesis conclusion as the mean-matched pairs T-test on differences assuming equal variances. Both results were included in the exploration of these cases (Appendix F).

2 Acceptance and Commitment Therapy, Adlerian Psychotherapy, Anger Management, Applied Behavior Analysis, Art Therapy, Autogenic Training, Aversion Therapy, Animal Assisted Psychotherapy, Bibliotherapy, Bioenergetic Analysis, Biofeedback, Brainspotting, Breathwork; Clean Language, Symbolic, Modeling and the Metaphor Therapy, Coherence Therapy, Collaborative Couple Therapy, Complementary and Alternative Medicine (CAM), Conflict Resolution Therapy, Contemplative Psychotherapy, Continuum, Core Energetics, Critical Incidence Stress Debriefing, Dance and Movement Therapy, Depth Hypnosis, Depth Therapy, Dialectical Behavior Therapy, Drama Therapy, Dream Analysis, Dyadic Developmental Psychotherapy, Ecotherapy, Ego State Therapy, Emotion Focused Therapy, Emotional Freedom Technique, Emotional Transformation Therapy (ETT), Energy Psychology, Equine and Animal-Assisted Psychotherapies, Existential Psychotherapy, Exposure Therapy, Expressive Arts Therapy, Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing Therapy (EMDR), Family Attachment Narrative Therapy, Family Systems Therapy, Feldenkrais Method, Feminist Therapy, Filial Therapy, Gestalt Therapy, Guided Therapeutic Imagery, Hakomi Experiential Psychotherapy, Healing Touch, Holographic Memory Resolution, Holotropic Breathwork, Hypnotherapy, Imago Relationship Therapy, Integral Psychotherapy, Integrative Body Psychotherapy, Interpersonal Neurobiology, Journal Therapy, Journey Therapy, Logotherapy, Middendorf Breath Experience, Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy, Motivational Enhancement Therapy, Music Therapy, Narrative Therapy, Neuro-Linguistic Programming, Neurofeedback, Neuropsychology, Nonviolent Communication, Parent-Child Interaction Therapy (PCIT), Rogerian Therapy, Play Therapy, Poetry Therapy, Positive Psychotherapy, Possibility Therapy, Experiential Therapy for Couples, Process Oriented Psychology, Psycho-Physical Therapy, Psychodrama, Psychodynamic Therapy, Psychosynthesis, Radiant Heart Therapy, Reality Therapy, Redecision Therapy, Regression Therapy, Reichian Breathwork, Relational Psychotherapy, Relational Recovery, Relationship Enhancement Therapy, Rubenfeld Synergy Methods, Sand Tray Therapy, Satir Transformational Systemic Therapy, Schema Therapy, Self Psychology, Self-Acceptance Training, Sensorimotor Psychotherapy, Shamanic Journeying, Somatic Psychotherapy, Soul-Centered Psychiatry, Fitness Psychology, Theraplay, Thought Field Therapy, Time Line Therapy, Transactional Analysis, Transpersonal Psychotherapy, Trauma-Focused Cognitive Behavioral Therapy, Voice Dialogue, Voice Therapy, Wilderness Therapy, and Yoga Therapy (Boterhoven De Haan & Lee, 2014; Carrere, 2013; Castonguay, 2013; Connors, 2011; Cross, 2013; Elkins, 2012; Feldstein Ewing & Chung, 2013, 2013; Gibson, 2011; Gold, 2011; Gottdiener, 2013; Hinshelwood, 2012; Hobson, 2012; Kalawski, 2011; Lambert, 2013; Lees, 2013; Levitt & Piazza-Bonin, 2011; Martindale & Smith, 2011; Mason, 2012; McLeod, 2011; Messer, 2012; Newton, 2013; Nolan, 2013; Owen, 2013; Paris, 2013; Pienkos & Sass, 2012; Pratchett, Daly, Bierer, & Yehuda, 2011; Rabinovich & Kacen, 2011; Safran, 2013; Siddique, 2012; Slavin-Mulford, 2013; Stewart-Sicking, 2013; Tryon & Winograd, 2011; Tryon, 2013; Wampold, 2012; Wiggins, Elliott, & Cooper, 2012; Yakeley & Wood, 2011).

Table of Contents

Dedication and Acknowledgements

Abstract

Chapter 1: Introduction

Background of the Problem

Research Objectives

Proposed Value of the Study

Historical Background

Introduction to General Semantics

Introduction to Jungian Psychological Types

Summary of the MBTI

Summary of the REBT/CBT process

Chapter 2 – Review of the Literature

Comparison of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) and Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT)

The Efficacy of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy and Rational Emotive Therapy

Frustration Intolerance Beliefs: Their Relationship with Depression, Anxiety, and Anger

A Consideration of Automatic Processing

Automaticity of Higher Mental Processes

Attentional Bias, Self-consciousness and Perfectionism in Social Phobia

Clinical Implications of Cognitive Bias Modification for Interpretative Biases in Social Anxiety

Utility of CBT/REBT for Social Anxiety

Happiness and Well-Being

Social Comparison and Well-Being

Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy

The Search for Meaning in Life and Well-Being

The Pursuit of Happiness

The Art of Happiness

Individual Differences in Subjective Happiness

Chapter 3 – Method

Purpose of the Study

Design

Confidentiality

Statistical Analysis

Chapter 4 – Summary of Data Analysis

Chapter 5 – Conclusion and Recommendations

Criticisms of the Study

Future Research

References

APPENDIX A – Positive Psychology Questionnaires

Subjective Happiness Scale (SHS)

Personal Growth Initiative Scale (PGIS)

Meaning in Life Questionnaire (MLQ)

Meaning in Life (Presence) Questionnaire

Satisfaction with Life Scale

Gratitude Questionnaire

APPENDIX B – Informed Consent For Participants

Description of the Study

Purpose of the Study

Possible Risks

Possible Benefits

Confidentiality

Opportunities to Ask Questions

Opportunities to Withdraw at Will

Opportunities to be Informed of Results

APPENDIX C – Myers-Briggs Assessment

APPENDIX D – Presentation on CBT/REBT

APPENDIX E – Collected data

APPENDIX F – Statistical Data Analysis

Analysis of Percentages Comparing the Abbreviated MBTI with the Full MBTI Assessment for ‘All’, ‘Female’, and ‘Male’ categories

ANOVA test on normalized data differences to establish differential effects from CBT concept exposure for the ‘All subjects’ category

ANOVA test on normalized data differences to establish differential effects from CBT concept exposure for the ‘Females’ category

ANOVA test on normalized data differences to establish differential effects from CBT concept exposure for the ‘Males’ category.

Tests for homoscedasticity, data normality and differential effects from CBT concept exposure for each of the 16 MBTI categories for ‘All subjects’, ‘Females’, and ‘Males’

Investigation of the influence of the strength of an individual MBTI category (>75% or <25%) on the effects of CBT concept exposure for the ‘All subjects’ category